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This thesis traces the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language from the TLP to his 
later writings. The question that looms in the background of my discussions is whether language 
owes allegiance to extra-linguistic features or whether we can explain language solely in terms of 
eomentional linguistic practices. The dilemma seems to offer two equally untenable options. I 
explore how the realist explanation makes an empty offer and how the conventionalist alternative 
seems to undermine the objectivity of language which realism seems to preserve. I conclude that W 
offers an account that satisfies the requirement for objectivity in language without committing the 
t11tal error of realism. In chapter one I examine his account of language in the TLP, an account that I 
claim has strong realist overtones. In chapter two I explore the implications of this account for thc 
status of philosophical propositions and philosophical method. Chapter three is the first of three 
chapters that examine his later view of meaning. I explore his account of language in the PI by 
examining his discussions of following a rule, the cluster of arguments that make up his celebrated 
Private Language Argument and his new account of necessity and show how his TLP account of 
language IS gradually dismantled and replaced with a very different outlook on language. [n the last 
chapter I explore the new philosophical method that he advocates, and link this new method to his 












Thc lLP saw language as a sophisticated calculus that pays homage to the atemporal logical form 
of the: \\orld. The form of the \vorld has at its nodal points simple objects; once we attach names to 
objects the calculus takes over, as it were, and governs how the names can be used. The first 
ob\ious problem \vith such an account is that it puts language on a static basis and so does not 
accommodate the plasticity of language. Often times the way we use words change gradually over 
time ne\\' rules evolve, concepts expand. Any account which makes language owe allegiance to a 
static atemporal independent reality - whether the TLP's logical form, platonic universals or the 
Russellian-type most-general features of the world will not be able to explain this dynamism of 
language. The most crippl111g problem with this account, however, is that it appeals to items that are 
not independently identifiable. We cannot identify Wittgenstein's 'logical form' or the platonist's 
uni\t~rsals independently of our existing vocabulary. Such realist theories are bogus; they take the 
form of an explanation in that they posit one phenomenon to explain another, but it turns out that 
wc have no independent access to the expfanans. All realism offers is an empty shell of an 
c.\.planation - the requisite ingredients are absent. It is attractive because it seems to promise an 
c.\.pl anation that preserves the objectivity of the rules of language, but it fails not because the 
(,.\.planation is wrong. but because the explanation is empty. But even if we could have access to 
such language-independent realities, how would they guide us? We have to grasp them in some 
way. In the PI Wittgenstein considers various candidates as the mental counter-part of the language-
independent reality - a mental image, a formula, a definition. He concludes that any mental counter-
part cannot take us from language to the world. Any image or fonnula can always be applied in 
morc than one way and so meaning will be indeterminate. The moral of the story is that a realist 
tllt.'ory of language cannot explain the interface between language and the world. The breakthrough 
in \\"ittgenstein's later \vork is that he realises he is looking for answers in the wrong direction. 
Rathcr than looking outwards towards something recondite, he discovered that the answers lie 
closer to home. Gi\'en the failure of realism the only other place to look for answers is our actual 
linguistic practices. When the focus \vas changed, the nature of the explanation changed -
c.\plaining language in terms of how language is actually applied does not yield a metaphysical 
(,.\.planation but a scientific one. Linguistic practices are explained in ten11S of facts that gave rise to 
them - our human natures. our environment, the need for communication, and so on. \Ve gain slLch 
c.\.planatory information by observing the way our practices have developed, hence Wittgenstein's 











in the later work. By examining language in terms of the application of words the problem of the 
proliferation of meaning is eliminated. Application takes us across the bridge from language to the 
world where an image or formula left us with a vista of empty pathways. The characteristic feature 
of the later conventionalism is that its appeal to actual application still preserves the objectivity of 
language. If an activity is to cOllnt as speaking a language there has to be criteria in virtue of which 
our application of words can be said to be correct. These criteria must be independent of what \ve 
\\OU I c! do and should tell us what we should do. The appeal of realism is thus not hard to appreciate: 
realism offers us criteria that are allegedly independent of what we would do and so offers an 
objective explanation of language. A conventionalist account of language seems to undermine the 
requi rement of objectivity: on the conventionalist account what we happen to do (our conventional 
practices) determine what we should do. Wittgenstein articulates his linguistic conventionalism by 
means of the notion of an incompletely specifiable technique that develops in the context of various 
natural and environmental factors and so does not develop capriciously. Speaking a language 
involves mastery of this technique and we judge whether someone has used a word correctly by 
judging whether he has applied the technique in the way we do. 
\Vittgenstein's explanation of logic in the TLP is minimally realist. While full-blown realism 
requires further truths .~ that there are universals, for example the minimalist realism in the TLP 
only requires that names have objects as their meaning and propositions have sense. This 
relationship between language and the world is not one of correspondence, but one where logic 
sho\\s the logical scaffolding of the world. When the doctrine of showing in the particular form it 
took in the TLP was abandoned, the residual strings that bound logic to the world were Cllt loose 
completely and logic emerged entirely autonomolls. Here again, as in his later account of meaning, 
logic does not lose its objectivity. Its objectivity is secured by an explanation of a very different 
kind to the traditional metaphysical fare of his predecessors (including the author of the TLP). Here 
too he offers an empirical account to explain the existence of logical (analytic) propositions and 
logical inferences (proof in logic and proof using logic). 
\\'ittgenstein believed that all philosophical problems are the result of misunderstanding the logic of 
our language. His task therefore is not to take these problems on face-value and attempt to answer 
them. but to show that they constitute misuses of language and in this way dissolve them. He tbus 
needed an account of language that draws the line between propositions that are genuine uses of 











prO\ide us with a theory of meaning. The theory yielded the 'general form of a proposition' ~ a 
fixl11 that all diverse propositions must, on analysis, bear. He had always maintained that 
philosophy should not attempt a theory of meaning, but had presented a theory anyway in the TIP. 
Latcr he declared that all \ve can do is describe the actual uses of language. These descriptions make 
a contribution to philosophy in that (i) they reveal all the interconnections between different uses of 
languagc that arc not immediately discernable from everyday use and so can help us see what is a 
legitimate lise of language and what is not, and (ii) they are developed against the background, and 
for the puq)ose of, dissolving philosophical problems. Whereas in the TIP the boundary of sense 
was draml by means of a theory of language; in the PI the boundary is not drawn, but discovered -
Wittgenstein indicates that there is value in attempting to cross the limit, so as to feel where the 
limit This way we discover the limit for the different uses of language. The TIP's theory of 
meaning \vent against the de/lire practice of philosophy advocated in that book. In the PI however, 
the abundant dialectical discLissions on actual uses of language, misuses of language, and the 
consequences of such misuses exemplifies his later prescription of philosophical method. The new 
account of philosophy does not replace the earlier mistaken theories, and sees no need for any 
replacement. It knocks down 'houses of cards', as Wittgenstein's puts it, so as to clear the ground 











Chapter 1: Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language 
Backgrollnd 
In Russell's Principia Matizematica l he fails to satisfactorily explain the nature oflogical necessity and 
in his 1913 TheOl~\' 0/ KIlOldedge2 he provides what Wittgenstein believed was a mistaken account of 
sense. Wittgenstein' s theory of factual propositions is intended to address both these concerns. It 
ans\\ers the questions: (a) in virtue of what does a proposition have sense'? and (b) what explains the 
. necessary' character of logical propositions'? The short answer to the first question is: Russell 
maintained that a proposition has sense if (i) it can be analysed into simple palis which contain names 
that designate objects that we are acquainted with and (ii) someone S is acquainted both with the 
objects in the world for which the words in the proposition stand as well as the 'form' of a proposition. 
The form of a proposition is thus something depicted by the proposition and something that S is 
acquainted with in Bluch the same way as S is acquainted with the objects for which the words in the 
proposition stand. Wittgenstein maintained that a proposition has sense if (i) it can be analysed into 
simple constituents that contain indefinable names that designate internally simple objects, and (ii) it 
has a certain logical form that cali/lOt be depicted by the proposition but is 51101,1'/1 by the proposition. 
Forms are thus not logical objects. The short answer to the second question is: whereas Russell 
maintained that logical propositions describe the world at the utmost general level and that logical 
relations and logical connectives stand for logical objects, Wittgenstein believed that logical 
propositions do not describe anything at all and that there are no logical objects. Logical propositions 
C:i.press connections between different forms of sentences. These forms are not objects in the world, nor 
do they exist in another world: rather, logical forms are intemal or intrinsic to factual discourse. 
These points need amplification, I deal with (b) first. The question here is: what explains the necessary 
character of logical propositions? When we make factual claims about the world, our sentences are 
combinations of constituent factual sentences that are combined truth-functionally i.e, the constituent 
factual sentences are combined in such a way that the truth or falsehood of the combinations will 
depend on the truth or falsehood of what went into them. We can test whether the resultant proposition 
i. e. the one that is a combination of the two factual sentence components, is factual, by running through 
all their combinations of truth and falsity. There are three possible outcomes to this test. The compound 










others. However, it may come out true for all combinations, or false for all combinations. In such cases 
i.e. \\here the constituent propositions are combined in such a way that they come out either all true or 
all nlise for all possible true-false combinations of their constituent parts, the combination makes no 
nlctual claim about the world. Wittgenstein calls these kinds of sentences 'tautologies' (all true-false 
combinations are true) and 'contradictions' (all true-false combinations are false). Tautologies and 
contradictions are limiting cases: they represent the boundary of factual discourse and are not part of it. 
They reveal the connections between the forms of factual sentences. If two sentences of given forms 
are combined by a logical connective and they produce a tautology, then this shows that tautologies are 
the result of certain combinations of language. They are not, as Russell thought, descriptions of logical 
realities that lie outside language. Logical propositions for Wittgenstein are thus a by-product of the 
ordinary lise of propositions to state facts and are not descriptions of anything. 
I no\\ tllrn to (a). The question here is: in virtue of what does a proposition have sense? Wittgenstein's 
ans\\er comes via what can be described as the two linchpins of the TLP: his version of logical 
atomism and his Picture Theory. From his atomism we get: a proposition has sense if it can be 
ultimately analysed into expressions containing simple, indefinable names that designate internally 
simple objects: his Picture Theory maintains that the names in a proposition must be concatenated in a 
\\ay that mirrors the logical arrangement of the objects in the state of affairs which it depicts. 
Furthermore, the way the names are concatenated (its logical form) is something internal to the 
proposition - it is not an extra item in the proposition and it does not depict any sort of item (logical 
object) in the world. This account of the possibility of language is clearly a realist one- it posits an 
(,xtra-linguistic reality that is supposed to explain and justify the logical form language takes. 
Language enjoys certain options on the surface, but deeper down it is based on the intrinsic nature of 
objects. which is not something \ ... ·e create but is set independently over and against us. In Notebooks 
X. July [916 Wittgenstein says: The world is given to me, i.e. My will enters into the world 
completely from outside it as into something that is already there .... There are two godheads: 
the world and my independent I. 
The atomistic understanding of the structure of language is something that Wittgenstein inherited fi-om 
Russell. For both. the sense of a proposition must be understood in terms of its constituent parts the 
\vholc is the sum of its parts. However, they differed in two fundamental ways: (a) they approached 











simpkst units of analysis. Russell approached the analysis of a complex proposition by asking what it 
would be in virtue of that \ve understand or leam a proposition. His solution is that we understand a 
proposition if we are acquainted with what its constituent parts designates. On the face of it, this 
seems a reasonable criterion - how else would we then leam the meaning of a word unless we are 
acquainted with the object it designates? So analysis must end with simple constituents, but these 
constituents must pick out familiar objects in the world that we could not come to know unless we 
were acquainted \vith them. Wittgenstein approached the matter quite differently. His thesis is a 
logical one. driven by a logical requirement. This is how he saw the matter: if the sense of a 
proposition depends on the sense of its constituent parts, then the analysis can only be complete \vhen 
we have reached a point when we can analyse no further. If our analysis stops at a level where the 
analysed propositions contain terms that are not simple i.e. which can be further analysed. then the job 
is not done. We have to reach the point where we can analyse no further if we are to be true to the 
theory that the sense of a proposition is a function of the sense of its constituent parts. In TLP 2.02! 1 
he offers a regress argument. one that is supposed to explain why analysis must end with expressions 
containing completely simple terms that designate objects that are internally simple. Given his 
criterion of simplicity. these end products of analyses must be such that they are logically independent 
frol1l any other proposition on the same level. If they were not. they would not be completely simple, 
since they would either imply or exclude some other proposition. This is how he argues: 
If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would 
depend on whether another proposition was true. (TLP 2.0211) 
And then he says: 
In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false). (TLP 
2.0212) 
H is point is that if \\e stop the analysis at a level where the analysed propositions contain terms that can 
sti! I be further analysed i. e. they are complex, then the sense of the original propositions would depend 
on it being true that the complex is constituted by such-and-such simpler items (it would depend on 
\\hether another proposition \vas true). But this would drive the analyses further down, since now the 











ill/illillllil. The point is that either you drive the analyses to the point of completely simple items or you 
nlce an infinite regress in which case "we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)." So 
the sense of a proposition must ultimately be a function of indefinable simple names designating 
Internally simple objects othenvise the whole business of a proposition's meaning something would 
ne\er get otT the ground. The buck has to stop somewhere, and it only stops when it can go no further. 
Although \Vittgenstein could give no examples of these completely simple objects he believed he had 
had offered an a priori argument for their existence (TLP 3.23). 
!1O\\\?\er. both Wittgenstein and Russell believed that the mere attachment of names to objects is not 
enough to explain why a particular arrangement of names constitutes a sentence with sense. Russell's 
original explanation had been that when a subject S judges that aRb (that a stands in some relation 'R' 
to h). 51 must be acquainted with three elements a. Rand b. The trouble with this of course is that S's 
acquaintance \vith a, Rand b is not enough to explain how he succeeds in grasping aRb rather than bRa 
or for that matter \vhy aRb makes sense and RRb does not. Russell's 1913 Theory oj' Knowledge 
manllscript suggests that the extra thing that is needed by S in order to understand a proposition is 
acquaintance with the 'pure form' of the proposition. This 'pure form' is a 'logical object'; it is not 
ho\\e\er a constituent of a proposition since, he argued, if the form of the proposition was a constituent 
of the proposition 'there would have to be a new way in which it and the two other constituents are put 
together. and if we take this way as again a constituent, we find ourselves embarked on an endless 
regress.'; Russell claims that our knowledge of forms is a special kind of acquaintance, a 'logical 
experience. If his notion of a 'logical experience' is going to do any work at all, it has to be kept 
separate from his idea of 'judgment'. For in 'judgment' we 'judge' whether a proposition is true or not; 
and \\hate\er logical experience is, it has to be the kind of thing that is prior to and separate from 
judgment. As Wittgenstein says in TLP 5.552: 
The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or 
other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience. 
Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so. 











1100\cvcr. Russell equated the pure form of a proposition with what is designated by "something 
standing in a dual relationship to something else." It appears that in order to understand the pure form 
of a proposition and hence in order to understand a proposition, we then have to be acquainted with the 
complcx of "something standing in a relationship to something else." The trouble with this is that it 
makcs the sense of a proposition depend on the truth of another proposition:~ It does not separate 
'judgment' (determining whether a proposition is true or not) from 'logical experience' (determining 
\\hcther it makes sense). 
In :Vlay 1913 Wittgenstein read Russell's manuscript which contained the idea that we do not only need 
acquaintance with the objects for which the names in a proposition stand, but also acquaintance with 
logical objects. With great vchemence Wittgenstein had said that Russell's theory was all wrong that 
he had tried Russell's vie\v and knew it could not work. 5 A letter which Wittgenstein had \vritten to 
Russcll in June 1913 throws light on Wittgenstein's reference that he had tried Russell's position 
beforc: 
.... 1 can now express my objection to your theory of judgment exactly: I believe it is 
obvious that, from the proposition 'A judges that (say) a is in relation R to b " if 
correctly analysed, the propositions 'aRb.v.- aRb must follow directly without the use of 
any other premiss. This condition is not fulfilled by your theory.6 
Hcre Wittgenstein gives the impression that he has expressed this objection before, but not precisely 
enough, Pears suggests that the June 1913 entry in Notebooks refers to the main fault in Russell's 
1 <) 1 () Theory of Judgment which remained uncorrected in his 1913 theory, viz. that Russell requires our 
undcrstanding of a proposition to involve our being acquainted with the abstract form x c; y. This does 
110t soh'e, but postpones the problem: we would now need to be acquainted with another proposition of 
that form ad infinitllm. Wittgenstein's more precise criticism of Russell's position was obviously a 
better yersion of a criticism he had made earlier, not just to Russell's earlier work, but to his own: In 
Sore/woks entry 21 October 1914 he says: 
I thought that the possibility of the truth of the proposition 0a was tied up with the fact 
(3 x, 0) . 0 x. But it is impossible to see why 0 a should only be possible if there is 











suppose that there existed only the two elementary propositions "0 an and "lJ'a" and 
that "0 an were false: Why should this proposition only make sense if "lJ'a" were true?} 
\\'ittgenstein's criticism of Russell had struck a devastating blow and Russell immediately sllspended 
further \york on his project. The vehemence with which Wittgenstein treated Russell's 1913 Theory of 
Judgment can be understood given that his fundamental conviction, more fully expressed in his later 
Picture Theory, was that the sense of a proposition could never depend on the truth of another 
proposition, The key feature of his Picture Theory is that it introduces a distinction between what a 
proposition says and what cannot be said by it, but only shown, For a proposition to say something true 
(to picture or depict the \vorld truly) it has to already have a sense. That a proposition has sense is 
logically prior to whether it is true. Hence what a proposition says must be distinguished from what 
lIIakes if possible for it to say what it does. And what makes it possible to say what it does (to say 
anything at all) is that it must already posses a certain (logical) form. Whether a proposition makes 
sense is a prior and independent matter to whether it is true, The logical form of a proposition is shown 
in its structure and this must be distinguished from what it says. Wittgenstein thus draws a distinction 
bet\\een ·truth-conditions· and 'sense-conditions' by this saying/showing distinction a distinction that 
Russell's account failed to secure. For in Russell's case, the sense of a sentence depends on whether 
some other sentence is true ~ clearly putting the cart before the horse and staring straight into the face 
of all infinite regress: if whether Fa has sense is dependent on whether (3x) (3;)~x is tme, then (3x) 
( :: ~ must have a sense, and so its sense would depend on the truth of another singular proposition of 
the same torm for example Fb and that starts an infinite regress.8 The saying/showing distinction 
makes the distinction between sense and truth: the sense of a proposition cannot be said (pictured) but 
only shown by a proposition. the truth of a proposition depends on whether it pictures the world truly. 
A proposition cannot say what is part of the preconditions for its saying anything at all. Hence' logical 
form' cannot be apprehended by a "logical experience'. 
Russell"s account fails to explain how we distinguish between aRb and bRa or why aRb makes sense 
and \\hy RRb does not. Wittgenstein's account explains this without positing or requiring extra items: 
Ihe logical form of a proposition is something internal to the proposition in the same way as the shape 
of a piece in a puzzle is internal to that piece. What holds the proposition together, the glue, so to speak 











Rather. the proposition hangs together in the way the pieces of a puzzle fit together the shape of the 
indi\idual pieces determine which other pieces can fit into them. 
So 
In a state-of-affairs objects fit into one another link the links of a chain. (TLP 2.03) 
The logical form of the proposition must already be given by the form of the 
component parts. (Notebooks, 1914-16, p. 23) 
The theory Wittgenstein offered looked like this: a proposition pictures a possible situation in the 
\\orld because the elements in the proposition map onto elements in the world, and the logical 
arrangement of the elements in the proposition mirrors the logical arrangement of the elements in the 
\\orld. The elements in the \vorld (objects) have an intrinsic logical form (its 'shape') that determines 
\\hich other objects it can combine \vith, and the way in which the elements in a proposition can 
combine depends on the form of the objects that they represent. This is the bare bones ofWittgenstein's 
picture theory a theory that essentially seems to be Russell's 1913 theory without the requirement of 
logical forms as objects of acquaintance.') This difference between the two philosophers is deep. 
\Vittgenstein is not just denying that the form of a proposition is a specific kind of item; he is saying 
that it is nothing of the sort - not this or that kind of constituent item. Form is the possibility of 
structure. (TLP2.033). A parallel difference nms between their related conception of logical 
conncctives: whereas for Russell logical connectives, like logical forms, stand for a special kind of 
object. for Wittgenstein they do 110t stand for anything at all; they indicate the different ways of 
producing truth-functional combinations of the sentences that they connect. If Russell's view is a kind 
of platonic realism positing the existence of special kinds of logical items such as connectives that 
cxist in some Platonic hinterland, Wittgenstein's position could bc described as closer to the 
Aristotelian notion of 'forms' - where forms are immanent and not transcendent. as in Plato. 
Wittgcnstein's views on logic stand in sharp distinction to those of Russell in that they are entirely anti-
platonic. For Wittgenstein logical propositions do not describe anything, they represent internal 











claims about the world. However, although Wittgenstein does not adopt a full-blooded realist stance in 
his ;lccount of logic, there are realist undertones - undertones which suggest not the conventional 
realist package. but which can best be described as a kind of 'minimalist' or 'vestigial,IO realism. 
Whereas full-blown realism requires the existence of universals or general all-pervasive features of the 
\\orIeL Wittgenstein's realism only requires that names have meaning and elementary propositions have 
sense. 
The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent 
it. They have no 'SUbject-matter'. They presuppose that names have meaning and 
elementary propositions sense; and that is there connexion with the world. It is clear 
that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations 
of symbols whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character - are 
tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We have said that some things are 
arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that some things are not. In logic it is only the 
latter that express: but that means that logic is not a field in which we express what we 
wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely 
necessary signs speaks for itself. If we know the logical syntax of any sign-language, 
then we have already been given all the propositions of logic. (TLP 6.124) 
Tractatus TheOiT ofLallgllage 
The characteristic feature about the methodology of the TLP is that it does not ask whether language is 
possible but starts off by acknowledging that language is possible and then asks what conditions must 
obtain given this possibility. This is much like the way in which Kant proceeded: Kant started off by 
acknowledging that we have knowledge rather than skeptically questioning whether \ve can claim to 
ha\c any knO\dedge: what he wanted to know was what made this possible. In asking what makes 
t~lctual language possible Wittgenstein was looking for the a priori conditions for language to work 
gi\cn that language is possible, what features of language, the world and the relation between them, are 
necessary. These features, he believed, were not the result of an investigation; rather they were 











one, In TLP 6.124 he is convinced that the world must have the features that make language possible. 
And in PI 107 where he comments on his views held in the TLP he remarks: 
.. , .the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a 
requirement. 
And again in P192: 
We ask "What is language?" "What is a proposition?" And the answer to these 
questions is to be given once and for all; and independently of any future experience. 
It i~ here that the method of inquiry of the TLP on the one hand, and the PI, on the other, into the nature 
of a proposition are in sharp contrast for, as we will come to see, the PI advocates an empirical method. 
Whereas in the TLP the question is: how lIlust things be given that language is possible, the question in 
the PI is: how are things ill fi/ct. given that language is possible. The emphasis is on describing hoyv 
things in fact are. rather than attempting to deduce a priori the necessary conditions for the possibility 
of language. But more of this later. 
In the TLP the theory of propositional meaning takes the form of first presenting the necessary features 
of the \\orld, and then presenting the structure and function of language. Although Wittgenstein 
[11."1 ien:d that the structure of language reveals the structure of the world, he presents an account of the 
\\mld first. Some commentators I J have objected to this presentation: if language reveals the logical 
characteristics of the world, then the story should be told in that order the exposition of language first 
and then the exposition of the world. Consequently, in their exegesis of the TLP. these commentators 
start off by first examining those statements in the TLP which deal with language and then follow with 
an exegesis of the account of the world. Other commentators have thought it important to stick to the 
orckr in thc TLP. Fogelinl2. for instance, sees the method in the TLP as natural. It begins with the claim 
that the \\orld is all that there is (the totality of facts) and then goes on to examine an important subset 
of this totality i.e. those facts (the propositions of language) that are used to represent other facts (the 
world). Thus, maintains Fogelin, irrespective of how the argument may proceed. the account of 
language presupposes the account of the world. According to Fann L', although Wittgenstein's 











the former because the former (his account of the world) anticipates and is required by the theory of 
language that follows it. Although it is language that reveals the structure of the world, the latter idea 
(that the world has a fixed logical structure) is one that Wittgenstein already contemplated, in 
rudimentary form. before working out his accollnt of language. Thus we find him saying, in Notebooks 
The great problem round which everything that I write turns is: Is there an order in the 
world a priori, and if so what does it consist in? 
"orman Malcolm 15 claims that Wittgenstein's view of the logical structure of the world is one of the 
ideas that inspired his writings in the TLP: both his entry on page 53 of Notebooks, as well as a later 
entry on page 62 (,The \vorld has a fixed structure.') seems to confirm this view. It seems then that 
although language reveals the structure of the \vorld, the idea of the world having a fixed structure may 
ha\l..' preceded his claims about language. 
I look at his account of the world first. The world, according to the TLP, is the totality of facts in 
logical space. A fact is the existence of a state of affairs. A state of affairs is a configuration of objects. 
An object is a simple substance. Every object. to be an object, mllst be able to enter into combinations 
\\ith other objects. The possibility that each object has of combining with other objects is called its 
. space'. The totality of such space is called 'logical space.' Since objects always occur in combination 
\\ith other objects, the basic constituents of the factual world are elementary facts. The world then 
consists ultimately of the totality of elementary facts. The totality of logical space is also referred to as 
the 'form of the world', ('The fixed form of the world consists of objects.' (TLP 2.023) Although the 
actual combinations may change, the possible combinations never do. The form of the world is the 
form of any possible or conceivable world. 
It is obvious that a conceivable world, however different it may be from the real one, 
must have something - a form - in common with it. (TLP 2.022) 
Objects form the substratum of both the actual and the possible world. The form of the world is a 











Wittgenstein's account of language took the form of examining the structure of language and the 
fUllClioil of language. The story goes that if we can use language to talk about the world, then some 
propositions must be directly connected to the world, in the sense that their truth-values are not 
determined by other propositions but by the way the world is. This led to the bifurcation of propositions 
into complex (non-elementary) propositions and elementary (basic) propositions. Complex propositions 
are related to elementary propositions in that they are tnlth-functions of elementary propositions- the 
trut!1-yalue of complex propositions depends on the truth-value of elementary propositions and the 
truth-\ulue of elementary propositions depends on the world. (An elementary proposition is true if it is 
a de~cription of the way the \vorld is if some feature of the world makes it true.) Elementary 
propositions admit of no further analyses. They consist ultimately of concatenated simple names and 
ckmcntary facts consist ultimately of concatenated simple objects. 
Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite. 
(TLP 2.021) 
The argument for logical atomism follows: 
If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on 
whether another proposition was true. 
In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false). (TLP 2.0211 
2.022) 
A I though Wittgenstein was sure a priori that there must be elementary propositions, he was unable to 
gin? examples of them since he was unable to perform, in practice, a complete analysis of complex 
propositions. 
The application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are. What belongs 
to its application, logic cannot antiCipate. (TLP 5.557) 
Here he indicates that analysis of propositions belongs to the application of logic. His investigation, by 
contrast, is a purely logical one, so the question of what elementary propositions there are has no 











proposition is 'a nexus, a concatenation of names.' (TLP 3.26) The contact point bet\veen language and 
the \\orld is at the level of names. Names refer to objects. Because a name is a primitive or simple sign 
(it is not a product of parts) it refers to simple objects (which are not products of parts). Simple objects 
arc a logical necessity. This, Wittgenstein believed, can be known a priori. Why? The meaning of a 
namc is the object it denotes. I f there were no objects names would not denote anything. Elementary 
propositions that are constituted by names would thus not be about the world. But elementary 
propositions are about the world (fact-stating discourse is possible). Therefore there must be objects. 
Although the contact point between language and the world is at the level of names and objects, when 
\\c makc statements about the world however, we use propositions. To understand how meaningful 
discoursc is possible we thus need to understand the relation between language and the world at the 
Icwl of propositions. In TIP 3.3 Wittgenstein says: 
Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have 
meaning. 
I "mcyer. he also says that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. In the context of TLP 3.3 
thc picture seems to be that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes, but it only so denotes if 
\\!1en it occurs in a proposition. it is combined with other names in a way that reflects 'the possibilities 
of combinations of their objects'. This correlates with how objects occur i.e. objects only occur in some 
or other combination with other objects. So for a sign to be a name it must occur in the nexus of a 
proposition: for something to be an object it must occur in the nexus of a state of affairs. 
Thc account of the function of language is supplied by his Picture Theory. He introduces his 
comparison between a proposition and a picture in TLP 2.1. 
2.1 We picture facts to ourselves. 
2.11 A picture represents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence 
of a state-of-affairs. 
2.12 A picture is a model of reality. 
2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them. 











2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a 
determinate way. 
2.141 A picture is a fact. 
2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate 
way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. 
L i 11(" 2.12 tells us in a very general sense what Wittgenstein means by a picture: it is a model of reality. 
Lines 2.13 2.14 tell us more specifically what being a picture or a model consists in: 
(i) The elements of a picture must correspond to objects (in the world). 
(ii) Elements and objects must correspond in the sense that elements represent or stand for 
objects. 
(iii)The elements must be related to one another in a determinate way. 
(iv)The way the elements are arranged in a picture mllst mirror a possible ammgement of 
things in the world. 
So something counts as a picture because its elements are arranged in a determinate way and this 
arrangement depicts the arrangement of objects in a state of affairs. In the case of ordinary pictures this 
account seems clear enough. The representation works because the spatial arrangement of the elements 
in the picture mirrors the spatial arrangement of the objects in a state of affairs. A proposition clearly 
cannot model reality in the same way. A picture depicts spatial arrangement: a proposition does not. As 
\\'ittgenstein continues to explicate the picture theory it turns out that (i) spatial arrangement is 
inessential in the relation between pictures and the world and (ii) what a picture essentially depicts is 
something logical - the logical as opposed to the spatial arrangement of objects. 
2.182 Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, not every 
picture is, for example, a spatial one.) 
2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same 
way as the elements of a picture. 










We ha\e come across the notion of logical form in the earlier discllssion of objects. There we saw that 
if an object can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of that combination mllst be written into the 
thing itself. These possibilities (its combinatorial potential) constitute its logical form. When a name is 
(nrrelated with an object it 'picks up' its logical form. Hence the way the name can occur in a sentence 
i" gO\erned by the wayan object combines with other objects. 
Der Name vertritt im Satz den gegenstand. (TLP 3.22) 
Thc \crb of I'crlrill. 'l'CrlrClcll'. is translated as: ', ... a name is the representative of an object.' in the 
Pear" and McGuiness translation Ill, as 'to deputize for' by Malcolm I and in Anscombe 's 18 translation 
proxy for'. So. if someone deputizes, acts as a representative of. or goes proxy for, someone else, 
then the deputy takes on the powers of whoever he is standing in for. In an elementary proposition a 
name takes the place of an object. As deputy, the combinatorial powers of the object are taken on by 
the name. Thus the logical relations between objects and between names are isomorphic. For example. 
a book can enter into a number of different relations with other objects it can be 'on top of. 
. between'. 'heavier than' and so on. However, it cannot be the colour of something, nor can we say that 
it is 'between Its 0\\'11 pages'. These combinations are not included within the logical space of the 
object. The word 'book' admits of the same combinatorial possibilities that the object does, so 'book' 
call not be used as a colour predicate, nor can you say something like 'the book is in between its own 
pages.' It is important to note that for W, the logical form of a proposition is oftentimes not discernable 
from the written or spoken sentence. The written or spoken sentence displays its 'grammatical form', 
and as Wittgenstein emphasizes, grammatical form is often misleading as to logical form. Consider the 
(\\0 expressions 'the rose is red' and 'the morning star is the evening star'. Both have the same 
grammatical form. They are both of the form 'x is y'. However, they do not share the same logical 
form. In the first expression' is' is used to predicate something of a rose. in the second it is used as a 
sign of identity. Thus the homonymy is deceptive. Logical structure, according to the TLP, lies beneath 
the sllrt~lce structure and can only be excavated by logical analysis. 
The central problem with this theory is that it is attractive but empty. It is attractive because it seems to 
offer an almost intuitive familiar kind of explanation, one modeled on the kind of causal explanation in 
sCIence. In a scientific explanation one phenomenon is explained in terms of another phenomenon that 











explanation of the structure of language, the explallCllIs (in this case the world) cannot be identified 
independently of the explanadlllll (language). The trouble with saying that a name can behave in a 
particular way only because the object which it designates behaves in that palticular way is that the 
behaviour of the object cannot be described independently of our existing vocabulary. Another way of 
appreciating the flaw in realism is to consider the realist's solution to the problem of the application of 
general words to things. \Vittgenstein concentrated on singular terms in the TLP because he regarded 
all \\ords as names. As a result he neglected the highly problematic area of how we determine the 
extension of a general word. In the PI however, the application of general words to things take center-
stage. In the case of the application of general words to things the realist posits an independently 
ex i~ting universal to explain what it is in virtue of that a general word has the particular extension it 
docs. For example, the realist will say that we ought to call some object blue because it is in tact blue. 
TIll' trouble vvith this explanation is that we cannot identify the colour of the flO\ver independently of 
l111r colour-vocabulary, or our practice of calling certain objects blue. Compare this with a genuine 
scientific explanation. For example, in the explanation of high tide in terms of the gravitational force of 
the 11100n. the gravitational force of the moon can be identified independently of the tide. The realist's 
explanation mimics a scientific one, but it is nothing more than the empty shell of an explanation. 
I t might be objected that the requirement that the meanmg of an expreSSIOn be something that is 
illlkpendently identifiable is unreasonable, since, if we were to take it seriously, dictionaries would be 
llf no help. Typically. dictionaries provide us with expressions which explain the meanings of words 
such that \\"e are able to. to put it in lay terms, understand what phenomenon or situation in the world 
the expression being explained picks out or represents. However. dictionaries only leave us with more 
\\"lmis: the words used in a definition are themselves open to various ways of understanding, and so 
must also be explained. Notice how dictionaries, in an effort to overcome the ambiguities or 
1l11sllllderstandings in language sometimes supplement a definition with a picture or a drawing. Notice 
also that sometimes when we are asked to explain the meaning of a word and we find that whatever 
explanation we give, there are misunderstandings in what 'we mean', or more and more clarification is 
cal led foc we have a tendency to give up explaining and in exasperation point at. or demonstrate (act 
out I what we mean. 
In lhe history of philosophy realism has enjoyed a persistent presence and it makes one wonder why its 











pretty ob\'ious once pointed out. has 110t ruined its appeal. One way of attempting to answer this is to 
:-;ee \\hat is lost once realism is called into question. In the case of a theory of language realism explains 
\\hat gi\'es our sentences their senses by positing what appears to be another ( extra-linguistic) reality. 
Thi:-; seems satisfying because it seems to provide foundations or justification for the structure of 
language - foundations in the absence of which our language would appear arbitrary, Something must 
gmern \\hat counts as sense - it can't simply be a matter of caprice. When the putative support 
structure that realism provides is removed. we feel vertiginous, and this seems to explain why people 
ha\l~ returned to realism over and over again in different ways. It gives us the support we need and \ve 
think \\e are getting. 
Cijn?ll that once pointed out the central tlaw in realism is so obvious, one wonders whether 
\\'illgenstein was not aware of it at all? We could perhaps answer by looking at the role his notorious 
notion of 'showing' plays in the TLP. According to this doctrine, the relationship between a name and 
the object \vhich is its referent and the relationship between a proposition and the state-of-affairs it 
depicts. is one that cannot be stated or captured by a proposition, but is shown. Although you cannot 
stare that an object is the meaning of a name, that the meaning of a name is the object it picks out is 
shO\m by its attachment to that object. and: 
',.l,. proposition shoH's its sense, 
,.'\,. proposition shOll'S how things stand if it is true. 
,\nd it sal'S lliat they do so stand.' 
It j:; unclear whether Wittgenstein realised that the realist answer to the relation between words and the 
\\orld is inadequate and offered his Doctrine of Showing instead. There is at any rate no textual 
e\idence to suggest this. What IS clear though is that the Doctrine of Showing masked the real problem 
in the realist account of the interface between language and the world. With the question of the 
relationship between language and the world neatly tucked into the 'cannot-be-said-but-only-sho\vl1' 
dr~l\\eL the problem was out of the way, so to speak. and did not rear its head for further grappling 
\\ith. It is interesting to note that Anscombe saw this Doctrine as an embarrassing feature of the TLP.Il) 
It \\as a kind of waste-paper basket, she thought. where all intractable problems were discarded. It was 











inadequacy of the realist's account of the relationship between language and the world. In Cambridge 
Lectures I he says: 
In all language there is a bridge between a sign and its application. No one can make 
this for us; we have to bridge the gap ourselves. No explanation ever saves the jump, 
because any further explanation will itself need a jump. 20 
III the later work Wittgenstein develops the idea that we come to understand the meaning of a word by 
understanding how it is applied. and that understanding how it is applied is a matter of leaming the 
technique for the application of that word. Although the Doctrine of ShO\ving employs the idea of 
application (a name shows its meaning by its application to the object named) it failed to do good work 
in the TLP because it \vas intimately bound up with logical atomism which explained the relation 
bet\\een language and the world at the level of indefinable names and simple objects. In the later work. 
\\hen logical atomism was abandoned, the idea of showing, when applied to the application of general 
\\ords to things. bore fruit. 
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Chnpter 2: Account of Philosophy in the Trnctatus 
111 the TLP Wittgenstein addresses both the status of philosophical propositions and the nature of 
phi losophical method. He prescribes what he believes to be the only correct method of philosophizing. 
Ho\\\?\·er. there is a discrepancy between what he preaches and \vhat he actually practices in the TLP. 
As tlll' as the practice goes. it conforms to the method of doing philosophy that he advocated in the 
'Preliminary' of Noles Oil Logic of 1913. There he prescribed that the way to do philosophy is to 
il1\estigate the logical form of propositions. By the time he \\Tote the TLP he had corne to believe that 
logical form cannot be described and hence cannot be the subject of investigation. The picture of 
philosophy in Noles 011 Logic is that: (i) philosophy is wholly descriptive; it does not consist of a priori 
deductions. (ii) philosophy is above or below, but not besides the natural sciences. Unlike the sciences, 
philosophy does not give us descriptions of reality and for this reason can neither eonfirm nor confute 
scientific propositions. (iii) the subject matter of philosophy is the logical form of empirical 
propositions. In this respect Wittgenstein and Russell was in agreement since Russell also maintained 
that philosophy is the study of logical forms; Wittgenstein however differed from Russell in that he did 
not belie\e that logical forms could be named. Russell believed that our knowledge of forms is a 
spec ial kind of 'logical experience', and that a proposition can therefore depict logical form. He thus 
treats logical form as if it is another kind of object in the world, which can be spoken about by 
propositions. Wittgenstein disagrees sharply \vith this. In TLP 4.121 he says: 
And: 
Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. 
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. 
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. 
Propositions show the logical form of reality. 
They display it (see also 4.124-4.1241) 
The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logiC is not that something or 
other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience. 










It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What?' (TLP 5.552) 
Furthermore, Russell believed that the correct philosophical method was one that took the sciences as 
their example in producing knowledge that approximates to the truth. For Wittgenstein however, since 
philosophy is a description of logical form, and since logical form is part of the pre-conditions of sense, 
any knowledge about logical form cannot constitute an approximate truth. Philosophy is thus 
categorically different to the sciences. It is sui generis. By the time Wittgenstein wrote the TLP he 
rl'jeetcd the de jure practice of philosophy that he formerly shared with Russell. He now no longer 
belic\cd that philosophy should be the description of logical form since he now believed that logical 
form is indescribable. Since the task of philosophy cannot be to describe logical form, philosophy 
cannot yield any theses or doctrines - not of logical form nor of anything else. Wittgenstein came to 
belic\c that the singularity of philosophy did not have to do with having a unique subject matter; rather. 
its uniqueness had to do with its methodology or the practice of philosophy. 
Philosophy does not give us any truths, rather: 
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists primarily of elucidations. 
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification 
of propositions. 
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make 
them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. 
Philosophy settles controversies about the limits of natural science. 
It must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thougilt. 
It must set limits to what can be thought by working outwards through what can be 
thought. 
It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said. (TLP 4.112 
-4.115) 
\\'ittgenstein's new conception of what can legitimately be achieved by philosophy is embedded in a 
particular metaphysical preconception about language viz. that there is a gulf bet\veen the surface 











one cannot read off the logical form hom the surface structure - logical form can only be accessed by 
logical excavation. Philosophical questions and conundrums are casualties of this feature of language. 
They are questions that are really the product and manifestation of linguistic confusion. They are thus 
/J.\(:'u£!o-questions. As sLLch we should not take them at face value and attempt to answer them but rather 
attempt to expose them for what they are. The way to do this, Wittgenstein proposed, was to unearth 
their real logical structure by logical analysis. He believed that language has a common logical 
strllcture. All legitimate sentences bear the form: 'this is how things stand.' (TLP 4.5) They all that 
things stand thus and so. All propositions arc thus descriptive. (See TLP 2.020 I, 2.225) When 
philosophical propositions are subjected to logical analysis, the end product does not bear this form. 
The correct philosophical task then is to establish or lay bare the real logical structure of language and. 
armed \vith this criterion of legitimate propositional structure, expose philosophical problems as 
misllses of language. In the pret~lce to the TLP Wittgenstein says that 'the subject-matter of the book is 
the problems of philosophy' and that the aim of the book is to show that the reason why these problems 
arc posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The corollalY of this is that once the logic 
of our language is understood we will cease to pose such questions since they are not genuine questions 
but the products of illusion. In order to understand the real logical form of language and prevent 
ourscl\Cs from making such linguistic errors we need, according to W, an adequate sign language or 
conceptual notation that conforms perspicuously to the logical syntax. Wittgenstein was of course not 
adnK<lting. as Russell mistakenly believed, the conditions for a logically perfect language. Ordinary 
language, according to W, is in perfect logical order: the purpose of an adequate sign language is 
simply to rnake perspIcuous the real logical structure of our language. His intention was to present the 
logil.:o-metaphysical conditions for any possible language. 
III order to understand the sense in which philosophical propositions are manifestations of grammatical 
mi:;takes we need to look at his distinction between 'senseless' and 'nonsensical', According to the 
TLP logical propositions are 'senseless'. They are senseless because they 'say' nothing. The notion of 
'saying' is bound up with the notion of 'sense'. A proposition \vith sense picks out a logical possibility 
or picks Ollt an area in logical space. What the proposition says, its sense, is the particular division it 
makes in logical space. Tautologies and contradictions make no such division. 'A tautology leaves 
open to reality the whole of logical space: a contradiction fills the whole ... of logical space leaving no 
point of it tor reality. Thus neither of them ean determine reality in any way' (TLP 4.463) Tautologies 











lack sense, they are not to be regarded as nonsensical since their signs are combined legitimately. We 
can set up truth tables for them. They are well-formed. Philosophical propositions on the other hand 
also lack sense and are therefore non-representational, but they fail to represent for a different reason 
their sign-combinations are illicit. They fail to fix an area in logical space because no object-
combination maps onto their particular sign- combination. [n short, their sign-combination contravenes 
logical syntax. 
Though the point is a more general one, the idea that philosophical propositions transgress the limits 
ol'language (contravene the rules of logical syntax) is best explained in connection with the discussion 
in the -t.12's in the TLP on formal concepts. According to Wittgenstein, formal concepts such as 
·object'. 'number', 'fact' (ontological categories), and 'name', 'proposition' (logico-linguistic 
categories) in their ordinary language use, function as variables. For example. \ve say: 'There are t\vo 
objects which .... ·. which. in logical notation is expressed as '3 x .3 y .... '. Such words function as 
\ariables oyer which properties can be predicated. However, in philosophical propositions we attempt 
to use such words as predicates. Typically, they get used as 'proper-concept words'. For example, we 
say: 'x is an object' or 'seven is a number'. Here 'object' and 'number' are used as predicates. And 
\\hel1\~Yer such words are used as proper-concept words (and thus as predicates) ' ... nonsensical 
pseudo-propositions are the result.' (TLP 4.1272). So, although one can say 'there are books', one 
cannot say 'there are objects'. 
The same applies to the words 'complex', 'fact', 'function', 'number', etc. 
They all signify formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual notation by 
variables, not by functions or classes (as Frege and Russell believed). 
'1 is a number', 'There is only one zero', and all similar expressions are nonsensical. 
(It is just as nonsensical to say, '2 + 2 at 3 0' clock equals 4'.) (TLP 4.1272) 
According to Wittgenstein. when words such as 'object' and 'number' are used as predicates, they can 
be gi\'en neither sense, nor Bedeutllng (reference).l A word or name only has a meaning (referent) in 
the context of a proposition (lIP 3.3), so, if an expression does not qualify as a genuine proposition its 











n(J 3.3 J claims that a symbol (a sign together with its sense) contributes to\vard the sense of a 
proposition (makes a semantic contribution). Thus, if an expression is used as a symbol- that is, if it is 
llsed to make a contribution towards sense but fails to, it is not a genuine symbol and henee any 
sentence that contains it is not a genuine proposition. Take the expression 'seven is a number'. Anyone 
capable of understanding this expression must already know the various uses (combinatory 
possibilities) of the word ·seven'. They must already understand that seven is a number word (and not a 
colour word. say). Thus to say of seven that it is a number is to make no semantic contribution to the 
sentence which has not already been made by the word 'seven' alone. 'Seven is a number' does not say 
anything. Rather. it stipulates a rule for the use of the word 'seven', or rather, it gives the rule tor the 
combinatory possibilities of 'seven' (that it is to be combined as a number-word and not, say, as a 
colour-word). fn the dictum of Wittgenstein's later work, 'seven is a number' is an act of naming, and 
::;incc '[n]aming is so far not a move in the language game.' (PI 49), one is thus not saying or 
communicating anything. 'Se\'en is a number' is more like stage-setting: it provides one with names so 
that communication can take place by using them. It's like setting up the chessboard and indicating 
\\hat is what on the board - that this piece is to act as king and another as queen, etc. Setting up the 
board like this is not yet playing the game - setting LIp the board like this does not yet count as a move 
in the game. Like\vise, naming is only setting up the stage in order for a game to be played, hence 
naming is not yet a move in the language game. Now, failure to make a semantic contribution to the 
semantic content of a sentence renders such a term, as well as the proposition in which it occurs. 
meaningless. All philosophical propositions which employ such formal concepts propositions such as 
':;e\en is a number', ·John is an object', 'being red is a concept' - suffer the same defect. The point 
here is that an expression such as ·seven is a number' is not a representational proposition, because 'is 
a number' is already, in a sense, contained in 'seven'. (If you understand 'seven', you already 
understand that it is a number.) No semantic contribution has been made in the sense that nothing more 
is added by 'is a number'. 
This defect. howeveL is a consequence of a more general objection: J11 'seven is a number', 'is a 
number' has no meaning because we have failed to give a meaning to a number'. To understand this 
ppint \\e need to refer to TLP 5.4733. Wittgenstein lIses the example 'Socrates is identical' and says 
that this sentence says nothing because \ve have failed to give 'identical' any adjectival meaning. If a 
proposition has no sense. that can only be because we have failed to give a meaning to some of the 











idea that the sense of a proposition is a function of the meanings of its constituent expressions. ('Like 
Frege and Russell, I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it.' 
3.31 X). The 'compositionalism' argument goes like this: the meaning of a name is determined by the 
object it stands for. Objects possess logical form. The logical form of objects is their possibility of 
entering into certain combinations with other objects. Objects, and accordingly, their names, fall into 
different logical categories: 'seven' can only be combined as in, for example 'give me more than seven 
apples'. but not as in 'seven is too bright'. The combinatory possibilities of 'seven' exclude the latter 
combination. When names are combined according to the combinatory possibilities of the objects for 
\\hich they stand. such a combination depicts a possible state-of-affairs. If they are not, the expression 
t~lils to depict a possible state-of-affairs. The reason it fails is that the constituent names have 
incompatible meanings (the objects for which they stand do not eombine in that way). We have, in this 
case. mixed up categories and committed what in Rylean terms would be called a 'category mistake'~ . 
In 'Socrates is identical'. 'identical' functions as an adjective but the combinatory possibilities of 
'identical' preclude such a function. The same point was made earlier ex is an object', 'seven is a 
llumber'). and it \vas emphasized that such a 'category mistake' amounts to transgressing the limits of 
sense to talk unintelligibly. 
To SLlm up, the problem with philosophical propositions is that their sign-combinations are illicit They 
arc instances of a 'category mistake'. More specifically, these propositions say nothing because we 
h;:l\e t~liled to give a meaning to some of the expressions in them. The particular sense in which we 
ha\e failed to give a meaning to some of the expressions is by employing formal concepts as genuine 
concepts. The result of this is that sllch expressions (formal concepts) fail to make a semantic 
contribution to the sentence, and thus the sentence as a whole lacks sense. However, that seven is a 
number or that x is an object is shown in our use of propositions containing these words, for example 
·there are seven more children' or 'this object is heavier than that object'. So the trouble with 
philosophical propositions is that they attempt to say (express as factual) what can only be shown in the 
actual use of language . 
. \t the end of the TLP Witw:enstein SeWS: '-' .; 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands 











to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throwaway the ladder after he has 
climbed up it.) (TLP 6.54) 
Here he is declaring that the theory of propositional meaning articulated in the TLP is self-destructive: 
gi\t~n his account of meaning the essential character of (the relationship between) language and the 
\\orld is impossible to express. These essential features can only show themselves or make themselves 
manifest. So the propositions of the TLP articulate a theory of meaning that has as its consequence the 
thesis that the nature of propositional representation cannot be factually discussed. The result of this 
project is that the \ery propositions used in the project are nonsensical. However, if these propositions 
are nonsensical because they are failed attempts at saying something, they are, as the TLP indicates, not 
t~lctlla1. What kind of discourse are they then'? TLP 6.54 says that they are elucidations. We know so t~1l" 
that. according to the theses of the TLP, what can be shown cannot be said. The main occupants of this 
category are the essential features of (the relationship between) language and the world, and what the 
TLP refers to as the mystical - religion, aesthetic appreciation, and morality. The 'elucidatory' 
propositions of the TLP seem to be another kind of showing. They are not like the propositions of logic 
\\hich show the formal features of language. they are not like ordinary factual propositions that show 
the structure and limits oflanguage, they are not like music or poetry that show the 'mystical'. Perhaps 
they show in the sense that they commit a wrong (cross the limits of language). to get you to a point 
\\here you can look back and see that what you have done was wrong. 
\Iore recently a novel approach to the interpretation of the TLP has been developed, one that maintains 
that just as in the case of the PI. the TLP does not subscribe to or advance any metaphysical theses or 
doctrines. This approach. now commonly referred to as the 'New Wittgenstein' approach, is 
, 4 
spearheaded by Cora Diamond-'. and strongly supported by, amongst others, James Conant and Warren 
Goldt~lrb'. They maintain that apart from the preface and the closing remarks of the TLP, the rest of the 
tnt is to be regarded as plain nonsense. Furthermore, when Wittgenstein says these nonsensical 
propositions must, in the end be discarded, we must, they advocate, discard them lock, stock and barrel. 
To maintain that the propositions of the TLP show something that cannot be expressed in words is to 
take on board a thesis that should have been discarded when the propositions of the TLP were 
discarded, The \'alue of the TLP. they maintain, does not lie in what Wittgenstein is saying, but in what 
he is doing by having written the TLP, Wittgenstein's writing of the TLP. Diamond maintains, was 











It \\as a demonstration of SOlis. The only way to understand the lIP, she claims, is to read it in the 
I ight of the preface and the closing passages, viz. in the preface Wittgenstein maintains that most of the 
propositions of philosophy are nonsensical and that the book intends to draw the limits of language 
th1111 the inside, as it were. In the closing passages he maintains that the propositions of the TLP 
perform a function - they get you to a point where you can see that ce11ain kinds of discourse are 
illegitimate including the very propositions making the point, but then they must be thrown away 
simply because they are illegitimate. And when we throw them away, we must not still hold on to 
something maintained by them. One cannot both throw them away. and at the same time salvage some 
l\~marks that one uses as commentary on the TLP. According to Conant the Preface and the concluding 
sections of the Tractatus form the Faille of the text. It is there that Wittgenstein provides us with 
instructions for how to read what we find in the bo(~r of the text. ,6. They (Diamond and Conant) claim 
that the passages of the TLP must be wrestled with or 'worked through' one has to struggle to make 
sense of them - but the final value of these passages is not that they impart some understanding, direct 
or indirect but that the reader (should) experience them as 'crumbling in upon themselves.' 7 This is all 
we are supposed to take away from the reading of the TLP. We wrestle with the passages because as 
Proops succinctly puts it - they possess enough 'psychological suggestiveness of sense's, however, 
because we experience them as 'crumbling in upon themselves', their exclusive value lies in their 
ability to relieve philosophical perplexity and to help us arrive at a kind of self-understanding. In the 
\\ords of Conant: 'The only insight that Tractarian elucidation imparts, in the end, is one about the 
reader himself: that he is prone to [certain pm1icular] illusions of thought.'') 
The implication of this view is that both the TLP and the PI are continuous in both task and method: in 
the case of both books the task is to draw the limits of language and the method involves an absence of 
theses or doctrines. Because this view maintains that the TLP contains no substantive philosophical 
theses and doctrines .. they claim that there is nothing for Wittgenstein to have repudiated in his later 
\\ork. They are thus skeptical of the 'standard' view that the later Wittgenstein came to regard a 
number of the central positions he held earlier as seriously mistaken. It is important to see that they are 
skeptical of the standard view not because they have argued or shown that his later views are not 
related (by \\ay of continuity or criticism) to his earlier views, but because it is a necessary implication 
of their reading of the TLP. The framing remarks of the TLP (the Preface and the closing passages). 
according to this vie\\ .. contains 'instructions' for reading the body of the book. The scope of the frame 










the frame (the Preface and the closing passages); Conant however, has shifted from initially holding 
that all of the TLP should be discarded as nonsense (Conant, 1989), to a view that he shared with 
Diamond. and then in rather ad hoc fashion, widens the scope of the frame to include TLP 4.112.10 
More recently, Conant has remarked that many of the sections to which he had earlier on devoted a lot 
of attention (Conant 2000). for example, the Preface. sections 3.32-3.326, 4-4.003, 4.111-4.12,6.53-
Cd-L belong to the frame of the work and are only able to impart their instructions concerning the aim 
and method of the work if they are recognized as sinllvoll. Furthermore. 'The Tractatus teaches that 
[whether or not a string of signs is UIlS ill 11 ] depends on us: on our managing or failing to perceive 
[erkcllII el/ ] a symbol in the sign. There can be no fixed answer to the question what kind of work a 
gi\t~n remark within the text accomplishes. It will depend on the kind of sense a reader of the text will 
be (tempted to) make of it.' J I Thus he sees the distinction between what is part of the frame and wh3t is 
part of the body of the work as not simply a function of where in the text the remark is situated (in fact 
one wonders if he now maintains this at all), but as a function of how it occurs to us, the readers (i.e. it 
\\ill depend on the kind of sense a reader of the text will be tempted to make of it). It appears then that 
there is no fact of the matter about whether a particular proposition is pal1 of the frame. It all depends 
on a particular reader's psychology. It has been well-argued that something is amiss with this line of 
thought Proops presents one of the most convincing arguments against the 'New Wittgensteinians'. 
Looking at the matter the way Diamond and Conant do (that the body of the text is discardable 
nonsense) leaves unexplained Wittgenstein's wrestling with issues in the Notebooks, the end product of 
\\hich culminated in the remarks in the TLP. For example, it does not explain Wittgenstein's letter to 
Russell on August 19th 1919 where Wittgenstein is adamant that the main point of the TLP is the 
Doctrine of Showing (Letters to Russell, Keynes alld .4foore, p.7L August 19, 1919) - a position 
corroborated in 'NOles Dictated to A1oore' (See Notebooks, pp. 107-9). If the body of the TLP were 
di~cardable nonsense. why would Wittgenstein emphasize the centrality of the Doctrine of Showing in 
hIS work'! It also does not explain his later works. a lot of which are active engagements with views 
and attitudes he held in the TLP. Furthermore, there seems to be, as Proops argues, no substantive 
reason for taking the Preface and the closing remarks as framework instructions as to ho\v to read the 
TLP - as is evident from Conant's ad hoc widening of the scope of the frame. I will not go into any 
further detail about the defects of the Diamond-Conant view. That could be a thesis on its own. All I 
\\ish to do here is to indicate that it would be difficult, on that view, to thread together a consistent 











demonstration of what cannot be done philosophically, what are we to make of his philosophical 
struggles before and after the TLP'? 
\'ly discussion below continues in the spirit of what can be called the 'traditional' or 'standard' view, 
the \iew against which the New Wittgensteinians are reacting. The standard view maintains that 
Wittgenstein's concern to al1iculate the nature (and hence limits) of representational discourse is an 
implication of a more central and dominant concern. The real driving force behind his work, he says, is 
to express the distinction between 'showing' and 'saying'. His reply to Russell's preliminary questions 
about the TLP goes some way to confirm this: 
- Now I'm afraid you haven't really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole 
business of logical propositions is only a corollary. The main point is the theory of what 
can be said by propositions - i.e. by language - (and, which comes to the same thing, 
what can be thought) and what cannot be said by propositions, but only shown; which I 
believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy. I~ 
In l~lCL the distinction between \vhat can be said and what can be only be show'n pervades the TLP from 
its pret~lce to its closing admonition: 
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. (TLP 7) 
And in a letter to von Ficker we read that the TLP 
consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is 
precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere 
of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY 
rigorous way of drawing these limits .... 14 
Thus Wittgenstein's intention is to draw a distinction between what can be said and what cannot be 
said - from within the limits of factual discourse - by saying only that which can be said. Only factual 
discourse constitutes sense. What lies on the 'other side of the limit' is, as Wittgenstein says in the 











(mil admission. crossing the limits. The situation is as follows: Wittgenstein's intention is to draw the 
limit by saying only 'what can be said' - and in so doing indicate what cannot be said precisely by not 
saying it. Now such an objective could perhaps be achieved by literally saying only what can be said 
(saying only that which conforms to the rules of syntax). What one would end up with by doing so is an 
il1\entory of all sayable expressions. For example: 'the cat is on the mat', 'the cat is not on the mat'. 
'the dog is on the roof. 'the dog is not.. ... ' and so on. The entire inventory of sayable expressions 
\\ ould thus constitute 'what can be said' and the limit would hereby have been drawn from within. 
(.\n objection could be raised to the idea of an inventory: an inventory comes to an end. Only 'so many 
things' constitute an inventory whereas the list of what can be said is, by contrast, endless. In 
response. perhaps one could say that such a very long(!) inventory would constitute better obedience to 
Wittgenstein's admonitions: rather say less than what can be said than attempt to say what cannot be 
said' However. providing an inventory \vould not make the point that Wittgenstein wants to make 
that language has limits and that certain things cannot be expressed in language but is shown by 
language. Rather than giving an inventory, Wittgenstein gave the 'general form of a proposition' a 
formula, or trademark. as it were, characteristic of all genuine propositions. Rather than having a list of 
all genuine propositions. we would instead be equipped with a formula that would enable us to 
recognize those propositions that 'can be said'. He set about presenting us with this formula by 
examining the structure and function of language. And this was where the trouble began. Saying what a 
proposition (essentially) is, involves, as wc shall scc, understanding (saying or thinking) what it is not. 
111 short. saying what a proposition is involves attempting to take an 'outside' perspective a 
perspectiYe where you can 'see' (and hence say) what counts as a proposition. But this then amounts to 
crossing the limits - it is no longer a view 'from within'. And, since 'what lies on the other side is 
simply nonsense'. such an outside perspective, which is required in giving a general 'formula' of the 
proposition, constitutes nonsensical discourse. Hence Wittgenstein's description of the propositions of 
the TLP as nonsensical. They are attempts to talk about the structure of language and the relationship 
bet\\cen language and the world ~ but it is precisely this, according to the TLP, which is ineffable. 
Ho\\e\er. although the propositions of the TLP cannot be said, what they attempt to talk about the 
relationship between language and the world ~ can be shown by the propositions of logic (tautologies 
and contradictions) and by ordinary bona fide representational discourse. 











a) the logical form shared by propositions and what they depict. (The harmony between thought and 
reality is inexpressible.) 
b) the meaning (bedewlil/g) of signs and the sense (sinn) of propositions. (Semantics is inexpressible.) 
c) logical relations between propositions. (Rules of logical inference are inexpressible.) 
d) the logico-syntactic category of signs. (Formal concepts are pseudo-concepts.) 
e) the logical structure of thought and the world. (The limits of thought are inexpressible can only be 
set from within.) 
The Picture Theory of language outlined in Chapter 1 explained that factual meaning is made possible 
because propositions depict possible situations in the world. Factual propositions are thus bipolar. But 
\\by mllst a proposition satisfy this requirement why must it depict a possible situation? To say that a 
proposition is bipolar is to say that it is capable of being true and capable of being false. This contrasts 
\\ith the notion of bi\·alence. \vhich states that a proposition is either true or false. For example, the 
11roposition 'the cat is on the mat' is bipolar, since it is possible for it to be both true and false (true 
\\hen the cat is on the mat, false when the cat is not on the mat). The expression 'the world has logical 
t'l)J'Jll' IS bivalent. since it can only be true (is necessarily true). There are no circumstances under which 
it could be false. Wittgenstein's conviction is that propositions that admit of bivalence and not 
bipolarity are not genuine propositions. Why? Some historical details are pertinent here. The vie\v 
originated with Frege. \vho claimed that names and propositions have both a sense and a meaning 
(referent). where the meaning of a proposition is one of the two 'logical objects', namely, the TRUE 
and the FALSE. Wittgenstein initially followed Frege in claiming that a proposition has a meaning, that 
is. that a proposition stands for (some or other) object, just as names do. However, Wittgenstein 
maintained that the meaning of a proposition is not a logical object (its truth-value), but the fact (a state 
(11' amlirs) that corresponds to the proposition. On the bases of this - that is, that the meaning of a 
proposition is the state of affairs which corresponds to it - it turns out that the meaning of 'p' and" -p' 
are identical: the fact that 'p' picks out is the very same fact that '-p' picks out. How is this? The 
proposition "p' asserts that something is the case, namely, p. The proposition '-p' assel1s that something 
is not the case. namely, p. Thus a proposition and its negation pick out the same state of affairs, since 
the t~lct that makes it true it the very same fact that makes it false. What 'p' depicts is the self:"same 










IS to understand what it depicts in its positive and negative sense. A proposition is thus internally 
related to its negation in much the same way as 
is related to 
To understand 'p' is to understand how things would be if '-p'. (T3.144, 3.221) 
It can now be seen why, on this account, essential features cannot be represented. Consider the 
expression 'the world has logical form'. I f this is a genuine proposition, then it must pick out a state of 
affairs which. although it does in fact obtain, need not obtain (that is, it must pick out a situation the 
negation of which is possible). But this is not so in the case of the sentence in question. One cannot 
(sensibly) ncgate 'the world has logical form', since the negation does not present a conceivable or 
genuine possibility. That is. a world that lacks logical form is not a world (in the Tractarian sense) at 
all. Logical form is a precondition of sense: to talk of a world that lacks logical form is to talk 
incoherently. A world that lacks logical form is not a recognizable (describable) world at all. Since the 
structure of the \vorld is a necessary feature of the world, its denial does not pick out a genuine 
possibility. The denial would depict a putative situation where the necessary features (the 
preconditions) are absent - \vhich is an unintelligible situation. Since a proposition picks out a situation 
that need not obtain, propositions that allegedly talk about essential features cannot be genuine 
propositions. 
Another way of understanding why propositions must be bipolar is to consider Wittgenstein's 
discussion on the futility of trying to justify a rule. Now, any explanation of the possibility of language 
is an attempt to explain the possibility of a rule-governed or norn1ative discourse. Wittgenstein argues 
that the propositions used in such an attempt would have to be meaningless ~ bipolar propositions 
cannot justify rules. The rules of a language are such that, given that language, they cannot be 
othcmise: propositions can thus not justify rules since they would then be (attempting to) pick out a 
situation which could not be otherwise ~ they would not be picking out a possible situation. Language 
cannot express what cannot be otherwise. I f a bipolar proposition 'justifies' a rule. then its assertion 











ruks will rule out as conceivable precisely what the justification implies is conceivable. The rules thus 
lose their prohibitory function. For example, with regard to colour propositions he says: 
If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying that they are made 
necessary by certain properties of the colours (say), then that would make the 
conventions superfluous, since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the 
conventions exclude my saying. 15 
Colour conventions permit . reddish-blue', but not 'reddish-green'. According to Wittgenstein any 
attempt to justify this would render the conventions superfluous, since any justification would have to 
appeal to the properties of colours. However, since it is conceivable that the colours lack these 
properties (colours having certain properties are contingent states-of-affairs), precisely that which the 
cOl1\entions prohibit would then be conceivable. The conventions would not act as grammatical rules. 
The general point is that because language can only state contingencies, any attempt to justify \vhat is 
taken to be a necessity would itself be a contingent statement. The rules of language, because they are 
necessary, therefore cannot be accounted for. Furthermore, any attempt to account for the rules must be 
expressed in a contingent proposition, the denial of which constitutes a genuine possibility. But this 
possibility IS what the rule is supposed to rule out. Rules can therefore not be accounted for. In 
Wittgenstein's Lecturesl\ve read: 
Language can express one method of projection as opposed to another. It cannot 
express what cannot be otherwise ... what is essential to the world cannot be said 
about the world for then it could be otherwise, as any proposition can be negated. 
However. although such necessity cannot be stated, that the rules are necessary expresses itself in the 
(1 inguistic) rules that certain expressions are permissible and others not. The immediate consequence of 
the claim that linguistic rulcs cannot be accounted for - that we cannot say what linguistic rules are ill 
lim/(' of - is that any attempt at a theory of meaning is impossible - ill principle. That which makes 
meaning possible cannot be the subject of investigation, since such an investigation would constitute, 











In his introduction to the TLP Russell l ! suggests a way out of this impasse. He maintains that the kind 
of problem Wittgenstein discusses would only arise for someone who attempts to account for the logic 
of his language ill that very language. The way out of this, Russell suggests, is to construct a meta-
language - a language which admits of a different logic to that of the object-language, and which is to 
be used to talk abollt the object-language. The propositions of the meta-language, because they 
conform to difrerent rules. would admit of sense. So \vhatever one said in this language about the 
object-language would qualify as meaningful. But Wittgenstein would never accept this. Talk of a 
meta-language. according to Wittgenstein. fails to appreciate the heart of the issue. To wit: any 
language one could construct must conform to certain rules - the same rules. (The world has a fixed 
logical form and hence language has a fixed logical form.) Wittgenstein's llse of rules was not 
language-specific, differing from language to language. It refers to the very mode of representation -
all.'" representation. It is the very possibilitr of representation. Any language that one could construct 
must conform to these logical rules. It is the Kantian point - these rules are the preconditions 0/ 
,houghl. Any expression that fails to conform to these rules does not count as part of language. Thus 
these rules are the rules for any meaningful language. So a 'meta-language', if it qualifies as a language 
at all. will not differ in logic from the object language - in which case it iSIl 't a 'meta-language' such as 
Russell had in mind. Russell's solution thus does not work. Syntax cannot be stated in allY language. 
Wittgenstein's denial that a meta-logic is possible does not (merely) rest dogmatically on the claim that 
there is just one logic that counts as the pre-condition of intelligibility, In Philosophical Grammar l8 we 
find him saying that logic determines what is necessary there is no meta-logic that makes logic 
necessary. He supports this claim with a regress argument: If it were possible to account for the 
necessity of logic in some meta-logic then that only postpones the problem; for we would have the 
sci fS:1me problem with such a meta-language: what grounds this logic? The situation would thus lead to 
an infinite regress. We \vould end up with an 'infinite hierarchy' of meta-languages. 19 Furthermore, 
any artificial language draws on ordinary language to clarify (at least some of) its expressions. If a 
language were not translatable in this way that is, if all its concepts or expressions were such that they 
were I/ot (or couldn't be) cashed out in ordinary language a multitude of problems would arise. For 
one. if ordinary language is. as it surely is. the only language we 'find ourselves with', how do we gain 
access to such a \vholly untranslatable language? Secondly, and importantly, such an idea inherits all 
the objections Wittgenstein levels against the idea of a 'private language' in the PI - a private language 











semantic bedrock. and there is no semantic exit from this language not upward via a hierarchy of 
meta-languages. nor downward to reality. 
When I talk about language ... I must speak the language of everyday. Is this 
language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? Then how is 
another one to be constructed? - And how strange that we should be able to do 
anything at all with the one we have! In giving explanations I already have to use 
language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory provisional one) ..... 
The point is thus clear: ordinary language is all we've got. Any move that we make is via this language. 
There can be nothing more basic nor more sophisticated than this. Wittgenstein levels the same 
criticism against any attempt to do meta-mathematics (that is, any attempt to provide foundations for 
mathematics. as F rege and Russell attempted). In Remarks all the F olllldatiollS oj'Mathematics2] for 
instance. we find him commenting on any attempt to ground mathematics in a more basic calculus. He 
says that 
they are no more the foundation of mathematics for us than the painted rock is the 
support of a painted tower. 
It appears that what Wittgenstein means here is that a painted rock appears to support a painted tower, 
but bccause it is merely pati of a painting, there is no real support going on. (n the same way, a more 
basic calculus may appear to do the job of grounding or supporting mathematics, but there is no real 
support going on. I suppose one could also say that, just as in the case of the painting, where a painted 
to\\cr. because it is PaIt of a painting - does not stand in need of the support it appears to be getting 
(from the painted rock). so it is with mathematics too. It does not stand in need of the suppOli that one 
thinks one is giving it by means of a more basic calculus. 
The closing passage of the TLP proclaims that 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'. 
Of course the proper appreciation of Wittgenstein' s remarks rests on recalling that 'saying'. 
proposition' and other terms have a very specitlc meaning in the TLP. So Wittgenstein's conclusion 
should not be surprising to anyone who has understood him up to that point. What 'can be said' 











logic and the mystical can only be shown. To try to say what cannot be said but only shown results in 
1l0llSense. We must thus be silent. This seems to be the import of the closing passage of the TLP. 
Silence in the context of this passage docs of course not mean complete silence. it simply means 'do 
not (try) to say', in the special sense of 'say' in the TLP. 'What call be shown, cannot be said.' (TLP 
... L 1212) Thus Ramsey's remark: 'But what we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle either,22 
l11i~ses Wittgenstein's point completely. Wittgenstein's point is that the inexpressible cannot be said (in 
filctual discourse), but only shown (by music, art, literature, religion and so on). For example, logic can 
shO\\ the limit of the world by arranging symbols in a particular way.23 Music and mt can show 
something important about the meaning of I ife that cannot be captured in factual language. And so too 
\\'itl1 whistling. So the mystical call be shown. There is not, however, much mention in the TLP of how 
the mystical can be shown, since Wittgenstein's central concern in the TLP is merely to show that it 
cannot be said. 
As concluding remarks to this section, I want to stress a point that has been made before. 
\\' ittgenstein 's concern to articulate a distinction between what can and what cannot be said is 110t 
fueled with Positivist interests. It was not his goal, as in the case of the Logical Positivists, to banish 
metaphysics from the realm of meaningful propositions, and in so doing discredit their status. Rather, 
his intention was to ascribe to metaphysics its 'proper place'. Metaphysics does not belong to the realm 
of descriptive discourse: however, just because this is so, cOl/fra the Positivists, metaphysics has a 
higher status than that of representational discourse. This 'insignificance of the sayable' is an 
underlying contention in Wittgenstein's work. Earlier on I quoted Wittgenstein in a letter to von Ficker: 
My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. 
And it is precisely this second part that is the important one.2-1 
:\nd again in TLP 6.52: 
We find that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions 











I takc Wittgenstein to mean that if there are no (scientific or empirical) questions left, but the problems 
of life remain untouched, then these' problems' and perhaps their 'solutions' are not a factual business. 
The 'llllderstanding' or grasping of them is not like grasping contingent states of affairs. They are 
grasped in some other \vay. They are inexpressible. 
There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is what is mystical. (T6.522) 
So it seems clear. then, that Wittgenstein's intention, tar from being to discredit metaphysics. was to 
s~m.? it from the banal status of representational discourse. The follo\ving remarks on the propositions 
of cthics and religion confirm this sentiment: 
My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk 
Ethics or Religion was to run up against the boundaries of language. This running 
against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics, so far as it 
springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the 
absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to 
our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of the tendency in the human mind 
which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.25 
I t seems that just as the attcmpt to talk about Ethics is a tendency worth respecting, so too with 
I1lctaphysical propositions. Why'? Ethical (and religiolls) propositions are, according to Wittgenstein. 
attt:l1lpts to talk about 'the Absolute' in the domain of Ethics. This amounts pretty much to what goes 
on in an attempt to talk about the limits of thought. To wit: when we attempt to talk about the limits of 
thought (which we take to be the essential features of reality) we are in effect assuming an outside 
position which is, as we've seen, an incoherent project. It is 'absolutely hopeless'. In the same way, an 
attcmpt to talk about. say, the' Absolute Good', is an attempt to make sense of the 'ethical' walls of Ollr 
cagc. However. just hecause we're in the grip of these ethical grids we can't make sense of them. 
:\ ttcmpting to make sense of them is an attempt to get outside our ethical limits, which is, as 
Wittgenstein says, an utterly hopeless one. But, says Wittgenstein, this attempt is something he would 











Man has the urge to thrust against the limits of language. Think for instance about 
one's astonishment that anything exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the 
form of a question and there is no answer to it. Anything we can say must, a priori, be 
only nonsense. Nevertheless, we thrust against the limits of language. But the 
tendency, the thrust, points to something ... I can only say: I don't belittle this human 
tendency; I take my hat off to it. .. For me the facts are unimportant. But what men 
mean when they say that" The world exists" lies close to my heart.26 
Holiday'7 suggests that philosophical propositions, as attempts to cross the bounds of intelligibility, are 
significant precisely because they tell us something about ourselves, namely, that human beings have 
an utterly hopeless tendency to want to see from 'outside' - in effect, to see or describe everything. The 
effect of such a realization ought to be a humbling one. It lets us see ourselves for who we are. By 
rUl1l1l11g up against the limits and transgressing the bounds of sense we gain a kind of self-knowledge 
that reminds us of our imperfections. The point is like the one that can be made about Socrates' 
dialectics. The Socratic questions have, or are intended to have, the effect of reducing our intelligence 
to aporia. This way \ve can get a sense of what we properly are. This Socratic indulgence in dialectics 
IS meant to teach us something about ourselves, and what we learn ought to have a reducing or 
shrinking dIect. Just as the remark of JesLls to those who wanted to stone the adulteress, 'He who hath 
committed no sin, let him cast the first stone,' had a humbling effect (because now, by putting the 
matter this way, they could all see that they were not faultless), so too here: seeing that we have a 
tendency to transgress the bounds of sense ought to produce a sense of humility within us. 
It has been suggested that Wittgenstein's preoccupation with logic and the limits of thought is parallel 
to his moral preoccupation with sin. In both cases the dividing line between right and wrong must be 
recognised and not crossed. His preoccupation with only saying what can be said - that is, staying on 
the one side of the line while fighting off the tendency to cross the limits - is like his preoccupation 
\\itl1 wanting to do the right thing while fighting off the tendency to sin. Remaining within the bounds 
of sense - of legitimate discourse - is like remaining \vithin the limits of legitimate moral 3ctioll. 28 A 
testimony to tbis conviction is reflected by a report of Russell's in Ray Monk's2,) biography of 
Wittgenstein. The story goes that Wittgenstein had often come to Russell's rooms in the evening to talk 
philosophy. He would spend hours tensely pacing up and down the room in complete silence till deep 











commit suicide. On one such evening, while Wittgenstein was doing his pacing ritual, Russell ventured 
a qUl'~tion: . Are you thinking about logic or your sins'?' to which Wittgenstein fiercely replied: 'Both!'. 
- '\0 sCl/se because they arc combineu illicitly; no reterellce because the sentence in which they occur lacks logical form. 
Ryk·,.; notion of 'category mistake' was inspired by these issues in the TLP. 
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Chapter 3: Linguistic Regularity 
By the time he wrote the PI Wittgenstein had abandoned the Picture Theory of meaning and had 
also given up the idea that all words are names. The new foeus was now on general rather than 
singular temlS. Furthermore, the relation between language and the world was no longer seen as 
located at the level of completely analysed constituents of language and their counterparts in the 
world objects. Whereas the idea in the TLP was that in order to understand something you have to 
break it down into its smallest constituent parts, much in the way scientists attempt to understand a 
phenomenon by breaking it down into its constituent parts, in the PI the whole project of logical 
analysis is abandoned. The level at which words are applied to things is not at the end product of 
reductive analysis; rather, it is at the level of the words of everyday language, including general 
words. In PI 60 Wittgenstein presents an argument against analysis against the idea that when we 
understand an expression we understand it by means of grasping the components that it can be 
analysed into. 
When I say: "My broom is in the corner", - is this really a statement about the 
broomstick and the brush? Well, it could at any rate be replaced by a statement 
giving the position of the stick and the position of the brush. And this statement is 
surely a further analysed form of the first one. - But why do I call it "further 
analysed"? - Well, if the broom is there, that surely means that the stick and the 
brush must be there, and in a particular relation to one another; and this was as it 
were hidden in the sense of the first sentence, and is expressed in the analysed 
sentence. Then does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really 
mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed in 
the brush? - If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that 
he had not thought specially of the broomstick or specially of the brush at all. And 
that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the 
brush in particular. Suppose that, instead of saying "Bring me the broom", you said 
"Bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted on to it."!- Isn't the answer: 
"Do you want the broom? Why do you put it so oddly?" Is he going to understand 
the further analysed sentence better? - This sentence, one might say, achieves the 











Imagine a language-game in which someone is ordered to bring certain objects 
which are composed of several parts, to move them about, or something else of the 
kind. And two ways of playing it: in one (a) the composite objects (brooms, chairs, 
tables etc.) have names, as in (15); in the other (b) only the parts are given names 
and the wholes are described by means of them. - In what sense is an order in the 
second game an analysed form of an order in the first? Does the former lie 
concealed in the latter, and is it now brought out by analysis? 
True, the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but 
does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of corresponding 
parts? (PI 60) 
This change in the formulation of the problem of the relation between language and the world is 
accompanied by a change in the solution. The problem with the earlier account is not just that it was 
mistaken about the level at which it located the connection between language and the world, but 
that it maintained that a one-otT baptism (single ostensive definition) was enough to explain how we 
manage to use a word correctly in the future. Posing the question in terms of general words makes 
this deticiency more visible. A general word has an infinite extension; merely eorrelating a word 
\\itll an object by no means explains how we manage to use that word to pick out a whole range of 
objects which are different but which also share some features with the original object, features in 
\irtlle of which they are united under the rubric of that word. What is needed, according to the PI, is 
a sllstained contribution from us. the language-users. But the PI also undermines the very etTort of 
the TIP . to present an account of mcaning. Although the TLP indicates that an account of 
meaning is impossible, what it advocates dejure is not in harmony with its de/acto practice. In the 
TIP the reasons against theorising has to do with the idea that some things 'cannot be said', but 
only shown. 
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they 
must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it logical form. 
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to 
station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside 
the world. 
Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. 
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. 










Propositions show the logical form of reality. 
They display it. (TLP 4.12-4.121) 
Thc reason some things cannot be said but only shown has to do with Wittgenstein's account of 
propositions. A proposition depicts a possibility in the world. This being the case, it can be either 
true or false (true if the possibility obtains, false if it does not). However, a putative proposition that 
attempts to say something about the possibility of sense, for example, that the meaning of a name is 
the object it picks out, will not have depicted a possibility and so cannot be true or false. That the 
mcaning of a name is the object it picks out is not a possibility; it is a pre-cone/ilion of the 
possibility of sense. It cannot be false, and thus by the same token cannot be true. I-Ience you cannot 
'say' (depict) that which makes sense possible, since that which makes sense possible is not a 
possibility in the \vorld. Propositions can only depict possibilities. But why can language only 
picture possibilities i.e. things which could be either true or false. Why can it not picture anything 
about the relation between language and the world? TIP 4.12 is instructive: 'In order to be able to 
represent logical form, \ve should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere 
olltside logic. that is to say outside the world.' In other words, there is no vantage point outside of 
language (outside of our relation with language and the world); there is no independent fulcrum that 
can be used to get a grip on OLlr relationship with language and the world. We cannot 'get outside 
language' . 
I n the PI the criticism of any attempt to construct a theory of language is in similar spirit but 
different rhetoric: Any attempt to explain the meaning of a phenomenon would require invoking 
another phenomenon to which \ve do not have independent access. We cannot identify the 
explanation of a phenomenon independently of the phenomenon itself. For example, if we 
attemptcd to explain the meaning of a gcneral word in temlS of a universal (which is its meaning) 
m.:: \\ould not be able to give an independent specification of the universal. The Picture Theory. 
being a theory of this kind, fails for the same reasons: if the meaning of a name is the object for 
which it stands. the only way to cxplain its meaning would be to refer to the object. The TIP 
suggcsts that the way to identify an object is to name it (TIP 3.203). However, doing so would not 
prO\ide an independent specification of the meaning of the name and would thus fail to explain its 












It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of 
any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived 
ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such' - whatever that may mean. (The 
conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not advance any kind of 
theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do 
away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this 
description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. 
These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking 
into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise 
those workings: in spite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are 
solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always 
known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means 
of language. (PI 109) 
We h;ne seen that in the TLP the way to establish whether a proposition is meaningful involves 
logical analysis of that proposition into its constituent elementary parts. These elementary 
propositions are then subjected to the acid test: they have to bear the hallmark of meaningfulness 
i.i.'. their names must designate objects and the propositions must bear the form of 'the general form 
of a proposition' that says that 'this is how things stand'. But before a proposition can be analysed 
ill this way, its real logical structure that is hidden by its apparent surface structure must be laid bare 
In the PI Wittgenstein still thinks that there is a gap between surface grammar and real logical form 
a gap that can mislead us but he does not think that the real logical form is something that must 
be excavated. The distinction in the PI is not between surface grammar and underlying grammatical 
form. but between surface and 'deep grammar'. 'Deep grammar' is revealed by a clear view an 
Cbersicht - of how we actually use language. When we are misled by the particular structure of a 
proposition our recourse is not excavation and analysis; rather, we should 'consult' the Ubersicht -
the map of the actual llses of language, and see whether a particular usage subscribes to the way the 
said expression is actually commonly used. The distinctive feature about his later work is that he is 
not digging under but looking on the surface of language and the acid test is not a ready worked-out 
formula but a test to see whether a proposition fits on actual use. 
With this as a background. we can nO\\! get down to examining his account of the meaningfulness of 
language in the PI. The issue can be introduced by posing the question in lay terms first: we tend to 











or information ~ that he now has something in (his) mind. We think that he either has a picture, or a 
j~mmtla, or a definition. or an image in some very general sense, in mind. The trouble with this way 
of looking at the matter, is that whatever he has in mind can always be interpreted in a number of 
di ffcrent \\'ays, so that, simply on the basis of what he has in mind, we cannot say that he definitely 
means one thing and not another. In technical terms, what he means is underdetermined by the 
alleged image he has in mind. For example. let's say that when someone understands what a cube is 
he has some particular image in mind. (Cf. PI \39-141 )However, it can always be contested that he 
could have that particular image in mind and still mean some other object in the world. To rule out 
this possibility. one would have to add that not only does he have some particular image in mind, 
but he also has a code or formula which maps the image to some specific object in the world (the PI 
ca lis such a formula a "method of projection') The trouble with this defence is immediately clear: 
\\e could raise the same kind of concern about the code or formula that we raised about the original 
image. What's to say that that code could not be variously interpreted or applied, and so on? 
The same problem arises when we think that somebody's understanding something consists in their 
h,ning a definition in mind. Definitions (like those in dictionaries) contain words that can be 
\arioLls\y applied. and so we would need to further define those words, ad h?finitum. Meaning 
would thus remain indeterminate, so definitions cannot give a complete account of meaning. (Cf. PI 
~O I)A blunt way of expressing Wittgenstein's solution to this problem is to say that according to 
Wittgenstein understanding (or meaning) something does not essentially have anything to do with 
ha\ing something in your mind (although. of course sometimes we may have some image in mind). 
L'nderstanding the meaning of an expression is like understanding how to dance, or how to ride a 
bic\cle. It is not that we arc in possession of some factual knowledge (definition, image, 
interpretation, whatever) but that we know how to danee, kilO1\' /zOH' to cycle. It is not about 
understanding that, but understanding how. In the case of knowing the meaning of a word, it means 
that we know how to use that word. It cannot be that we know a definition, have an image, or have 
. interpreted' the word (Wittgenstein thinks of a definition as a kind of interpretation), for if it were, 
the problem of indetenllinacy of meaning sketched above would always arise. That was crudely 
putting the problem and solution into a nutshell. Below I examine the issues at greater length with 
more explicit reference to the PI text. 
In the PI Wittgenstein addresses the issue of meaning by exploring what fixes the meaning of 
general terms. and his investigation takes the form of exploring the conditions under which we are 











indication that a \vord has been uscd meaningfully has to do with whether we can find regularity 
between what people say (the sounds they make) and their actions. There needs to be a regular 
employment of signs in order for us to say that certain behaviours count as speaking a language. (PI 
207.237) 
In other places in the PI (for example PI 201) the issue of what fixes the meaning of an expression 
is discussed in terms of 'rules' and 'following a rule'. In the discussion that follows I will examine 
the conception of meaning in the PI in the rhetoric of 'following a rule', although it must be noted 
that in every case of the meaningful employment of a sign there need not be a rule, but simply a 
regularity in the use of the sign (as indicated in PI207-20S). 
Speaking a language is a normative activity. There are COlTect and incorrect ways of applying 
\yords. To use a word correctly is to have followed the rule governing the correct applieation of that 
word. Wittgenstein's examination of rule following can be broken down into two concerns. The one 
concern is \vhat it is in virtue of that we can say that someone has followed a rule. The question 
here \\ould be: \\'hat is the rule governing the correct application of a word? The second concern is 
ho\\ a rule guides a speaker. The question here would be: how does the speaker know how to apply 
a \\ord correctly? So the first is an ontological issue (what are the rules); the second is an epistemic 
issue (how do the rules guide behaviour). Wittgenstein explores rule following in terms of two 
eli ffcrent but analogoLls cases \ ·i:.. (a) the application of a general word and (b) the continuation of a 
mathematical series. These two issues differ in terms of the problems they present, and in terms of 
\\hat would go toward answering the problem. They are united, nevertheless by the fact that they 
both concern the normativeness and the hence the meaningfulness of language. As far as the 
application of general words goes, this is how the problem is framed: a general word such as 'red' 
or . horse' has a determinate extension: it applies to certain objects and not others. These objects are 
di fferenL but share cel1ain characteristics in virtue of which they are united under that general term. 
The question that arises is: what determines the extension of the general term'? As for the problem 
of the continuation of a mathematical series, the problem is as follows: a mathematical operation 
like '-:-2' demands that a particular series be followed, vi:::. '2,4,6,S ...... ' Following the series in this 
\\a: constitutes the COlTect application of the rule '+2'. The question that arises is: in virtue of what 
is follO\ving the series in this way correct? In ternlS of rule-following, the two problems present 
di ftercnt questions: in the case of the application of general words, the question is: what is the rule 
tor applying the general term in one way and not another; in the case of the second problem, we 











in one \vay and not another. It must be noted that although I have subsumed the problem of 
mathematical regularity under the discllssion of the possibility the meaningfulness of language, it is 
a topic that also properly fits Wittgenstein's discussions on mathematics and regularity in 
mathematics. In fact Frascolla l believes that Wittgenstein had thought of the mathematical problem 
first: the problem of the application of general words to things being a corollary of the former. 
Pcars~ however thinks otherwise. According to him there is evidence that the discussions on general 
\\ords precede the discussions of mathematical regularity. For the purposes of this thesis I will treat 
the discussions on mathematical regularity as a contribution to the general problem of linguistic 
normativeness and treat this and the problem of the application of general words as separate but 
parallel discussions on linguistic normativeness. 
PI sections 185-189 deal with the mathematical problem; sections 198- 200 deal with the issue of 
rule following in a general way, section 201-202 deals with the problem of the application of 
general words to things in terms of the impotency of definitions. This is an implied reference to the 
\,iel1na Circle's obsession with analyses and definitions. However the problem of the application of 
general words is examined in more general terms in an earlier section PI 139-141. The problem is 
that of the candidate for the meaning of a general term. In PI 139 the candidate considered is a 
mental image, in PI 20 I the candidate is a definition. In both cases, the complaint is that neither can 
explain the interface between language and the world. PI 201 presents the solution: nothing can 
scn'e as the required candidate since there is no such candidate. There is no mental talisman, nor 
any verbal formulation that can do the job of fixing the meaning of a general term. Nothing extra-
linguistic guides a person when he is following a nile; nile following is ground in action. Following 
a rule is a matter of having been trained to apply a word in a certain way, and we obey the rule in 
the \\ay one obeys an order i.c. blindly and without hesitation, as if compelled to. But nothing 
external compels you the compulsion comes from within, so to speak - from having been trained 
to react in certain ways and then responding to the training in a certain way. The way we respond to 
traming is our natural tendency to react in certain ways; these natural tendencies are shared by the 
linguistic community. We can be said to understand the meaning ofa word when we have mastered 
the technique for the use of that word. 
In general terms, the debate about linguistic normativity is generated on the one hand by our 
intuith'C understanding of how things must be given that our linguistic practices are stable, and on 
the other, by the implications of the philosophical explanations of that stability. To say that our 











the standard in virtue of which our application of a word is correct must be independent of how we 
in t~lct do things, failing which there \vill not be a distinction between what we do and what we 
should do. A standard of correctness can naturally tell us that we have gone wrong. If the standard 
is not independent of us - if it does not support the distinction between what we do and what we 
should do - then we will not be able to use it to say when we have gone wrong. 
Phi losophers have had different conceptions of the candidate for the standard of meaningfulness. 
Broadly. they can be divided into two camps .- those who endorse a realist conception, and those 
\\ho endorse a form of constructivism. According to the realist conception, the standard of 
meaningfulness is independent of us - of our abilities, our cognitive limitations and our practices. It 
is independent of what we would do and what we could do, and tells us what we should do. 
Constructivists. on the other hand, think of normativeness as somehow not independent of, but tied 
lip with. what we in tact do and could do. This is not to say that constructivists do not endorse the 
distinction between what we do and what we should do. Rather, they think that social practice in 
some way generates standards of con'ectness, and thus that whether we have followed a rule 
correctly can be judged relative to such social practices. So whereas they may 110t endorse talk of 
rules existing independently of our abilities and our practices, they do maintain that there are norms 
according to which we can say a rule has been followed. The Wittgenstein of the PI is generally 
read as endorsing a form of constructivism which maintains that we detemline the meaning of a 
\\ord by looking at how we customarily apply it. Against the idea that understanding or meaning is 
a matter of having something in your head (an image) or understanding something (a definition) he 
savs: 
... there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. (PI 
201 ) 
Language is ground in action or practice, and: 
... 3 person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, 3 
custom. (PI 198) 
We are initiated into the customs by training. Once trained, \ve follow the rules almost instinctively, 










Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react 
to an order in a particular way. The training has been successful if the initiated does 
what the linguistic community does. But what if one person reacts in one way and 
another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right? Suppose 
you came as an explorer in an unknown country with a language quite strange to 
you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, 
understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on? The 
common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we 
interpret an unknown language.' (PI 206) 
In the PI Wittgenstein attacks different candidates for the repository of meaning. The first important 
thing to realise about his attack is that it is directed not just against the Tractarian account of 
meaning. but against any accollnt that attempts to make meaning static. Any realist-type account of 
meaning compromises the plasticity of meaning: by locating the repository of meaning in some 
language-independent reality, the meanings of words are, in a sense, carved in stone. They cannot 
undergo change and do not undergo change. However, in real life the meanings of words do not 
remain static but change over time. The Tractarian account fails to accommodate this. According to 
that account of meaning, the essence of language is embodied in a pre-existing structure or grid that 
acts as a kind of intermediary between language and the world. It is this pre-ordained structure that 
confers meaning on the words and sentences in languages. The structure consists in the totality of 
logical possibilities. and such that once we attach names to objects, a whole language would thus 
hene been constructed. So although we have an option at the level of attaching names to objects, 
\\"hat we do after that is mandatory. The logical structure governs what counts as meaningful 
constructions of language. In this sense, the TLP endorses a particular kind of realism viz. Platonism 
about meaning and understanding. The structure of language and hence the repository of meaning is 
set over and against and hence independently of us independent of our cognitive abilities and our 
practices. On a Platonist conception of meaning the meaning of our words resides in some kind of 
platonic entity a platonic form which is neither material nor mental, but which exists in a kind of 
platonic realm. This platonic form is the seat of the essence of a word; it is some kind of entity that 
unites a number of disparate objects under its umbrella. The TLP is Platonist only in that invokes a 
mind-independent reality that confers meaningfulness on language, or rather, determines the correct 
\\ays of Llsing words. [n the PI Wittgenstein spends more time marshalling an attack on what could 
be seen as the mental counterpart of the abstract grid of possibilities the mental image. The two 











ha\\.; "in his head' when he could be said to have understood a word. It is via the mental image that 
\\'c could be said to be put in touch with the fixed structure outside our minds. In the PI, by contrast 
Wittgenstein says more about the mental counterpart of the external grid, and focuses less on the 
grid itself. However. both parts of the theory are of course necessary if we are going to give the 
kind of explanation Wittgenstein believed was necessary. The would be no point in locating the 
repository of meaning in something external to and independent of us unless we had some way of 
grasping it. By the samc token, the mental image would be pointless if it did not put us in touch 
with the structure outside our mind. And, the mental image can only play the role it does because it 
is the mental counterpal1 of the repository of meaning. The complaint in the PI against both the 
structure outside our minds as well as the mental image is the same: it is invoked as the standard of 
correctness of our words ~ but, as sLlch, it is commissioned to play an impossible role. The 
impossible role is one where, once a word is attached to a thing, the mental image or external grid 
determines the future behaviour of that word the word is slot onto a pre-existing grid or locked 
onto rails extending into the future. The role is impossible because firstly, a limited set of examples 
cannot unequivocally fix an indefinitely prolonged sequence of correct applications, and secondly, 
anything in our minds -- a formula or picture can be applied in indefinitely many ways. An image 
can therefore not unambiguously fix meaning. So the idea of fixed rails is a fantasy and the idea of a 
mental image puts an impossible demand on the language-user's mind. What is required is our 
sustained contribution in the form of established practices that fixes particular series of applications. 
This shifts the seat of authority from the external logical stmcture to our very own linguistic 
practices. "B understands the principle of the series" surely does not mean simply: the formula "an 
= ... ,." occurs to B. For it is perfectly imaginable that the fornmla should occur to him and that he 
should nevertheless not understand. "He understands must have more in it than: formula occurs to 
hi111, And equally, more than any of those more or less characteristic accompaniments or 
manifestations of understanding. (PI 152)1t may now be said: "The way the formula is meant 
determines which steps are to be taken". What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? It 
is. tor ex.ample, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it {PI 
190 )Customary use determines the way the formula is to be applied. But teaching an initiate how to 
apply tbe formula is not a guarantee that he will be able to apply it correctly in the future. A 











.... Now - judged by the usual criteria - the pupil has mastered the series of natural 
numbers. Next we teach him to write down other series of cardinal numbers and get 
him to the point of writing down series of the form 
0, n, 2n, 3n, etc. 
at an order of the form "+n"; so at the order "+1" he writes down the series of natural 
numbers. 
1000. 
Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1 000 - and he 
writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. 
We say to him: "Look what you've done!" He doesn't understand. 
We say: "You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!" 
He answers: "Yes, isn't it right I thought that was how I was meant to do it." - Or 
suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way." It 
would now be no use to say: "But can't you see ..... 7" - and repeat the old 
examples and explanations. In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes 
natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we 
should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and 
so on." 
Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally 
reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line 
from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip.' (PI 185) 
When someone learns to speak a language, several ingredients are present: there is an established 
(regular) \vay of using words or expressions, the language-user is initiated into the practice of 
speaking a language by training. the training takes hold because of the natural responses of the 
initiate. responses which are shared by other members of the linguistic community. The initiate has 
been successfully trained when he applies words in the way the community does, and follows the 
rule in the way one obeys an order. automatically or instinctively. 
It mLlst be noted that in Wittgenstein's discLlssions of the pupils who make outlandish mistakes 
when taught the meanings of general words by examples of their correct application, he is not 
meaning to say that these are probable mistakes that a teacher should be aware of in real life. The 











coming to understand what the whole issue of what holds together the things to which a general 
\\ord applies and distinguishes them from other things. In Wittgenstein' s own view the student's 
misapplication of rules does not indicate or constitute a real-life problem: in real life, if the lesson 
has been \ve1l-designed with appropriately chosen examples, there is only one way in which he 
understands them - the natural way - and where there are minor variations, they can be easily 
excluded by further examples. In Lectures on the Foundations ofAfathematics he makes a similar 
point about the \\'ay in which children are taught the sequence of cardinal numbers: 
This hangs together with the question, how to continue the series of 
cardinal numbers. Is there a criterion for the continuation - for a right 
and wrong way - except that we do in fact continue them in that way, 
apart from a few cranks that can be neglected?3 
He goes on to explain the confidence with which we ignore the cranks: 
This has often been said before. And it has often been put in the form 
of an assertion that the truths of logic are determined by a consensus 
of opinions. Is this what I am saying? No. There is no opinion at all: it 
is not a question of opinion. They are determined by a consensus of 
action: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the same 
way.4 
It mLlst be noted that although in this paragraph he is making the point about the 'truths' of logic. 
from the context we can see that he is extrapolating this point from the discussion on the meanings 
of individual words. We don't take the cranks seriously not because we are of the opinion that they 
are wrong. but because of the consensus of action on our part about the right way to go on. There is 
no decision involved in what counts as the right thing. There just is this consensus of action that is a 
brute fact about us. We all. given the same training, happen to go on in the same way. Our language 
has the stability it does not because we decide, from a range of possible ways of going on, to 
respond in some particular way. nor because there is some extra-linguistic entity (a formula, image 
or platonic universal) that guides us. but because of the brute fact about us that there is a consensus 
of aClioll. The idea of 'consensus' of action could be a bit misleading. It gives the impression that 
'consensus' means an explicit agreement of some form ~ coming to hold the same view after some 











that the consensus he is talking about is not a question of opinion is to drive home the point that 
these reactions are automatic or instinctive, so to speak. They are the reactions that we find natural. 
The point howevcr, is not just that there is a consensus of action, but that there is a consensus of 
([CliO/l. It is what \ve do that fixes the standard of correctness. As PI 201 emphasises 
What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going 
against it" in actual cases.' Acting meaningfully, or understanding a sign does not 
have anything to do with having 'something in mind', but rather with acting in a 
certain way a way that can be described as 'obeying the rule'. 
So \\hereas in the TLP language is based on our recogl1lsmg or knowing the possibilities of 
combination of simple objects, in the PI the conception is that what lies at the bottom of the ability 
to use language is 'our acting'. In On CertainZr Wittgenstein says: 
Giving grounds, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not 
certain propositions striking us immediately as true, a kind of seeing on our part; but 
it is our acting that lies at the bottom of the language-game.5 
Wittgenstein's complaint against platonism is not just limited to linguistic issues he saw platonist 
tendencics at work both in philosophy and in ordinary thinking. We have seen what's wrong with 
platonism: it solicits, on the one hand, a recondite entity to play an impossible role, and on the other 
ham1. something familiar, mental item (the mental counterpart of the extemal grid), to play an 
equally impossible role. The most crippling defect however, is the one discussed in chapter one: 
platonism attempts to explain our linguistic practices by appealing to putative independently 
existing items which. on examination, cannot be identified independently of the way we happen to 
LIse language. What then leads us to this theory? What underlies our platonist convictions, 
\Vittgenstein believes, is an illusion generated by the experience of following a rule. At PI219 he 
says: 
"All the steps are already taken" means: I no longer have any choice. 
The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines 
along which it is to be followed through the whole of logical space. 











No: my description only made sense if it were to be understood 
symbolically. - I should have said: This is how it strikes me. 
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. 
I obey the rule blindly. 
The observation about following a rule blindly is an observation about the phenomenology of rule 
following. When we follow a rule, we follow it in a way that can be described as having followed it 
bl indly, or following it as if we are compelled to fol1ov.,1 it in that way, as if we had no choice. The 
feeling that we are on a pre-ordained path is a projection of the feeling of inevitability when we 
apply a word. This experience gives the impression that there is some extemal force that locks us on 
a certain path where 'all the steps are already taken'. From this experience we conjure up the idea 
that the rule conducts you like a gangway with rigid walls. This, however, is only a dramatisation of 
the experience of following rules and must be understood symbolically rather than literally. We thus 
haw a philosophically distorted perspective of expressions sueh as 
'the steps are determined by the formula' 
the way the formula is meant determines which steps may be taken ... ' 
This distorted philosophical picture asks us to imagine either some item that magically throws open 
to \iew the red carpet of correct applications or some item that contains, in some sense, all the 
possible applications of a word. These fixed rails are really a fantasy - an attempt to forge a factual 
picture out of some kind of poetry. The charm of this picture derives from the fact that it seems to 
adequately capture what must be the case given our experience. But cha1111 is all it has when its 
implications are played out, we see that what it imagines -- a self-signifying item -- is impossible, 
puis an impossible demand on the language-user's mind, and can in no way guide us: any finite 
series of examples can always be taken in an infinite number of ways. To reiterate, Wittgenstein's 
tactic is as follows: he presents us with what seems to be a problem (no course of action can be 
determined by a rule). But this problem derives from a distorted picture generated by a misguided 
attempt to make philosophical sense of the experience of following a rule. Given this, what is 
required is then not to answer the impostor question, but to expose the soil that gave rise to the 
question (a dramatisation of an experience). Once the breeding ground is exposed for what it is (an 
illusion) we don't need to answer the putative question any more, for there is no question of that 
sort. The compulsion that we experience when we follow a rule does not come from olltside, but 
from within from our own natures. The regularity in our language is maintained by the fact that, in 











(PI 206). The misguided scenarIO is one where we are kept on the pre-ordained tracks in some 
mysterious \vay - as if we are locked onto it. or as if we are in some gangway that forces us down a 
particular path, but Wittgenstein disturbs the peace of the situation by highlighting that we are in 
t~1Ct not safe on these tracks deviation is a very real possibility. But we do not deviate, so the 
question becomes what keeps us on the tracks - if it is not the tracks themselves? Our shared 
natural responses honed by the trained we have received, keep us on track. But this being the case, 
talk of a 'track' becomes supertluous. It is then our shared natural responses that playa role in the 
next step we take and not some imagined pre-ordained pathway. 
Jettisoning the idea that there is a fixed pre-ordained stlllcture that determines all the correct 
applications gives the impression that we can make things up as we go along - that we can take the 
Ilull1pty-Dumpty attitude: 'this is my word and I can do what I like with it'. In other words, if there 
is nothing independent that governs the meanings of our words, then it seems that we can do as we 
please there is no overarching arbitrator that binds us to behave in certain ways. We seem to be in 
a position of someone who is told to 'do the right' thing' but then not given any guidance as to what 
counts as the right thing. However, this imagined situation is the result of having a particular idea of 
Wh<lt . guidance' should consist in. We expect the guidance to come from outside from something 
independent of us and when this idea is undermined, we think we are left in the lurch. 
But \\T are not left in the lurch because any guidance post only guides in so far as there is some way 
of applying it. ' ... any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot 
gi\\: it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not detennine meaning.' (PI 198) Ko 
definition. no explanation, no series of examples can take us from language to the world. They can 
ah\ays be applied in more than one way. As a repository of meaning they are impotent The life-
gi\ing force is the application we make of them. 
In all language there is a bridge between a sign and its application. No 
one can make this for us; we have to bridge the gap ourselves. No 
explanation ever saves the jump, because any further explanation will 
itself need a jump.6 
In PI 198-202 Wittgenstein criticises any theory of meaning that only otlers verbal analyses of 
particular words since definitions do not tie language down to the world. This is an implied 











3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: 
it is a primitive sign. 
3.261 Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve 
to define it; and the definitions point the way. 
Howcver. vvhereas the Vienna Circle was solely pre-occupied with definitions, the TIP recognised 
that definitions can ultimately not explain the interface between language and the world and that the 
meaning of a name or proposition is shown in its application: 'What signs fail to express, their 
application shows.' TLP 3.262. Since what is shown cannot be said, the TIP concludes that the 
rclationship between language and the world is ineffable. However, while it may be correct to say 
that the link between a sign and the world is shown in its application, it does not follow that this 
ri.?lationship is ineffable. In other words, simply because there is no theoretical construct that can 
adequately explain the relationship between language and the world, and because that link is 
something we make when we apply the word, it does not follow that we can give no general 
account of the application of \vords to things. What we can in fact do is describe what happens at 
the 1l1terface between language and the world. The description would factually explain what is 
i1l\ohed in this application and how regularity is preserved in application. This is what 
Wittgenstein does in the PI. 
Nothing can bridge the gap between language and the world 'we have to bridge the gap 
ourselves'. Does this give us free rein? The mere fact that communication is possible shows that we 
do use words in a regular \vay. We now know that this regularity does not and cannot come from 
some other entity that lays down a fixed pathway for us to follow. We now know that we make the 
application. Sometbing about us must then govern this application. And this 'something' is our 
shared natural responses. But. does this appeal to shared natural responses upkeep the distinction 
bet\\ccn what \ve do and \vhat we should do'? Does recourse to shared natural responses imply that 
we hme to wait and see what \ve would do in some considered case before we can say what we 
should do'? Wittgenstein's answer comes via two notions that of a technique and that of customs 
or illstitutions. The short answer is that our shared natural responses are governed by a technique 
that we are taught. Learning the meaning of a word involves learning the technique of applying it: 
understanding a word is to be master of that technique. Obeying a rule (using a word correctly) is a 
custom. So our behaviour is hedged in by the established custom. The custom develops in the 











that are ultimately responsible for the boundaries of our behaviour. So the ingredients of his new 
approach are as follmvs. There is a technique of application. This technique is customary (it is an 
established lise, and not an extra-human mandatory regulation), but it is shaped by our shared 
natural responses and the parameters of our natural environment. 
In LFM, Lecture X, Wittgenstein says: 
Suppose we in this room are inventing arithmetic. We have a technique of counting, but 
there is so far no multiplication. Suppose that I now make the following experiment. I give 
Lewy a multiplication. - We have invented multiplication up to 100; that is, we've written 
down things like 81 x 63 but have never yet written down things like 123 x 489. I say to 
him, "You know what you've done so far. I\low do the same sort of things for these two 
numbers," - I assume he does what we usually do. This is an experiment - and one which 
we may later adopt as a calculation. What does that mean? Well, suppose that 90% do it 
all one way. I say "This is now going to be the right result" The experiment was to show 
what the most natural way is - which way most of them go. Now everybody is taught to do 
it and now there is a right and a wrong. Before there was not. 
It is like finding the best place to build a road across the moors. We may first send people 
across, and see which is the most natural way for them to go, and then build the road that 
way. Before the calculation was invented or the technique fixed, there was no right or 
wrong result. (LFM, X, p95). 
The point here is that the way in which human beings find it natural to proceed becomes the 
standard of correctness, Wittgenstein's criterion for "the natural way to proceed" is the way in 
which "most of them go", It is a brute tact about human beings that, given a cel1ain background, 
setting and training. most of them will, naturally proceed in a certain way. In PI 242 Wittgenstein 
calls this natural convergence of behaviour "agreement in judgement". This "agreement in 
judgement" is the foundation upon which the development oflanguage is possible. For a language 
to be possible there has to be a regular or consistent employment of symbols - else there would be 
110 sense in saying that a \\'ord means something (one thing rather than another). This regular or 
consistent employment is secured by the fact that we all have a natural inclination to, given the 











If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements. This seems to abolish logic, 
but does not do so. -It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to 
obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly 
determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. 
Thc particular way in which we proceed becomes established as a cllstom or practice and becomes 
the standard of con-ectness against which we judge whether future applications are correct or 
incorrect. Individuals that pat1ake in this custom or have mastered the custom can be said to possess 
the technique for doing X. Two individuals can be said to be partaking in the same technique simply 
because they belong to the same community, have the same inherited background, have been 
trained in the same way, and share the same natural human responses. This is \vhat guarantees 
sameness. 
A particular application is judged COITect or incon-ect not by a standard independent of the 
technique or practice. Realism demanded that the standard of correctness be independent of what 
wc \\ollid do or be inclined to do. This demand, as we have seen earlier, led to a dead end. It turned 
out that the criterion (the universal) which was supposed to be independent of our practices could 
not be identified independently of ollr practices, and so did not offer a genuine explanation of our 
practices. In the case of the appeal to a technique an application is judged correct or incon-ect if it 
accords with the practice (which is the manifestation of the technique). There is no further 
independently available criterion. 
[n LFM 20 I Wittgenstein says: 
You might ask: what are we convinced of when we are convinced of the truth of a logical 
proposition? How do we become convinced of, say, the law of contradiction? We first learn 
a certain technique of using words. Then the most natural continuation for us is to 
eliminate certain sentences which we don't use - like contradiction. This hangs together 
with certain other techniques .............. "Recognising the law of contradiction" would come 
to: acting in a certain way which we call "rational". 
Here there is an explicit mention of the term "technique". Using words ~ using language- is a 











techniques. Here too Wittgenstein emphasises that what human beings take to be law-like is what 
human beings find natural. Although Wittgenstein does not explicitly state it here, this as an 
implicit argument against the idea that our logical rules derive their validity from something 
Illdependent of us. The notion of the platonic universal which, in the rea list's account, played the 
role of justifying the extension of a word, or justifying our logical rules, has been replaced in 
Wittgenstein's later w'ork with the mterwoven concepts of 'technique', 'what we find natural', 
. custom and human agreement in judgement'. 
i\1cGinn criticises Wittgenstein's notion of a custom accusing Wittgenstein of overcooking an idea 
\\hich plays no significant role in the later account ofianguage7• McGinn claims that if human 
beings have a capacity to do something, there seems no reason that the point has to be made that the 
capacity has to be played out several times and by several people (i.e. McGinn takes issue with PI 
199: '"It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one person 
obeyed a rule .... "). What McGinn fails to appreciate is that a technique can only become a standard 
of correctness when it is executed several times and when the members of that community agree on 
that application. It is this agreement that establishes the custom and it is this custom that we look to 
in order to establish whether an application counts as COITect. One may complain that Wittgenstein's 
account of technique is somewhat vague, since it cannot be given a complete verbal formulation. 
HO\\cver. a technique is. in a manner of speaking, a moving target: a specific technique can never 
be fully articulated in terms of a formula or inventory because the past and present applications 
ah\ays under-determine the future applications. Furthem10re, it is in the nature of a technique that 
the possessor cannot or may not be able to say what it consists in, but can nevertheless have a 
know-how of it. 
\Ve now need to knmv whether appeal to technique is an appeal to investigation-independent 
criteria and thus upholds the distinction between what we do and what we should do. A technique is 
of course not an inventory containing all the conect applications - it cannot be since the possible 
applications of a word are infinite. A technique can also not be completely specified in words. 
Because future applications are different to past applications, the \vay a word was applied in the 
past does not sct the blue-print for how it should be applied in the future. But past applications 
inform the technique, and influences the way the word will be applied in the future. However, does 
this mean that we have to have to wait and see how \ve apply a word in order to say what the correct 
application of that word should be? In one sense we do have to wait and see, but what we are 
waiting to see is not some arbitrary application on our part; rather we are waiting to see how the 











certain moves and not others. Pears8 uses the notion of 'fit' to articulate how the technique works. 
The general idea is that how a general word is applied to a thing on one occasion contributes to the 
meaning of the word and plays a role in determining the way it is used on the next occasion - so the 
past feeds into or influences the present and future. The bearer of a technique thus does not have 
ti·ee rein in future applications, but is constrained by the how the technique was developed in the 
past. Pears' had suggested (in conversation) that the notion of 'fit' works like a zip-fastener: the 
fastening or closing of any particular link depends on the closing of the previous links and this is 
turn contributes to setting the scene for closing the next link. He later revised this. In the case of a 
zip- fastener, all that happens is simply that the closing of each link creates a situation that makes it 
possible for the next link to be closed. In Pears 20049 he suggests that the past influences the lmy in 
which the technique will be employed in the future, though never completely determines it. This is 
part of the reason a technique cannot be specified in words: it is a way of doing things which 
although we may be able to give particular examples or manifestations of it, because it is able to 
generate an infinite a series of applications different to the past but nevertheless not arbitrary, it 
defies complete specification. It is a moving target. It is precisely this 'moving target' feature of the 
technique that separates it from all other accounts that attempt to put meaning on a static basis. 
Because the repository of meaning is not once and for all specifiable, because it does not reside in, 
or is constituted by some static item, real innovation or mutation is possible. Only appeal to 
technique can explain this plasticity of language. The meanings of words change over time, and any 
account which locates meaning in some static repository will not be able to accommodate this. 
Being in possession of a technique puts the speaker in possession of something which allows for 
mutations, but does not give completely free rein in future applications. The technique govems 
future applications although it is not completely specifiable. 
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Chapter 4: Private Language 
In the PI. unlike in the TLP. Wittgenstein does not offer a theory of meaning; what he does offer are 
remarks some descriptive, others logical and yet again others critical which together can be taken as 
his later conception of language. His views on language come out most strongly in the rule-following 
considerations discussed above and the battery of arguments that immediately follow it viz. the 
celebrated private language argument. The private language argument can be seen as a way of making 
the point already made in the rule-following considerations, but from another angle: in the rule-
following considerations the notion of an established practice for the possibility of language is 
introduced as the repository of meaning. The argument takes the form of undermining any verbal 
formulation of a rule since the words used in such a formulation stand open to various interpretations 
and can thus not unambiguously fix a course of action. It cannot explain the interface between language 
and the \vorld. In the private language argument the role of established practices is brought out by 
examining a scenario where they would be absent. The scenario is that of a putative private linguist 
trying to set up and follmv his own linguistic rules to record his immediate private sensations 
phenomena which he alone has access to - without buying into and using the resources of a public 
language. The putative private linguist tries to set up a language without recourse to the established 
linguistic practices of the linguistic community and also without recourse to the physical world \vhich 
plays a role in producing the sensations he has. The argument attempts to show that such a language 
\\Quld not only be unshared in practice, but unsharable and hence unteachable in principle. In fact the 
argument attempts to show that such a 'language' is not a language at all; nothing that the putative 
pri,ate linguist does or could do could count as speaking a language. Such a 'language' would be 
unintelligible to everyone else including the putative private linguist. The idea then is that in the 
absence of the linguistic community and the physical world, a language cannot get otT the ground, and 
that any account of language that tacitly assumes a position, or pre-suppositions the kind of which on 
closer examination would amount to a private language (a radically unsharablc language), would then 
be \\Tong. 
Before I go proceed I need to qualify my introduction of the private language argument. I am not 
suggesting that Wittgenstein intended to demonstrate the significance of social institutions by means of 
the priYate language argument, although some philosophers have suggested that this is part of his 










subtracts the resource of established linguistic practices and the physical world which plays a role in 
producing these responses and in so doing corroborates the significance of the linguistic community. 
\\:l1at is unanimously agreed upon is that the immediate target of the private language argument is both 
Carnap's idea of a private phenomenological language, as v.leB as Wittgenstein's own view during his 
\ eriticationist phase, both of which endorsed the idea of a language that to private inner 
sensations. The wider target is the Cartesian assumptions that underlie many philosophers' thoughts 
about language. What is 110t entirely clear is the role Wittgenstein intends us to understand the 
linguIstic community plays. The question thus is: does the imp0l1ance of the linguistic community 
deri\e from the fact that it plays a particular kind of role - a role which some other item could also play 
or is the point that the linguistic community as such is indispensable nothing else could play its 
role') This qucstion stands at the intersection of a number of important inter-related considerations. One 
is that it has bearing on the private-Ianguage-solitary-Ianguage debate; another is that it will help LIS 
understand more clearly the logical status of established practices or customs in his discussion. 
The broad target of the private language argument is the mainstream of modern philosophy from 
Descartes through classical British empiricism and Kantianism to contemporary cognitive 
representationalism - the common denominator being the tacit presupposition of the possibility of a 
pri\ate language. This presupposition is built 011 two natural assumptions. The first is that the meanings 
of \\ords are determined by what they stand for this is part of the Augustinian picture of language. 
The second assumption is that in the case of psychological terms, what they stand for are phenomena 
that are only accessible to the individual. So for example, the word pain refers to an epistemically 
pri\ate experience and it follows not only that no one can know what I have when I am in pain but also 
that. because of this, no one else can know what I mean by 'pain'. So, if both the contents for all our 
words and the evidence for our beliefs are provided by ideas, impressions, intuitions, sense-data, then 
the whole of our language is private in this sense. It is this picture of language and language-learning 
that lies at the bottom of. and unites the conception of representationalists, idealists, rationalists, 
empiricists and Kantians. Russell's conviction that the meanings of our words must be sense-data led 
him to be the first to accept the conclusion of Locke's inverted spectrum: given that meanings are 
pri\ate experiences, what one person means by 'red' may be what another means by 'green'. He was so 
strongly convinced of this that he regarded it as a precondition of intersubjective understanding that 
t\\O people cannot mean the same thing by their words. The TLP also bought into this idea. although 











shades of colours, points in the visual field. During Wittgenstein's verificationist phase he endorsed, 
together with Carnap and Schlick, the idea of a primary phenomenological language which refers to 
immediate experiences. We see this in Philosophical Remarks where he says: 
We could adopt the following way of representing matters: if I, L.W., have a toothache, 
then that is expressed by means of the proposition 'There is toothache'. But if that is 
so, what we now express by the proposition 'A has toothache', is put as follows: 'A is 
behaving as L.W. does when there is toothache' ....... It's evident that this way of 
speaking is equivalent to ours when it comes to questions of intelligibility and freedom 
from ambiguity. But it's equally clear that this language could have anyone at all as its 
centre. 
Now among all the languages with different people as their centres, each of which I 
can understand, the one with me as its centre has a privileged status. This language is 
particularly adequate ..... - The privileged status lies in its application ... ,2 
Bet\\een 1932 and 1935 he rejected the idea of a phenomenological language and then attacked 
idealism and solipsism. The notion of a private language first appears in the lectures of 1935-63. The 
tinal condensed version is in PI 243-315, sections 270-272 being particularly scathing of the 
consequences of endorsing the idea of a language which refers to private immediate experiences. 
[n PI 243-55 Wittgenstein introduces the idea of private language and shows that our psychological 
\ocabulary is not private in this sense, in sections 256-71 he argues that the very notion is incoherent. 
This is followed by sections 272-315 where he argues that the preceding considerations do not amount 
to saying that the mental is unreal. In PI 258, he invites us to imagine a case where someone (a putative 
pri\ate linguist) wants to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end the 
pri\ate linguist associates the sensation with the sign "S" and writes the sign in a calendar for every day 
on \\hich he has the sensation. He makes this association by concentrating his attention on it and saying 
"S" to himself a kind of 'inward' ostensive definition. Thus baptised, the private linguist can record a 
recurrence of the sensation. Wittgenstein denies that this amounts to a meaningful employment of "S". 
The putative private linguist claims in our public language that he is using a sign "S" as part of a 
language. that is, according to rules. albeit rules only he understands (PI 261, 270). But it transpires 











language. So. if \ve are to grant the putative private linguist any success at his attempt, it would show 
that he was not doing - in fact could not do, what he intended to. He is only successful when he 
deploys the resources of both the material world and the linguistic community. Following the text, the 
first restriction Wittgenstein says the private linguist faces is that his definition of the sign cannot be 
formulated in a public language, since a private language cannot be understood by anyone but the 
putati\'e private linguist. Furthermore, the sign in the private language cannot be said to refer to a 
sensation or even to something, for 'sensation' and 'something' are words belonging to a public 
language. (PI 26 J). The only \vay. it seems. for the private linguist to endow his sign with meaning is 
to define it extensively. by 'concentrating his attention' on the inner experience and. 'as it were, pointing 
to it il1\nlrdly'. thereby 'impressing on himself the connexion between the sign and the experience. To 
this ~uggestion Wittgenstein retorts: 
But, "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings 
it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But 
in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One 
would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is 
right. And that only means that here we can't talk about "right". (PI258) 
.~nd of course. if we cannot talk about "right" i.e. if we cannot talk about a word being applied 
correctly or incorrectly. then we cannot talk about a word having any meaning. The point is that we 
cannot talk about "right" unless we have a criterion of correctness. And this is precisely what the 
pri\ate linguist lacks. Verheggen4, in her article FVittgellsteill and Solitary Languages, following Barry 
Stroud', cautions against reading Wittgenstein's reasons for claiming that the private linguist has no 
criterion of correctness as being verificationist inspired. She examines the way Pears/) presents the 
matter. Pears, according to her being representative of holding such a view. According to her, Pears 
claims that a private linguist has no criterion of correctness because the private linguist could never be 
in a position to tell whether the applications of his signs are correct or not. And it is for this reason that 
a private language is not possible. Pears writes: 'someone who cannot discover what he is in fact doing 
\\ill not be able to maintain any proficiency at doing it, and will never be in a position to learn to do it, 
m \:'\e11 to try to do it.'· And again: 'We cannot even try to acquire a skill without a usable criterion of 
~uccessful performance.'s The problem with such an interpretation, according to Verheggen, is that it 











independent of how things seem to him) to verify the truth of his subsequent reports. But the real 
trouble. she argues. is not that the private linguist is in this aproductive position, but that there is 
nothing in which a correct application consists in. So it seems as if she thinks that Pears thinks that the 
pri,ate linguist faces an epistemic difficulty: bereft of recourse to the public domain the private linguist 
has no way of telling whether an experience is 'the same as' one that went before (one that he has 
identi fled and ostensively baptised). 
Stroud. although he does not mention Pears in his article, complains that this way of taking the matter 
(the dew Verheggen ascribes to Pears) amounts to a kind of veriflcationism: a state of affairs is 
intelligible only if it is ascertainable by means of a particular test or criterion on each occasion that it 
does obtain or that it does not. Now although Stroud does not explicitly attribute this view to Pears, he 
echoes Verheggen's charge of Pears and probably is the inspiration behind her charge - Verheggen 
being a student of Stroud's. The verificationist charge applied to their reading of Pears would be that 
according to Pears, because the private linguist cannot verify his sensations (cannot supply a truth-
\aILll~ tor his descriptions), we can say that there is no criterion of con-ectness. In the words of 
\' erheggen "Wittgenstein's conclusions, in PI 258, that the would-be private speaker has no criterion of 
correctness is in fact misleading. II') She adds as a footnote that it has misled numerous commentators, 
though not all ~ Stroud being one of those not so mislead. And she goes on: "For it is not just that she 
hus no criterion of correctness to assess the application of her private sign, but that there is no criterion 
or cnrrcctncss to which her application can be subject."lo So, it is not just that the putative private 
speaker has no way of telling vvhether he has applied his sign con-ectly or incorrectly, but that there is 
no such thing as applying his sign correctly or incon-ectly. There is no such thing as applying his sign 
correctly or incorrectly just because no standard has been set up in the naming ceremony the private 
linguist attempted to undertake. No connection between sign and experience has been made, where a 
connexion is understood as something that puts you in a position to use the sign con-ectly in the future. 
Tn corroborate her vic\\' on the source of the problem for the private linguist she then reproduces the PI 
arguments against the workability of ostensive definitions, ending by stressing the importance of 
established linguistic practices. 
It appears that Verheggen and Stroud have both misunderstood Pears. Firstly, it does not appear that 
Pears is advocating any veri tlcationist-inspired reason for the failure of the private linguist to set up his 











criterion \'i::. that no criterion has been set up by the bogus naming-ceremony, is something Pears never 
disputes. According to Pears. the naming ceremony has achieved nothing it is empty. No standard or 
model of correctness has been established. Furthermore, in the specific case of the private linguist, if he 
can ne\'er discover whether he is right or wrong, then this just means that he has not set up a criterion. 
It does not help to say that there may well be one, for in the private linguist's amputated world the only 
criterion C(l1l be one that he would have set up. If the domain of our examination were the material 
\\orld with our public language. then one could draw a distinction between someone's not being able to 
kno\\ something, and there being a fact of the matter. However, in the private language scenario, if he 
could not know something, then it follows that there is nothing (no fact of the matter), since the private 
linguist's world is cut off from anything that could serve as 'the fact of the matter'. Pears' reading fits 
nicely \yith the text: he can't talk about 'right' because he has no criterion of correctness (PI 258). In 
other \yords. he cannot say \vhether his application of the sign is correct - whether his applying the sign 
to a future occurrence is a reoccurrence of the original occurrence since he has not even determined 
"hat would count as an instance of "S". He has not set up a criterion. So. if he cannot tell whether his 
appl ication is correct. it just means that he has not set up a criterion and given that he takes his world 
as complete, then, if he has not set up a criterion, there is no criterion (in his world). And we cannot say 
that there is a criterion in the material world, since he has cut himsel f off from the material world. The 
indispensable role of an independent criterion of correctness which happens to be the external world is 
stressed in Philosophical Grammar: 
... Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it in 
relief but it can't be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the very 
fact that language can and does only refer to it. 
For since language only derives the way in which it means from its meaning, from 
the world, no language is conceivable which does not represent the world. 11 
And again. in Philosophical Occosiolls he discusses the futility of privately setting up a criterion lor 
the usc of the word red (a discllssion parallel to the one about privately setting up criteria tor the use of 
the sign 'S' to name the sensation 'pain' which the putative private linguist allegedly experiences in PI 
25K): 











connect the word 'red' with 'a particular colour'? In fact what does the expression 'a 
particular colour' here mean? What is the criterion for his connecting it/ the word/ 
always to the same colour/ experience! ? Is it not often just that he calls it red? 
In fact, if he is to playa lang[uage] game, the possibility of this will depend upon his 
own and other people's reactions. The game depends upon the agreement of these 
reactions; i.e. they must describe the same things as 'red'. 
"But if he speaks to himself, surely this is different. For then he needn't consult 
other people's reactions and he just gives the name 'red' now to the same colour to 
which he gave it on a previous [288] occasion." But how does he know that it is the 
same colour? Does he also recognise the sameness of colour as what he used to call 
sameness of colour, and so on ad inf[initum]? It is quite true he! connects! uses, in 
agreement with or[d]ina[r]y use, the word "red"! and the same colour! and that he 
would not say that he saw now the colour he had seen before, that that colour is red 
but that what he sees now is not red etc. 
It is quite true he connects the word and the exp[erience]. 
But I could use language just for making entries in my diary and without ever having 
learned it. I could have invented a name for the particular colour sensation, say, the 
name "red" and then used this name to note down whenever I had that colour 
sensation. That means, you (would) playa private language game with yourself. But 
let's see, how are we to describe this game? - Christening. The words" 'seeing red' 
means a part[icular] experience" are senseless unless we can follow them up by 
namely this -> (pointing) or else they may say experience as opposed to phy[sical] 
obj[ectJ, but then this is grammar. 12 
The point is clear: there is no way a language can be set up unless the standards of correctness are 
independent of the potential language-user. These standards must come from the world - the world 
being the source of the meanings of our words. Clearly this is not a verificationist position, but an 
emphasis on independent criteria of correctness. There is no inner world cut off from the external world 
and our practices. Speaking a language is an accomplishment driven by an intention to accomplish 
something i.e. it is not like sneezing. which is an automatic response. And, like with all events that are 










kJl(m what it is that he has to achieve, and Oi) he must be able to measure, or verify, whether bis 
attempts have been sllccessful. i.e. whether he has hit the target so to speak. For example, if someone is 
running a race with the intention of completing the distance before the other participants, he has to 
kno\\ (a) what would cOllnt as having succeeded in this case, reaching the finish line, and reaching it 
before anyone else does, and (b) how he is performing vis-a-vis the other participants, and how far he is 
fhml the finishing line. If he is running a race against others, and he has no clue how he is perfol1ning, 
and n('\er will. or never could know, then there is no way that we could ever say (or he could ever say) 
that he has accomplished anything. In fact, under these conditions he cannot even set out to accomplish 
anything. (CC 'Imagine someone saying: "But I know how tall I am!" and laying his hand on top of his 
head to prove it.' (PI 279». He does not have any idea of what he is supposed to achieve, and a 
limiori. no idea of whether he is successful at his attempt. With respect to the private linguist, his task 
is to master a technique (apply a word in a regular fashion), but he lacks the resources for intentional 
accomplishment.
11 
What I want to do now is examine why the private linguist has not managed to set up a criterion. This 
question introduees the issue raised earlier about the role Wittgenstein means us to understand the 
practices of the linguistic community play. The question to be addressed is: do the established linguistic 
practices fulfil an indispensable logical role, or is appeal to the practices themselves indispensable? 
Another way of addressing the question is to ask whether a solitary, as opposed to a private language is 
possible. Whereas a private language is one in which the would-be speaker attempts to record 
experiences which he alone has access to, and to rely solely on the occurrence of these experiences cut 
off from their physical causes or behavioural consequences, a solitary language would be one which a 
\\ouki-be speakef attempts to record events in the physical world, but has never had access to any 
human communication and hence is not a member of a linguistic community. The difference bet\veen 
the t\\O situations would be that whereas the private linguist only has his immediate experiences to go 
by. the solitary linguist has access to standard physical objects that endure over time. What this 
amounts to is that whereas the private linguist'S resources afe only accessible to him, and a recurrence 
can only be checked by his recalling a memory of a former occurrence, the solitary linguist's resources 
are publicly available and durable: although there is no one around him to correct him should he make 
a mistake, he could in principle be corrected because physical objects are public objects. Furthermore, 
he does not have to rely on a memory to evaluate a potential recurrence ~ physical objeets are durable 











If \\l' think that a solitary language is possible it means that we regard the role that the linguistic 
comlllunity plays as indispensable. It is a role that can be fulfilled by something else presumably 
physical objects. If we think that a solitary language is not possible, then we think that appeal to the 
linguistic community itself is indispensable bereft of which a putative speaker cannot be said to be 
speaking a language. Now the PI does not concede to or refute such a position; however, according to 
Pears 1-+ nothing in Wittgenstein's discussions rules out the possibility of a solitary language. Tn other 
\\ords. nothing in Wittgenstein's work indicates that it is the appeal to the linguistic community rather 
than its role. which is the indispensable factor. Anyone contesting this reading would have to show 
either that the PI does rule out stich a reading, or that such a reading is inconsistent with the general 
tenor of the PI, or that a solitary language is not possible on logical grounds. 
We go back to the question of \vhy the private linguist has not managed to set up a criterion. The 
pri \ate I inguist maintains that one can give a meaning to "S" independently of any public language, by 
means of a private ostensive definition. FIe has a sensation and baptises it by concentrating his attention 
on it and saying "5" to himself. Subsequently he keeps a diary in which he records an "5" every time he 
ha:-- the same sensation. \Vittgenstein denies that this amounts to a meaningful employment of "S". No 
criterion of correctness has been established. 'I impress (the sensation) on myself "can only mean: this 
process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have 
110 criterion of correctness." (PI258) And therefore he can only go by what seems right. This remark 
has been interpreted as resting on scepticism about memory: I cannot be certain that I use "S" only 
\\'hen I have "S". because my memory is fallible. However, understanding the above passage this way 
imites the retort that the fallibility of memory is just as much a problem in the case of a public 
language. The argument is therefore either unsound or undermines the possibility of language 111 
general. However. fallibility in public language need not be a problem if mistakes can be corrected a 
resource which is not a\ailable in the private language scenario. 
While checkability is an important ingredient in the possibility of language, what is at issue is not the 
truth of the utterance "There is 5 again" but its meaningfulness. The point is therefore not about the 
reliability of memory. but about whether there is anything to remember whether a criterion has been 











There is no question of my memory's playing me a trick - because (in such cases) 
there can be no criterion for its playing me a trick. 15 
slI1ce the original ceremony failed to establish a rule for the use of "S". This position rests on 
Wittgenstein's further argument that there cannot be a private ostensive definition, since there are no 
mental analogues to the essential features of public ostensive definitions. Public ostensive definitions 
work only because the thing to be named has already been individuated, in a manner of speaking. In 
other \\ords. the person for whom the ostensive definition is intended already has to understand the 
logical category of the thing that is being named, or, put more generally, the logical category of the 
c/c/iniendulIl needs to have been determined. Its overall role in the language-game must already be 
clear. By the time the person learns the name of a thing, he should already have had the concept so to 
speak. By simply uttering a word in the presence of some object does not tell the person what features 
to attend to and hence what features must be looked out for when using the \vord subsequently. The 
person has to have the concept before an ostensive definition can be of any use; the ostensive definition 
cannot create a concept. In Philosophical Occasions Wittgenstein is emphatic that there can only be a 
name (one can only name something) if there already exists a technique for using it, and this technique 
mllst be something independent of the language-user as well as being public: 
The relation between name and object. Lang[uage] game of builders. What is the 
relation between names and actions names and shapes? The relation of ostensibly 
defining. That's to say, in order to establish a name relation we have to establish a 
technique of use. And we are misled if we think that it is a peculiar process of 
christening an object that makes a word the word for the object. This is a kind of 
superstition. So it's no use saying that we have a private object before the mind and 
give it a name. There is a name only where there is a technique of using it and that 
technique can be private; but this only means that nobody but I know about it, in the 
sense in which I can have a private sewing machine. But in order to be a private 
sewing machine, it must be an object which deserves the name "sewing machine," not 
in virtue of its privacy but in virtue of its similarity to sewing machines, private or 
otherwise. 16 











category of what is being named must already have been determined viz. that "S" is the name of a 
sCllsl/firm. However, 'sensation' is a word in our public language that is defined by reference to 
beha\'ioural criteria. Since the pnvate linguist has severed this connection, he needs to explain the 
category or 'post' of liS" afresh. However, simply uttering 'This is S' does not make "s" the name of a 
sensation. since it leaves undetermined what 'this' is. He cannot therefore create a category or a concept 
just by littering a word in the presence of some occurrence. Nothing, by means of which the occurrence 
is to be individuated or determined, has hereby been established. Concentrating one's attention cannot 
establish criteria of identity for subsequent uses of "S". Such criteria can be provided only by 
specifying what kind of thing is at issue through a sOltal term. But the private linguist has not 
established what he is concentrating on. He cannot say that it is a certain 'experience' or 'phenomenon'. 
since he lacks the resources for explaining those terms provided by our public language. He cannot 
e\'en say that "s" refers to something he has, since 'has' and 'something' are also words from our public 
language with a determinate grammar. This kind of elenctic argument forces the putative private 
linguist to the point where he \vould like just to emit an inarticulate sound' (PI 257, 261-3). If a private 
ostensive definition cannot provide a standard of correctness, then its putative sample - the inner 
pri\ate object drops out of the picture as an 'idle wheel'. Any explanation of the possibility of 
language cannot contain reference to private objects objects which speakers refer to but which cannot 
en?r be known to others. Wittgenstein's 'beetle-in-a-box' example has bearing here: in a language-game 
in \\hich everyone has a box and refers to its contents as a 'beetle', but in which no one has access to the 
contents of other people's boxes, the contents of the box and their nature are irrelevant to the meaning 
or 'beetle'. The same is true if we imagine the inner object (the sensation S) changing constantly 
without our noticing. The reason is not that the private object is unknowable, but that it is semantically 
irrelevant. 
Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' 
meant - so that he constantly called different things by that name - but 
nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms 
and presuppositions of pain" - in short he uses it as we all do. Here I 
should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves 
with it, is not part of the mechanism. (PI271) 











turn on some part of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not 
connected with the mechanism at all.) (Pl270) (Cf. P1293) 
This howe\er gives the impression that we are left with a kind of behaviourism which denies that there 
is anything behind our outward behaviour. To this possible charge Wittgenstein says: 
And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation 
itself is a nothing." -Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing 
either. The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as 
a something about which nothing could be said. (PI 304) 
And then to the charge that he is saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction he says 
that the only fiction he is pointing out is a grammatical fiction. The sensation is a semantically 
irrdevant 'grammatical fiction' if we construe the grammar of 'pain' on the model of object and name. 
There are no criteria of identity for private mental entities since any attempt to articulate its 
identification (or misidentification) can only be done in a public language where the meanings of 
\\ords are learnt differently. This does not imply that there are no such objects (sensations), but that 
sensations cannot be understood as private entities. The meanings of words like 'pain' are thus fixed by 
criteria other than the experience of the sensations. And it is for this reason that the putative private 
linguist cannot set up a criterion of correctness. 
\V e have yet to ans\ver the question: is it the linguistic community as such that plays an indispensable 
role or can this role be replaced by something else i.e. is it the role that the linguistic community plays 
\\hich is indispensable or is it the linguistic community itselF which is indispensable? The traditional 
\\a). in the literature of approaching the problem is to attempt to imagine a would-be solitary linguist 
and then to ask what advantages he has over the private linguist. When you introduce the issue like this 
you quickly see that the solitary linguist has public objects available to him - public objects being 
objects which are not just accessible to him but to others as well. The advantage of public objects is 
that. whereas the private object has to be identified or individuated from a stream of experiences by the 
pri,ate linguist. the solitary linguist has access to objects that are already individuated, so to speak. 











the private objects were only accessible to the private linguist and nobody except he himself could give 
a \crdict on whether he has had a reoccurrence of an experience; in the case of the solitary linguist the 
objects he intends to record are available to others. So, should he go wrong, someone else could. in 
principle. point out that that he has gone wrong. But there is no 'someone else' in the world of the 
private linguist. So. how could mistakes be pointed out to him? 
Pears. in The False Prison. (vol. II) argues that the solitary linguist can calibrate, or judge his 
recordings on standard objects. Standard objects can be used to detem1ine whether you have used a 
\\ord correctly. The plausibility of this turns on the explanation of hmv a connexion has been set-up 
between the standard object and the word. The question now is: would the putative solitary linguist run 
into the same kind of trouble the putative private linguist runs into: in both cases, is the naming 
ceremony empty'? The position of the solitary linguist might at first glance have appeared more 
promising than that of the private linguist. since. in the case of the private linguist he does not have the 
impossible task of having to. without buying into the public language, individuate the 'thing' he intends 
to name. In the case of the solitary linguist the identity of the objects around him 'shouts out at him'. 
They are already individuated. But one wonders how he made the name-object connexion in the first 
place. To address this question, I want to re-examine what Wittgenstein says about the linguistic 
community's practices. The established practices act as a criterion - a model- of correct usage. To say 
that they act as a criterion of correct usage is to say that they fix or determine the meaning of a word. 
And the meaning of the word is not some particular object, but the role of that word - the use that is 
made of the \vord. So that. if a word lacks a particular lise, if it does not fit into some language-game .-
it lacks meaning. People do certain, and not other things, with that word, that is why it has that 
meaning. There is a practice of using a word in a certain way.17 Thus a word only has meaning if there 
exists a practice for its use. The practice fixes its meaning. This much is agreed upon by both advocates 
of the possibility of a solitary language and those who deny its possibility. 
'\JO\\ let's imagine ourselves in the primordial position of the solitary linguist. He has to set up the 
practice by himself. To set up a practice by himself means to establish a tradition of using a word in the 
same wayan subsequent occasions. So, first he has to connect a word to a thing. The problem for the 
pri\ate linguist was that he had to individuate his sensation and that can only be done in the public 
language. In the case of the solitary linguist, his 'things' are already individuated: ho\vever he still has 











What is important to notice at this point is that whereas someone bom into a linguistic community finds 
himself in a world of established practices which serve to order his world - to direct what he must 
\\ant. so to speak, the solitary I inguist's behaviour will be guided only by his basic desires: his desire to 
eat and drink and avoid bodily harm etc. So let's assume he eats a fruit and it tastes bad. He might uttcr 
some word in its presence to refer to say. the colour or the shape of the fruit. An observer may not 
immediately know what exactly he has referred to; we may need to observe future occurrences and put 
the pieces together, in a manner of speaking. But I can see no reason to think that the solitary linguist 
has not focussed on a particular aspect and connected his word to that feature of the fruit. But perhaps 
therc is something left Ollt before reaching this conclusion. The issue here is whether the solitary 
linguist can set up a rule. and to set lip a rule is to set up a defined course of action for accomplishing 
something. After all. what would drive such a recurrence of behaviour would presumably be a 
recurrence of the desire to perform it. This seems to be important, since, if the solitary linguist reacted 
in a similar \vay in the presence of a particular stimulus on numerous occasions, it does not seem to be 
enough to call such behaviour 'following a rule'. For example, let's say that every time he walks in a 
S\\<Impy area his foot becomes stuck in a muddy patch and he pulls hard to get it out. He might do this 
on c\ery occasion, but he is not following a rule. What he needs is some goal that must be achieved. 
somc course of action that must be repeated in the same way on subsequent occasions in order to 
achieve success. It might not immediately be appreciated why the solitary linguist needs a goal, smce 
\\hcn we compare him to the public linguist, we see that often times the public linguist does what he 
does because that is the rule. and the rule is what everybody does: there may not be, or he may not have 
a goal. However. the point about the importance of a 'goal' for the solitary linguist is that he does not 
find himself embedded in a world of 'concerns' already established independently of him, and into 
\\hieh he has to be initiated. In the case of the solitary linguist he must have an agenda. so to speak, and 
his natural 'concerns' provide such an agenda - an agenda that leads him to wallf to associate a sign 
with an object. The significance of this discussion is to suggest how the solitary linguist might, in a 
world cut off from ready-made concerns and practices, come to focus on some particular aspect of an 
object. When driven by the same goal or desire, he exercises his 'method' or 'technique' for achieving it. 
A naming ceremony can yield a criterion of correctness only when it establishes how to use a sign in 
the future (what would count as the correct employment of the sign). In the case of the private linguist. 
his ceremony establishes no such thing. With no resources from the physical world, he cannot say what 











language learner already knows the grammar of the word indicates that one must already 'know' what is 
to be picked out before you can apply a word to it and not the other way round, since there would be 
'nothing defined or pat1icular' that you have named. In the case of the public speaker, an ostensive 
definition is productive only if he already knows the grammar of the word, although he may not knmv 
the actual word. In other words, he knows how such a word is to be applied. This point about ostensive 
definitions indicates that ostensive definitions cannot be the beginning of language-learning (of 
acquiring a language). But in the case of the solitary linguist all he has at his disposal to get things 
going is ostensive definitions. So the question is about whether his naming ceremony (ostensively 
dcfining some item) cstablishes how to use a sign in the future. And it seems it can: the solitary linguist 
focuses on some particular aspect - the aspect he focuses on being driven or directed by whatever his 
need may be and in so doing establishes how the word must be used in the future. I think it is 
important to stress the role played by what I have called the 'agenda' that drives the solitary linguist to 
foclls on one aspect rather than another. of an object. Take the case of the private linguist again. He 
utters "S" in the presence of a sensation. The trouble with this ceremony is that it does not tell you how 
the sign "S" is to be used in the future. precisely because it has not really been 'used' in the ceremony. 
Nothing about the sensation was focussed on such that we can say that 'that' is how "S" is to be used. 
Why not'! The reason given before was that the private linguist does not have a repertoire to do so. The 
idea was that any aspect he may want to focus on is an aspect that comes from and belongs to the 
public linguistic community - and derives from the resources available to this community. But why 
could the private linguist not focus on an aspect of the sensation that does not need the resources from 
the public language? We would have great difficulty imagining such a situation simply because it 
would involve our having to give an example or conceive of a situation which is in principle 
unintelligible to us (since it must be an example which must not be articulated in public language) -
something which of course we can't do. This shows up something fundamental about the status of a 
pri\ate language: we cannot genuinely intelligibly set up such a situation. So, if \ve cannot even 
intelligibly set up a scenario that would count as the speaking of a private language, any account of 
language that tacitly assumes a private language is not a genuine rival as a theory of language. Any 
theory of language tacitly assuming a private language is thus wrong not because it is incomplete or 
false. but because it assumes premises that do not amount to an intelligible rival theOly. 
But there is something else that is significant aboLlt the private language scenario: the private linguist 











aspect of his sensation. If he still has to set up a language, then presumably he does not already have a 
stock of 'aspects' that he could draw from. He has no resources since he has no other concerns - neither 
concerns thrust upon him by any community, nor concerns prompted by the natural world or 
physiological concerns. He has, to put it bluntly, nothing in his world to get anything going, In the case 
of a public language learner in the linguistic community, the grammar of signs is already established 
he just has to 'catch on', He has to learn the established technique for using signs correctly. Colour 
\\ords. number words. shape words are already there the various aspects of how we can speak about 
an object has already been determined; it is simply a matter of his being initiated into this language. In 
the case of the solitary linguist. the grammar of signs is not set up, but, the way nature makes its 
presence felt (some things taste unpleasant, some things hurt) and his biological interests (to avoid 
unpleasant things, for example) steer his focusing on this or that aspect of an object. The private 
linguist however, cut off from the natural world. is like a 'minister without a portfolio'. He has no 
resources whatsoever. and hence nothing to go by, 
I ha\e noted above that while Wittgenstein does not explicitly mIl' out the possibility of a solitary 
language. whether the idea of a solitary language would at all have been accepted by Wittgenstein has 
puzzled commentators. Pears];' suggests that much of the obscurity comes from the fact that 
\Vittgenstein uses the sensation of pain as his working example, Now this example is not problematic 
in itself: it is the way he deploys it that prejudices his arguments: he concentrates almost exclusively on 
the effects of pain, and ignores their causes and the role they play in learning the meaning of a \vord 
like 'pain', For example, in Pl257 he asks: 
"What would it be like if human beings showed no outward 
signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)?" 
'rile point he is intending to lead up to here is that if pain were separated from its natural expression 
(out\\ard signs of pain) it would not be teachable. Hence he answers the question with 
"Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache' ," 
Pears") suggests that since both the question and the answer are segregated from the rest of the passage 











\\ho has given the answer: however the comments that follow do not make mention of the possibility of 
learning the meaning of the word 'pain' through the stimuli that cause the sensation: 
Well, let's assume that the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the 
sensation. 
- So does he understand the name without being able to explain its meaning to 
anyone? 
From this we see that Wittgenstein does not at all consider the connection of the \vord pain with its 
\ariolls possible stimuli: in the absence of the expression of pain (henee the absence of a community) a 
child will not be able to talk about his pain. It is odd that Wittgenstein fails to mention pain stimuli. 
which undoubtedly plays a role in teaching the use of the word pain. This would have to be put down to 
neglect rather than rejection of the role of stimuli in learning the use of sensation words. Although, as 
Pears suggests, pain has always played a central role in the sceptical treatment of perception, and that 
may explain why he concentrated on it. it did produce an imbalance in his treatment of sensation 
\\ords. Thus the exegetical problems which his discussions raise come from (a) choosing pain as his 
main example (and neglecting cases with a uniform stimulus and no uniform effect), and (b) focussing 
exclusively on the external manifestations of pain and neglecting its causes. This has led to a bias 
tlnouring the role of established linguistic practices and communication between people and neglecting 
the role that standard objects play: our vocabulary must track types that are regularly connected in the 
\\orld around us. Tbe point is tbat the regularity in our language is sustained not only by the linguistic 
practices of the community. but also by the regularity in types of standard objects in the world. And of 
course it is our relation with standard objects that Pears deploys in his discussion of the possibility of 
setting up a language by calibrating on standard objects?) 
I t is wOl1hwhile to note that this is an area of philosophy that stands at the junction between science 
and philosophy. The abstract philosophical discussions of the possibility of a solitary linguist can be 
supplemented. or for that matter even replaced, by empirical evidence: discoveries of children that 
sllnive since birth in complete isolation from a linguistic community indicate that they were able to 
perform tasks successfully on many occasions. Tbe kinds of tasks needed to survive would not be those 
that can be described as mere stimulus-response behaviour, but behaviour that required the person to 











and to do something intentional is to know what counts as succeeding in what you're doing. It could be 
Sl1o\\l1, empirically, that such children who have survived in isolation have in fact needed to follow 
rules, have needed to know what counts as succeeding in what they're doing. Given this, the task would 
no longer be one that attempts to philosophically demonstrate the coherence or possibility of a solitary 
language, but one which has as its starting point the existence of a solitary language and which tries to 
understand and describe how the solitary linguist manages to survive. 
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Chapter 5: Necessity 
Wittgenstein's discussions on necessity in his later work center around two areas ~ (i) the explanation 
of the necessity of the inference from contingent premises to a contingent conclusion in a valid 
argument (proof using logic) and (ii) the explanation of the necessary status of a theorem derived from 
a set of axioms in a logical proof (proof in logic). The explanation of the necessity in these two cases 
has generated a classical dilemma: does the necessity derive from correspondence with independently 
necessary features in the world. or does it have something to do with the internal structure of language? 
Does nature force these propositions upon us, or do we stipulate them? Note that in this case, as it \vas 
in the case of the application of general words to things, the problem is cast in tel111S of only two 
alternatives either it is the case that necessary propositions capture independently necessary features 
in the world and are thus constrained by these necessary facts, or they do not describe anything at all 
and they are not constrained in any way and so our formulation of them is entirely capricious. So the 
dilemma is that either necessary propositions are objective or they are subjective. However, the 
dilemma obscures a third possibility, namely, that the rejection of realism does not automatically imply 
capriciolls conventionalism. This was the point made in the earlier discussion on the application of 
general words to things. Realism about universals had failed to explain the extension of a general word 
because the universal could not be identified independently of the set of things it was said to apply to. 
Bu! the failure of realism did not imply that the extension of a general word could not be specified in a 
way that would yield an explanation without this shortcoming. In the case of the application of general 
\\ords to things. the explanation offered was a scientific one. The scientific explanation was not meant 
as yet another contender on the same footing with realism. In fact, the scientific explanation is a 'nol1-
explanation'. It is really a descriptive account of what actually takes place when \'v'e apply general 
words to things. It mllst be seen as the only possible account that can be offered given the failure of a 
philosophical theory. The account makes use of the notion of an incompletely specifiable technique. 
The technique could not be completely specified by any verbal formulation because although the 
technique influences the way a speaker will apply a general word, it never completely determines it. It 
is. in a manner of speaking. constantly under construction. However, because the technique is, in this 
sense. a lllo\'ing target it may seem to fare no better than the realist's appeal to universals - it too 
cannot be appealed to independently of what we in fact do. Nevertheless, although the previous 
applications do not completely determine the next application, it does influence how the word would be 











future applications are fed in by the past applications, the technique does not constitute appeal to a 
candidate that is not mdependently specifiable. The appeal to a technique as a candidate (rather than the 
realist's universal) also prevents being swung onto the other hom of the dilemma viz. capricious 
comentionalism. Although \ve do have to wait and see how a speaker would apply a word in every 
l1e\\ case. the future application is influenced by the past applications, so the speaker does not have 
/uis.w:.~/(tire ill future applications. 
In the case of the student who followed the mle '+2' in the way we do up to a certain point and then 
de\iated from our way after a certain number has been reached, the question that was raised was: in 
\irtue of wbat can wc say that prior to the number after which the student deviated, he was following 
tbe rule the way we did? Or. in virtue of what can we say that two people are following the same mil' 
\\here. Lip to the present. they have behaved in the same way. In the case of the notion of a technique. 
the same question can be asked: in virtue of what can we say that two people are following the same 
technique. or. in virte 0 what can techniques be individuated? The answer to this of course has to do 
\\itl1 understanding how a technique I developed. We have seen that a community may eventually 
de\e1op an an agreement on th proper wy to 0 something. Some prodedure is executed several times 
and the members of the community eventually agree on the application 
]\;ote again that the crucial feature of this appeal to technique is that it opens up the field to an 
cxplanation of a very different kind to that offered by realism. It offers a kind of empirical explanation. 
one that derives from a description of how we in fact do things. Realism addresses the question: what 
IIlIlS! be the case given that meaning is possible and then offers an a priori or transcendental 
explanation. Wittgenstein addresses the question: how are things ill fact, given that our words have 
meaning. [t treats the application of general words to things as part of human activity, and like other 
human activities. the explanation must be sought within the realm of human activity. It therefore otTers 
an empirical rather than a metaphysical theory. The empirical alternative is not intended as just another 
contender to the realist theory. but is offered as the only available substitute. The search for a 
philosophical answer to the question failed, not because realism was an inadequate contender. but 
because it was not a contender at all. It was a bogus explanation since it appealed to items that are not 
spccifiable independently of our vocabulary. The failure of realism opened the path to the only other 
possible kind of explanation. The scientific explanation is clearly not situated in either of the camps of 
the dilemma. but rather undercuts the dilemma. It neither makes appeal to items that are not 











In the case of the explanation of the necessity of logical propositions we are faced with a similar 
situation. Again the debate is cast in terms of the dilemma between language and the world. The 
question is whether necessary propositions capture independently necessary features in the world, or 
\\hether they are simply arbitrary stipulations. And in this case too, we will come to see. Wittgenstein 
abstains from taking pat1 in the debate. He offers an explanation which, on the one hand, does not make 
appeal to extra-linguistic factors and so does not face the charge of appealing to factors which \ve are 
not able to identify independently of our practices, but which, on the other hand, does not amount to 
capricious stipulation. His discussion of the incompatibility of two complementary colours 
demonstrates Wittgenstein position in the debate. He deliberates about what guarantees that two 
complementary colours (red and green) do not overlap - whether it is a feature of the world 
independent of our colour vocabulary, or whether it is something produced by our language. The 
source of the necessity of the incompatibility offed and green presents a special problem. Unlike in the 
case of a necessary proposition such as: 'something cannot be both a fish and a bird at the same time' 
the source of the necessity comes from mutually exclusive definitions. A bird may be described as a 
creature with wings and a fish may be described as scaly and wingless. But in the case of red and green 
a definition like this is not available. The only way to know what 'red' is, is to see red. Of course we 
could offcr a definition in terms of light waves of the colour spectmm, but this is not what we have in 
mind when we use colour words. 
I n his earliest discussions on necessity after he returned to philosophy in 1929 he says: 
To a necessity in the world there corresponds an arbitrary rule in language. I 
A bit later he says more explicitly: 
The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only 
thing that one can draw off from this intrinsic necessity into a proposition.2 
In Zettel he qualifies both these verdicts at great length: 












355. But doesn't anything physical correspond to it? 
He goes on to deny that physical facts provide the complete explanation of the incompatibility. 
356 .......... But what is the right simile here? That of a road that is physically 
impassable, or the non-existence of a road? I.e. is it one of physical or mathematical 
impossibility? 
357 We have a colour system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside in 
our nature or in the nature of things? How are we to put it? Not in the nature of 
numbers or colours. 
358 Then is there something arbitrary about this system? 
Yes and no. It is akin to what is arbitrary and what is not arbitrary. 
Clearly Wittgenstein is denying that our colour system resides in the nature of colours and hence that 
\\hat makes a proposition necessary is any kind of correspondence with anything independently 
necessalY in the world. The question that would naturally arise here is whether the world plays any role 
at all and if so. what'? Wittgenstein asks and answers this question: 
364 ........ but has nature nothing to say here? 
Indeed she has - but she makes herself audible in a different way. 
"You'll surely run up against the existence and non-existence somewhere!" But that 
means against facts and not concepts. 3 
One difficulty \vith getting our mind round the denial that the world is the dominant partner in the 
explanation of the formulation of our concepts is that it seems so natural to think that our colour 
\ocabulary must have been set up the way it is because that is the way colours occur naturally. It seems 
there must be a correspondence bctween our colour vocabulary and the colours in nature. The short 
Cllb\\er was given earlier: we cannot talk of the way colours 'occur naturally' simply because \ve do not 
ha\t~ access to the colours except through our colour vocabulary. A fuller explanation is that if we were 
to ask a realist to identify two complementary colours without using our colour vocabulary at all he 
would not get very far. Deprived of such a vocabulary. he may resort to pointing to two coloured 











two colour-words. He is thus faced with a dilemma. If he refrains from using the colour vocabulary he 
would not have said anything at all: if he employs the vocabulary, the incompatibility may just be a 
consequence of his lise of the colour-vocabulary. The trouble is that it is only after necessary 
propositions have been formulated that we can ask about the source of their necessity. The point then is 
not Ihat realism is f~llse, but that the realist option cannot be independently fom1Ulated as an option. 
This might point to the real source of the difficulty in this problem: we cannot adjudicate between the 
t\\O options simply because we do not have two clearly distinguishable altematives. We cannot 
distinguish the realist alternative \vithout using our colour-vocabulary. Our vocabulary is already 
il1\olved even if only in the formulation of the problem. So then we do not have two options before tiS: 
language or the world. The problem seems intractable because we are trying to force an answer to tit 
onto one of the t\\O altematives, and clearly it cannot because we do not have two altematives. This is 
not to say that because the problem has been formulated in language the source of our colour 
\ocabulary is entirely in language, but only that the possibility becomes discussable at all only once it 
has been formulated. 
Howc\,er, as Wittgenstein's discussion on the incompatibility of two complementary colours indicates, 
he did think that the truth lay closer to the one alternative. Necessity is not an exotic impOli, but has its 
origins in native soil human life and human conventions. But these conventions are not capricious. In 
a sense they are arbitrary, since nothing independently of the conventions make them right, or justify 
thcir adoption. but their adoption is nevertheless hedged-in. Wittgenstein thus pays respect to the 
realist intuition that whatever determines what counts as necessary cannot be a matter of our whim - it 
has to be independent of how we happen to do things, but he escapes the fatal flaw in realism by 
locating the restraint not in some putatively independent hinterland, but within the domain of our 
natural history. 
Wittgenstein's critical remarks on realism must not be seen as an attack on a view he held in the TLP. 
In the TLP as well he repudiates realism, however, he still endorses what could be called a 'residual 
realism', a realism that appeals to the logical form of the world rather than factual truths as a validation 
of logic. In TLP 5 I he asks: 
If there would be a logic even if there were no world, how then could there be a logic 











On the one hand Wittgenstein is asserting that logic is independent of the world, on the other hand that 
there is a relation between logic and the world. We can reconcile these two claims by seeing that in the 
first part he is reacting against realism that requires for the existence of logic the existence of certain 
truths. for example. that there are universals or that the world has completely general features to which 
logical propositions correspond. Wittgenstein is totally against this: logic cannot owe allegiance to any 
facts: if it did. then if the facts were otherwise, it would mean that logic would run up against the facts. 
and this would mean that logic could be falsified. This would undermine the very character of logic. 
Logic cannot be true or false: logic is the pre-condition of propositions that have a truth-value. 
The thing that is so difficult to understand can be expressed like this: as long as we 
remain in the province of the true-false games, a change in the grammar can only lead 
us from one such game to another, and never from something true to something false. 
On the other hand, if we go outside the province of these games, we don't any longer 
call it 'language' and 'grammar', and once again we don't come into conflict with 
reality . ..! 
Haying said this. Wittgenstein still thinks that there is a relationship between logic and the world. The 
:,ccond pal1 of the question (How could there then be a logic given that there is a world?) is answered in 
TLP 6.124: 
The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they 
represent it. They have no 'subject matter'. That presuppose that names have 
meaning and elementary propositions have sense; and that is their connexion 
with the world. It is clear that something about the world by the fact that certain 
combinations of symbols whose essence involves the possession of a 
determinate character - are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We 
have said that some things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that 
some things are not. In logic it is only the latter that express: but that meclnS that 
logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but 











If we know the logical syntax of any sign-language, then we already have been 
given all the propositions of logic. 
Logic does not require the existence of facts, but it does require that names have objects as their 
meaning and that elementary propositions have sense. This relationship between logic and the world is 
not one of correspondence, but one where logic shows that there are objects (which are the meanings of 
names) and that there are logical possibilities (elementary propositions have sense). These are not part 
of the content of the world. but represent the skeleton or logical scaflolding of the world. As 
\Vittgenstein says in TLP 5.552: 
The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or 
other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience. 
Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so. 
It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What?' 
This is the 'vestigial' realism that Pears5 talks about. The realism is vestigial because it represents the 
last traces of a realist account once the postulation of (a correspondence between) extra linguistic truths 
and logic are given up. It has the outer form of realism, but none of the content. This vestigial realism 
dcri\cs from his other commitments viz. his Logical Atomism and his theory of Tautology. Logical 
Atomism requires that the sense of a proposition depend on the sense of its analysed constituent parts. 
The end-product of this analysis is indefinable names. Indefinable names designate simple objects. 
Propositions have sense because simple objects, which are the meanings of indefinable names, exist. 
Logical propositions in the TLP consist entirely of tautologies and contradictions or propositions 
reducible to tautologies or contradictions. A tautology consists of at least two propositions joined by a 
logical connective. So a tautology requires that its constituent propositions have sense (and a 
propositions has sense if its names have meaning). Thus for logic to exist we need elementary 
propositions with sense. Then it is just a question of combining them in a special way (tautologies are 
combined in such a way that it includes all possibilities; contradictions that it excludes all possibilities). 











If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying they are made necessary 
by certain properties of the colours (say) then that would make the conventions superfluous, 
since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the conventions exclude my 
saying. Conversely, if the conventions were necessary. i.e. if certain combinations of words 
had to be excluded as nonsensical, then for that very reason I cannot cite a property of 
colours that makes the conventions necessary, since it would then be conceivable that the 
colours should not have this property, and I could only express that by violating the 
conventions. 
The following remark in Philosophical Grammar also undennines the idea that logic requires any 
contact with reality. 
The thing that is so difficult to understand can be expressed like this: as long as we 
remain in the province of the true-false games, a change in the grammar can only lead 
us from one such game to another, and never from something true to something false. 
On the other hand, if we go outside the province of these games, we don't any longer 
call it 'language' and 'grammar'. and once again we don't come into conflict with 
reality.6 
In Call/hridge Lectllres J. which marks his return to philosophy in 1929, he presents the new lay ofthe 
land: 
"" .. it cannot be justified" (sc. By a realist demonstration of its correspondence with an 
independent reality) "it is not arbitrary in so far as it is not arbitrary what rules of 
grammar I can make use of. Grammar described by itself is arbitrary; what makes it 
non-arbitrary is its use. 7 
Logically necessary propositions cannot be validated in the way contingent propositions are validated. 











They do not correspond to anything, but rather are the conditions or possibility of producing contingent 
statements about the world. Logical propositions are a categorially different kind of proposition to 
contingent ones. By this time Wittgenstein had completely abandoned all trace of the residual realism 
and was well on his way to the conventionalism propagated in the PI. In the PI he advocates that logic 
is autonomous (it does not owe allegiance to any extra-linguistic truths). However, this autonomy must 
be understood in the context of what Wittgenstein was reacting against i.e. realism. Wittgenstein 
repudiated the idea that the existence of logic needs the existence of truths, and that there is a 
correspondence (and for that matter any kind of relationship) between these truths and logical 
propositions. In the PI Wittgenstein does make reference to facts in explaining logic, but he does not 
present a metaphysical account; rather. he solicits facts in the world to playa role in the development of 
logical propositions. This is a very different kind of explanation, and uses facts in a very different way 
to \\hich the realist does. The discussions below of proof in logic and proof using logic illustrate how 
he does this. 
While the mutual necessary exclusion of complementary colour words discussed earlier articulates well 
Wittgenstein's rejection of realism, it nevertheless represents a limiting case, since it explores the 
relationship between a necessary proposition and facts in the world. With more typical examples of 
necessary truths we would explore the alleged relationship between the necessary proposition and some 
non-contingent all-pervasive features of the world perhaps the kind Russell had in mind. However, it 
is because the colour-incompatibility example is a limiting case that it is so revealing, since it shows up 
that a realist explanation of the source of necessary truths is mistaken by discussing the alleged 
relationship between a necessary proposition and a much more familiar and tangible phenomenon i.e. 
colours. The colour incompatibility example shows up that necessary propositions cannot be validated 
in the \vay empirical propositions are validated i.e. by appealing to something in the world. This 
example is perfect because it allows us to see that appealing to correspondence with features in the 
\\orld is a dead-end. but that features in the world call be appealed to, although in a very different way. 
Recall the discussion on the application of general words to things. The point there was that though it 
\\as a matter of convention what the particular extension of a general word is, the convention does not 
de\\:lop unbridled. It is hedged in by a technique of applying a word - a technique the development of 
which is a function of our needs (the need for communication, and hence homogeneity in the language 
we lise). our physiology, our natural environment and what we find natural to do. In the case of 











realist claims that this connection is already made independently of us, and we receive it as a ready-
made gift, as it were. Wittgenstein's explanation is that we are not so lucky. A necessary proposition is 
one that we make ourselves, and then have the benefit of its use later. To use another analogy, necessity 
is nol a status that a proposition is born with - it does not come into the world as necessary in the way a 
prince is born into royalty. The situation is more like that of a group of people without an appointed 
leader. A few amongst the group assume responsibility from time to time, but there may be one who is 
always amongst those who aSSllme responsibility. Over time, this person comes to be regarded as the 
leader. He was not the leader from the outset, he was just part of the group like the rest. But he earned 
leadership because of his deeds. It is important to note though that it is not merely in virtue of his deeds 
that he earns this position, but it is also that, because of his deeds, the people accept him as leader. This 
is \\hat Wittgenstein had in mind in his explanation of the origin of necessary propositions. A particular 
pattern of reasoning may have been used over a long time and may always have, when fed tme 
propositions, generated tme conclusions. It encountered no recalcitrant experience. Over time, we start 
to think of this pattern of reasoning as necessarily tme, necessary not in the sense that we have finally 
discovered a pattern of reasoning which was tme independently of us anyway but which took us time to 
discover. but necessary because, as it happens, we have not encountered counter-examples to it. It is 
crue ial to see that it is not the case that the pattern of reasoning was necessary all along unbeknownst to 
us, and that we came to discover it as necessary because of its perfonnance. In other words, when we 
tinally ascribe necessity to it, we do not do so in the following spirit: "Well of course it did not 
disappoint us (was ahvays verified) since it was actually a necessary pattern of reasoning all along, clad 
in the garb of a contingent pattern of reasoning. The trouble lay with us - we took so long to recognize 
it. It practically had to prove itself to us. As for its outstanding perfonnance (always verified by 
experience), well, what else can we expect? It is behaving tme to its nature!" Nothing could be further 
from what Wittgenstein meant. The way Wittgenstein saw the matter, the proposition we regard as 
necessary was not a prince clad in the garb of ordinary folk. He was part of ordinary folk to start off 
with. And then he earned his position, not because his behaviour was in character, but just because, as 
it happened, it was verified on every occasion of its use. By the time it was regarded as necessary, it 
had genuinely graduated to this new status. It is a case of rags to riches. In the terminology of the later 
\york, a necessary pattern of reasoning is an empirical pattern of reasoning that hardened or 'petrified' 











96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, 
were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not 
harden but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions 
hardened, and hard ones became fluid. 
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may 
shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the 
shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. 
98. But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be 
wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may be treated at one time as something 
to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing. 8 
Discovering necessities on the realist account is like a join-the-dot puzzle the pattern is already there, 
we only have to join the dots. In the absence of such a realist picture, we have to explain how we 
construct necessities out of the only material that we have in hand i.e. our ordinary language, and tell a 
story that shows how we use ordinary language (and not some exotic Platonic postulate) to expand 
language. We have to show how the very material we have can be used to generate more such material. 
It is a case of using local talent rather than importing foreign material to manufaeture new goods. Such 
an explanation solicits empirical facts to explain how and why we have come to adopt certain patterns 
of reasoning as necessary. 
Of course the inferences used in proofs using logic are not the only kinds of logical propositions. There 
are also \vhat we eall analytic truths. Wittgenstein gives an explanation of analytic truths in a similar 
\'eil1, These kinds of necessary propositions were once empirical propositions that have petrified into 
necessary propositions. The process is one where certain empirical facts about a phenomenon get 
incorporated as part of the definition of that phenomenon. So for example' A is B' could transform 
from an informative expression stating some contingent fact about A, namely, that it is B to a 
conceptual proposition where A is B is definitive of A. The fact that a spider has eight legs might 
initially have been a contingent fact about spiders. However, that a spider has eight legs, might over 
time. become part of the definition or the concept of a spider. So 'a spider has eight legs' might then 











truth.') Wittgenstein uses the analogy of the relation between the present state of a clock and the future 
mOYement of its hands across its face to make the point (PI 195). In that example, there are two ways 
of articulating the relation - it could be either necessary or contingent. If it were necessary, the only 
way to then explain it is to say that the future movement of the hands across the face of the clock was 
included in the criteria of the description of the present state of the mechanism. The necessary 
relationship between the present state and the future movement is thus a conceptual one. This kind of 
'conceptual' explanation of necessity is what Wittgenstein refers to as 'petrifaction'. In Remarks on the 
Foul/datiolls o(Matlzel1latics VI. where he discusses the rule "+ I " he says: 
It is as if we have hardened the empirical proposition into a rule. And now we have 
not a hypothesis that gets tested by experience, but a paradigm with which experience 
is compared and judged. And so a new kind of judgment. lO 
It is important to note the two stages involved in the development of a necessary tmth. The one is 
\\hen. as a contingent proposition, it enjoys uncontested confirmation, and the other is when it is 
thereafter adopted as a necessary tmth 'petrified' as a definition. It is cmcial that we keep the reasons 
\\e regard a proposition as necessary logically distinct from our having ratified it as nccessary. Failure 
to do so \vould mean that we are using the fact that it is (has been ratified as necessary) as part of the 
reasons for ratifying it as necessary. In other words, it would amount to saying that the reason the 
proposition has not encountered recalcitrant cases is because it is necessary. This would then make the 
whole accollnt incoherent, since it would rely on the status that we accorded it as part of the reason we 
accord it that status. 
I t is II1teresting to note that this conventionalism is already part of his thinking as early as the TLP. 
We can foresee only what we ourselves construct. (TLP 5.556). 
This is, in keeping with the general tenor of the book, a rather stark way of putting the matter. In both 
cases however, the point is an anti-platonic one: necessary propositions are manufachlred by us. As in 
the case of the application of general words to things, once platonism is exposed as a fake, the worry is 
about how to explain the presence of necessary truth in a way that does not make it seem as if it is all a 











restraint but nothing like the platonic kind. The world does play a role in the explanation of the 
restraint but the explanation is in no way modeled on the kind of explanation that is involved in 
explaining the tnnh of empirical propositions i.e. a correspondence between language and features of 
the world. The conventions we adopt are the ones we find we can use; for example, they may be useful 
because they are \vithout infinite complexity and they give the simplest descriptions. 
This conventionalist account of language generates a specific kind of explanation of the growth of 
language. At first blush it might seem as if the picture it offers is one of the two antithical explanations: 
linguistic innovation is either invented or discovered. But this may be too stark a manner in which 10 
put it: if linguistic innovation is a matter of discovery, it seems that we must already have had a idea of 
how things should be: logical proof would simply be a matter of confirming what is already the case. 
The trouble with this is that appeal to correspondence with some extra-linguistic reality in order to 
explain the growth of language will fail in the way any platonic-inspired explanation does. What it 
appeals to cannot be identified independently of what it is used to explain. However, if we say that 
language-growth is a matter of invention, we give the impression that growth proceeds unhedged. 
\\hich of course compromises the objectivity of necessity and the rules of language. Wittgenstein's 
comentionaIism accommodates both potential extremes: it neither makes the mistake of appealing to a 
real ity \vhich is not independently identifiable, nor does it leave the road open to caprice. 
Pears 11 is illuminating in showing a connection between Wittgenstein's Theory of Tautology in the 
TLP and his conventionalism in his later work on the one hand, and a dominant theme in his account of 
language one that is present in both the TLP and his later work namely, the idea that language 
grows from the ground-level upwards rather than from the top downwards. Russell is an example of the 
top-down approach. In the case of Russell the idea is that the growth and development of language 
proceeds from a set of self-evident axioms that are then used to formulate theorems and generate 
further axioms, the self-evident axioms being more primitive than the generated ones. Another example 
of the top-down explanation is Chomsky. His idea is that we come with a set of ready-made logical 
structures. which we use to recursively generate other logical propositions and patterns of inference. 
Wittgenstein's bottom-up approach is more like the theory of evolution. We start with very basic 
primitive propositions, perhaps, in some cases not even propositions, but primitive expressions of 











It is a help to remember that it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts 
when someone else is in pain; and not merely when oneself is - and so to pay 
attention to other people's pain-behaviour, as one does not pay attention to one's own 
pain behaviour. 
But what is the word "primitive" meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of 
behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype 
of a way of thinking and not the result of thought. 
Suppose someone explains how a child learns the use of the word "pain" in the 
following way: When the child behaves in such-and-such a wayan particular 
occasions, I think he's feeling what I feel in such cases; and if it is so then the child 
associates the word with his feeling and uses the word when the feeling reappears. 
What does this explanation explain? Ask yourself: What sort of ignorance does it 
remove? - Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are 
so many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our 
language is merely and auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our 
language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is 
behaviour.) (Instinct).12 
' ....... how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? of the 
word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the 
primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has 
hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, 
later, sentences. They teach the child new behaviour.' (PI 244) 
Our repertoire expands as a function of our needs, the rewards and obstacles that our environment 
prmides, our natural responses and so on. The pattern of the development of language resembles a 
spider-web rather than a flow-chart with a hierarchical order. The idea IS that language sprawls pretty 











de\'elopment of language is the thinking behind his explanation of language in terms of language-
games in the PI. However, this bottom-up view is already present in the TLP, specifically in his 
account of logical propositions. The story there was that logical propositions can be explained in terms 
of it being a degenerate complex constituted by simple contingent propositions that are combined in a 
\\ay that cancels out all sense. This explanation of necessary truths of the propositional calculus in 
terms of simple propositions combining to form more complex ones seems to be in the same vein as the 
later idea of the development of language in tem1S of simple propositions forming the building blocks 
of more complex ones. That Wittgenstein's treatment of necessary propositions in the TLP is a form of 
the more fully articulated bottom-up approach to the development of language that we see in his later 
\\ork seems to be confirmed by his treatment of the views which his TLP account of necessity was 
meant to replace. The view he was replacing was the idea that language proceeded from a set of self-
evident axioms and theorems that formed a calculus; once some of the theorems had been proved, they 
would provide new rules of inference. The trouble with this view was that it leaves unexplained the 
adoption of the original axioms and rules of inference. The shortcoming with the explanation of the 
de\elopment of language in terms ofaxiomatization is explained in the TLP: 
Proof in logic is merely a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of 
tautologies in complicated cases. (TLP 6.1262) 
All the propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the case that some of them are 
essentially primitive propositions, while others are essentially derived propositions. 
Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology. (TLP 6.127) 
There is thus no explanation as to why certain propositions should be treated as primitive axioms from 
which other propositions are deduced. That 'every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology' indicates 
not only that logically necessary propositions are independent of each other but also that they are 
independently recognizable as sllch. 
It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they are true 












I will now examine his later treatment of proof in logic. His account of the role of proof in logic is a 
com'entionalist one and is linked, as has been indicated earlier, to the idea that language grows from 
ground-level upwards. At first glance the connection seems obvious. We have determined so far that 
the dewlopment of language is not a matter of discovery. That route is a dead-end. We have seen that it 
is probably more accurate to say that it is a matter of invention, although not capricious invention. This 
being the case, whatever it is that proof in logic establishes, it would not be that it establishes that a 
pattern of inference is in fact correct. I f we said that it establishes that a pattern of inference is correct 
\\'e \\ould be assuming that the connections already exist independently of and prior to us and that its 
correctness has to do with its correspondence with these independently necessary features. But if it 
does not exist independently of, and prior to us, then logical proof must playa different role. The role 
of proof in logic in Wittgenstein' s conventionalist account is that it confers on a pattern of reasoning a 
newfound status i.e, it becomes a IUle of inference, and in this way proof introduces a new rule of 
inference and expands our repertoire of logical rules. Our repertoire of rules thus grows in a bottom-up 
nlshion. A proposition is proved. and so becomes available to be put on the shelf as a logical rule, or in 
Wittgcnstein's words. becomes available to be put into the archive. 
In /?l'!I1arks 011 the FOllndations ot'lv/athematics I where Wittgenstein talks about the development of 
mathcmaticallUles he says (with reference to calculation): 
164. I learned empirically that this came out this time, that it usually does come out; but 
does the proposition of mathematics say that? I learnt empirically that this is the road I 
traveled. But is that the mathematical statement? - What does it say, though? What 
relation has it to these empirical propositions? The mathematical proposition has the 
dignity of a rule. 
So much is true about saying that mathematics is logic: its movement is within the 
rules of our language. And this gives it its peculiar solidity, its unassailable position, set 
apart. 
(Mathematics deposited among the standard measures.) 
165. What, then - does it just twist and turn about within these rules? It forms ever 












166. But then doesn't it need a sanction for this? Can it extend the network arbitrarily? 
Well, I could say: a mathematician is always inventing new forms of descriptions. 
Some, stimulated by practical needs, others, from aesthetic needs, - and yet others in 
a variety of ways. And here imagine a landscape gardener designing paths for the 
layout of a garden; it may well be that he draws them on a drawing-board merely as 
ornamental strips without the slightest thought of someone's sometime walking on 
them. 
167. The mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer. 13 
Opposed to this is the top-down view, where we start off with basic axioms and rules of inference 
which are used to prove other axioms and rules of inference, the deduced axioms and rules of inference 
being ones that exist prior to our proving them and the proof serving as a discovery of what was always 
the case unbeknownst to us. We have already identified the problems with this: it relies on the idea that 
there is a language-independent reality which, as it tums out, is not independently identifiable, and it 
postulates axioms to explain the arrival of other axioms on the scene while failing to explain the origins 
of the initial axioms and rules of inference. The bottom-up approach seems to avoid these troubles. But 
it has troubles of its own. 
Let's first examine Wittgenstein's account of the role of proof in logic in more detail. Language 
grO\\ tll is obviously not a matter of increasing any factual information. Language growth involves the 
expansion of our concepts and proof plays the role of expanding the conceptual repertoire of language. 
In the TLP proof in logic was used to identify tautologies that were not easily recognizable as such. In 
the PI proof in logic is used to create rather than to identify. The general idea is that when we prove a 
proposition. we are not just conferring on it a new status, i.e. as a rule of language, but after we have 
prO\ed it we see the proposition in a new light. The proven proposition contains more information than 
before it was proved. It has, in a manner of speaking, expanded conceptually. The proof changes the 
character of the original proposition. [n this way proof in logic creates new concepts. It creates a new 











When I said that a proof introduces a new concept, I meant something like: the proof 
puts a new paradigm among the paradigms of language; like when someone mixes a 
special reddish-blue, somehow settles the special mixture of the colours and gives it a 
name. 
But even if we are inclined to call a proof such a new paradigm - what is the exact 
similarity of the proof to such a concept-model? 
One would like to say: the proof changes the grammar of our language, changes our 
concepts. It makes new connexions, and it creates the concept of these connexions. It 
does not establish that they are there; they do not exist until he makes them.14 
It seems then that we alter the grammar of the conclusion of a proof in the very process of driving 
to\\ards the conclusion and in this \vay we are, in a manner of speaking, inventing new destinations. 
I n the course of the proof our way of seeing is changed - and it does not detract from 
this that it is connected with experience. 
Our way of seeing is remodeled. 15 
One would like to say: the proof changes the grammar of our language, changes our 
concepts. It makes new connections, and it creates the concept of these connections. 
(It does not establish that they are there; they do not exist until it makes them.) 16 
For example, someone who maintains that one can trisect an angle by means of a ruler and compass 
lacks a proper understanding of the relevant concepts 17. It is only after grasping the proof of the 
impossibility of such a construction that a person will understand that the phrase 'the trisection of an 
angle by means of straight edge and compass' is nonsensical. In this case it is not a matter of a new 
concept that has been created but rather that a person has, by means of the proof, become conceptually 
enlightened. His 'way of seeing is remodeled'. It appears that once you understand the logical package, 
or \\hat is logically packed into a concept, then you see it with new light. Goldstein l8 suggests that 
what Wittgenstein may have had in mind can be illuminated by a comparison with Kuhn'sl9 idea of 
'ren)lurionary science' a conceptual revolution in which the old paradigm is abandoned and a new set 











of mass and length are quite different from those in classical physics. In relativity physics, length is not 
an absolute measure, but depends on the relative velocity of the object being measured and the 
measuring device. This being the case, Newton would not be able to understand a conjecture in 
relati\'ity theory before he understood the concepts, and he can only acquire such an understanding by 
karning the theory. In a similar \vay, when doing a proof in logic or mathematics, we create new 
concepts and the proposition proved cannot be understood independently of an understanding of those 
concepts and that proof. The comparison with Kuhn, as Goldstein warns, should nevertheless not be 
pushed too far, since Kuhn thought that conceptual revolutions are rare, and that, most of the time, we 
are doing 'normal science'. For W, however, the normal state of logic and mathematics is 
re\o!utionary. 
Earlicr on we saw another \vay in which language expands conceptually: an empirical proposition 
hardens or petrifies into a conceptual one when a bit of empirical information is included in the 
definition of a phenomenon. The process involved the scientific community agreeing that an empirical 
proposition that has not faced recalcitrant instances be regarded as a conceptual one: the empirical 
information becomes part and parcel of the concept of a phenomenon. In the case of proof. innovation 
in language is achieved not by adopting a new definition, but by unpacking the logical connections that 
add up to the proposition being proved. Once a proposition is seen in the light of these logical 
propositions, there is a sense in which the proposition has changed in character. It is like leaming new 
information about a person, infonnation that in a way changes the identity of the person for us. For 
example, say \ve come to know A as the husband of so-and-so. Later we come to know B as the local 
practitioner. But we don't know that A is B. Later we come to know that A is B. In this case it is not 
just that we come to know more information about A, the husband of so-an-so, but that we have 
established that the person whom we knew under the description of the local practitioner is in fact the 
husband of so-and-so. We then see A in a new light after we know the additional information. The 
analogy is of course of limited value in this case it serves to illustrate how new information can alter 
or expand the identity of something how something can come to be seen in a new light. 
\Vittgenstein's account of the source of necessity of analytic propositions and logical inferences used in 
proof using logic (petrifaction) as well as his account of the proof in logic paints a picture of how he 
scm grm:vth in language. In the case of the adoption of a definition, his view is that what may once have 











using logic he maintains that the necessary status of the inference from premises to conclusion is an 
achie\'ed status: \ye have not ahvays regarded the inference as unassailable. But in the case of proof in 
logic there is a double whammy: the proven proposition not only has a new status and in this way adds 
to our store of concepts, but the proven proposition also undergoes a change in character. Once a 
proposition has been proved we know something different or more about it than before it was proved. It 
undergoes a change in epistemic character as well as in content. In the case of petrifaction of 
propositions, the birth of a new concept comes about when a connection between specific contingent 
properties is forged and treated as necessary. In the case of proof, the birth of a new concept comes 
about when connections are forged between logical structures. In both cases a contingent proposition is 
withdrawn from the stock of hypotheses and 'placed under the aegis of stipulation'?O 
The explanation of the grmvth of language in terms of proof using logic and proof in logic is, however, 
somewhat paradoxical. The trouble is that we say that we are constructing a proof for proposition x, 
and when we have in fact established the proof, we have a proof of not proposition x, but proposition 
x-'-n a new proposition. Thus we set off to provide a proof for x, but we end up having produced a 
proof for x+-n. The question that arises is: Have we then provided a proof for x'? In Remarks 011 the 
FOllndations o/'Mathelllatics VI.l6 Wittgenstein's discussion of a mathematical example shows up this 
paradox clearly. These comments also apply to proof in logic. He says: 
Thus the truth of the proposition, "4+1 =5", is, so to speak, over-determined. Over-
determined by this, that the result of the operation is defined to be the criterion that this 
operation has been carried out. 
The proposition rests on one too many feet to be an empirical proposition. It will be 
used as a determination of the concept "applying the operation +1 to 4. For we now 
have a new way of judging whether someone has followed a rule." 
Hence 4+1 =5 is now itself a rule by which we judge proceedings. The rule-grounding 
proceeding is the proof of the rule. 21 
The point here is that proving a proposition alters its sense. 
Now how about this - ought I to say that the same sense can only have one 











Of course some people would oppose this and say: "Then the proof of a 
proposition cannot ever be found, for, if it has been found, it is no longer the 
proof of this proposition." But to say this is so far to say nothing at al1. 22 
It is clear from this that proof in logic is completely different to the proof of a contingent proposition. 
In the case of the latter. you prove that something is the case, and the underlying assumption is that 
there is a fact of the matter. So when you prove that something is the case, you have simply found 
evidence that things are in fact thus and so a state of affairs that would have obtained whether or not 
you ascertained it. With proof in logic, what you have concluded was not the case without the proof. 
The proof creates. in a manner of speaking, the conclusion. The conclusion did not have an existence 
before the proof. 
Whether or not this account of necessity is adequate depends on whether it meets several criteria. The 
Platonist account was an attempt to explain the compUlsion of logical inference by appealing to 
external factors that compel us to reason in a certain way. Because these factors were external to, and 
independent of how we happen to act. it secured the objectivity of logic. Logical inference is not 
capricious. Any account that withdraws access to such external resources faces the challenge of 
explaining \\'hat secures the objectivity of logic. A conventionalist account faces this challenge square 
in the face because it appeals to resources that seem, by their very nature, to undermine the requisite 
objectivity. Wittgenstein's conventionalism has been criticized as falling short of these two criteria. On 
the one hand the complaint is that his account does not adequately accommodate the compulsion that 
\\c feel when draVv'ing a logical inference. Secondly, his explanation is seen as compromising the 
objccti\ity of the validity of an inference. The first of these criticisms takes issue with his account of 
drawing the conclusion of a valid argument from accepted premises. 
"But am I not compelled, then, to go the way I do in a chain of inferences?" 
Compelled? After all, I can presumably do as I choose! - But if you want to remain in 
accord with the rules, you must go this way" 
Not at all, I call this accord. - "Then you have changed the meaning of the word 
'accord' or the meaning of the rule". - No. Who says what "change" and "meaning the 











However many rules you give me, I give a rule which justifies my employment of 
your rules.23 
What seems to arrest commentators is Wittgenstein's remark that one is not compelled to reason in a 
particular way, and that one can go on as one chooses. The worry is understandable. Moving from a set 
of premises to a conclusion in a valid argument seems like something that should not be up to us. It 
seems that there should be reasons that take control of us which give us no choice. We should not be 
ab Ie to . do as we choose'. But the worry may start to be alleviated if we backtrack a bit In the earlier 
discussion on linguistic regularity in PI 20 I the point was made that no course of action could be 
determined by a rule because every course of action could be made out to accord with the rule. What 
this \\as supposed to show is that there is a way of following a rule that is not an interpretation, but can 
only be described in terms of behaviour such as going with or against the rule. The historical context of 
this discussion is the Vienna circle's preoccupation with definitions as the full explanation of the 
meaning of a word. Wittgenstein's remarks are meant to show that any verbal explanation of a word 
would always leave its meaning hanging in the air the words in the definition of an explanation could 
always be taken in different ways, ad it{iillitullI. The gap between language and the world would only 
be bridged in the application of a word. So the focus is taken away from something outside our 
behaviour and placed squarely on us and our linguistic practices. Whatever 'must' there is in the 
application of a word comes from our practices. Hence Wittgenstein distaste for the term 'compelled' 
must be read as a criticism of the idea that anything external to and independent of us compels our 
linguistic practices. Man is the measure of all things. The discussion on the notion of technique in the 
application of general words to things is meant to clarify the sense in which man is the measure of all 
things. But it may not be suitable as part of a defense of his account of logical necessity. In the case of 
the application of general words to things, the problem was that we needed an explanation of what 
guides or determines the way a series is supposed to be continued, where past applications would not 
completely determine how the series should be continued. The notion of technique is meant to explain 
how we use language to get a grip on the world. In the case of necessity, the problem is not one of the 
relation between language and the world, but the relation between two techniques, where the relation 
bet\\een language and the world in the two cases has already been established. With reference to the 
text quoted above, where Wittgenstein makes the astonishing remark that in logical inference one can 











It is true that anything can be justified. 24 
A bit later remarks: 
But the phenomenon of language is based on agreement in action. 25 
And then he says: 
And: 
We say that, in order to communicate, people must agree with one another about the 
meanings of words. But the criterion of this agreement is not just agreement with 
reference to definition - e.g. ostensive definitions - but also agreement in judgments. 
It is essential for communication that we agree in a large number of judgments.26 
If language is to be a means of communication, there must be agreement not only in 
definitions, but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish 
logic, but does not do so. - It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and 
another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call measuring is 
partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurements. (PI 242) 
These two paragraphs clearly indicate a peculiar feature of Wittgenstein's position. It appears that his 
comcntionalism is characterized by two aspects. "It is true that anything can be justified" marks a 
voluntarism aspect: 'The phenomenon of language is based on agreement in action" marks his 
cOl1\cntionalism. Failure to recognize that his conventionalism is characterized by these two phases 
\\il1 produce a caricatured version of his account. For instance, Dummett, in his Wittgenstein's 
Philosophl' ol/vfathemQlics:;7 represents Wittgenstein as what he calls a 'full-blooded conventionalist'. 
According to full-blooded conventionalism all necessary propositions are the direct expressions of 
linguistic conventions. The necessity of a particular statement derives from our having expressly 
decided to treat that statement as unassailable. Contrasted with this is moderate conventionalism 
according to which all necessary truths derive either immediately or remotely from linguistic 











'vVittgenstein unacceptable. He argues that it~ given the axioms and rules of inference in a proof in 
logic. 'vve could still have an option in the conclusion we draw, our adoption of necessary propositions 
would be entirely capricious. Dummett's point is that the axioms and rules of inference should 
determine. entirely independently of us, what conclusion must be drawn. It is at this point that it helps 
to see that Wittgenstein's conventionalism has two phases. The voluntarism aspect seems to be directed 
at a specific audience i.e. realists. In this phase, where Wittgenstein suggests that we have an option in 
the conclusion we draw (both in proof using logic and proof in logic), the idea is to shock the reader 
into recognizing that realism is not an option. When he says that we have an option in the conclusion 
we draw. he means to reject the idea that there is an independent set of necessities which takes us by 
the throat. as it were, and forces us along a particular path. In adjudicating between the different 
interpretations of Wittgenstein's account, it is always important to bear in mind why Wittgenstein 
rejected realism. The shortcoming of realism was that it was not a genuine explanation. It promises an 
explanation, but then does not deliver any goods at all. What it appeals to as an explanation is not 
independently identifiable. However, just because the features appealed to in this case is not 
independently identifiable, it does not mean that we cannot identify any features that can explain 
necessity. What we need is an account that preserves the objectivity of logic and so does not make 
logic a matter of caprice, but which does not appeal to factors that are not independently identifiable. It 
cannot be a theory which posits a correspondence with something independently necessary, so another 
kind of story altogether must be told. Dummett does not emphasize the reason Wittgenstein is 
discontent with realism and so takes Wittgenstein as allergic to the idea that an}' features can 
determine, completely or incompletely, what we hold as necessary. He thus looks right past phase two 
of 'vVittgenstein's conventionalism, where Wittgenstein discusses the ingredients of an account which 
acknowledges necessity and attempts to explain it in terms of contingent independently identifiable 
nlctors. 
The point was made earlier that Wittgenstein's conventionalism is characterized by the fact that people 
agree in their applications of words to things. However, the criterion of this agreement the way we 
ascertain that people are applying words in the same way as others do, is that the community share a 
\\hole lot of other agreements in judgments. For two people may overtly be doing 'the same thing', but 
the criterion for whether their application counts as the same must be sought further out whether they 











240. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question 
whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don't come to blows over it, for 
example. That is part of the framework on which the working of our language is based 
(for example, in giving descriptions). 
241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is 
false?" - It is what human beings say that is true or false; and they agree in the 
language that they use. That is not agreement is opinions but in form of life. 
(PI 240-1) 
There is no caprice in what we actually do, since what we actually do is a function of various other 
t~lctors which govern our behaviour tacts about our natural dispositions (that we look in the direction 
of an arrmv and not the other way, for example), our need for communication which brings about a 
homogeneity in the way we lise words, the constraints of ollr environment (that objects do not appear 
and disappear randomly, for instance), ollr desire for descriptions that are simple, coherent, and can be 
Llsed without mfinite complexity. The requirement for objectivity is so as to preserve the distinction 
between what we happen to do or choose to do, and what we have to do. Wittgenstein' s 
conventionalism is an attempt at providing an account that accommodates this. It is an account that 
does not appeal to transcendental factors that are not investigation-independent; it appeals to facts in 
the world. but does not model a theory of correspondence of the form appealed to in some theories of 
truth. Rather, it appeals to facts. and so leaves the field open to a scientific explanation. These remarks 
seem only to bear on the application of words to things. Our concern here is the problem of connecting 
t\\O applications. What determines that two concepts are related in a way such that given the one 
another particular concept should follow? For example, given (if p then q) and (if q then r). one should 
conclude that p implies r. Or lIlodus tollens: given that p implies q and that q is not the case, we should 
conclude that p is not the case. Wittgenstein's discussion of mathematics raises an analogous situation 
to the one of logical inference and can be helpful in understanding the sought-after ingredient. He asks: 
Could there be mathematics without agreement on the part of calculators? 
Could there be only one human being who calculated? 
Could there be only one who followed a rule? 
Are these questions, say, like this one: 











Performing mathematical inferences requires that people agree in the judgments as to what counts as a 
correct inference. The rest of the questions that follow in the above passage indicate the direction of the 
point Wittgenstein is trying to make - namely, that mathematical inferences require agreement on the 
part of calculators. Both in the case of logical inference and the application of general words to things, 
in so far as they are used as tools for communication, there has to be agreement between language-
lIsers as to the extension of a general word and, in the case of logical inference, as to which inferences 
becomes part of the stock of our conceptual apparatus. 
If Wittgenstein's conventionalism is plausible, then it opens the way to the plausibility of alternative 
systems of thought. It has been complained that Wittgenstein's examples of such alternative systems 
are thin and unconvincing, and that this casts some doubt on the reasonableness of his views. We saw 
that Michael Dummett28 accused Wittgenstein of what he called 'full-blooded' conventionalism. 
Dummett's complaint is that Wittgenstein says of the conclusion of an argument that one is free to 
accept or reject the conclusion, the implication being that there is nothing in the formulation of the 
axioms and rules of inference and nothing in our minds at the time when we accepted these axioms and 
rules which beforehand shows whether we would accept the proof or not, and that this shows that there 
is nothing vvhich forces us to accept the conclusion. It is only Ollr acceptance of the conclusion that 
con tel'S necessity on the theorem thus proved. Conferring necessity involves our 'putting the 
proposition in the archives' and counting nothing as recalcitrant to it. So doing, we make a new 
decision. and are not merely making explicit the implication of what was implicitly acknowledged or 
acquiesced to in the body of the argument. In this full-blooded conventionalism, Dummett maintains, 
\\c make up our minds about the conclusion quite independently of anything in the body of the 
argument the axioms and rules of inference. Nothing forces us we are making a decision 
capriciously. In the discussions above it has been argued that our coming to accept a principle of 
inference or a logical proposition is not capriciolls. There are many contingent facts that lead to a 
pattern of inference or a proposition's being accepted as inexorable. That Wittgenstein maintains that 
\\e are free to accept or reject the conclusion of a proof is a reaction against the realist idea that there is 
some external force that 'force-guides' us from premises to conclusion. But, just because 
\Vittgenstein's reacts against this it does not imply that we draw conclusions capriciously. All this has 
been discllssed above. Dummett goes on to complain that we cannot conceive of a situation where 











understood the rules of inference and the axioms. He says because Wittgenstein's examples are thin 
and unconvincing it underscores his complaint that something is wrong with Wittgenstein's account 
We cannot, according to Dummett, come up with cases that count as an alternative logic to ours own. 
Barry Stroud29 thinks that Dummett's worries about an alternative logic can be alleviated by 
recognizing the following: Wittgenstein maintains that it is essential to inferring, calculating, counting 
and so on, that not just any result would be allowed as correct. If people inferred any way they liked (or 
continued the series any which way), then "we shan't call it 'continuing the series' and also presumably 
not . inference' .,,30 So, although there is no external influence forcing us in a particular way 
('Presumably I can go whichever way I like'), there is an internal influence - general agreement 
amongst people as to the correct results of calculations or inferences as well as a general agreement in 
the results of one' s own calculations at different times are imperative for there to be such a thing as 
calculating or inferring at aU .. <1 A calculation is thus different to an experiment, where with 
experiments one can. at different times and places, obtain different results. In the case of logical 
inference, Wittgenstein says: 
The steps which are not brought in question are logical inferences. But the reason why 
they are not brought in question is not that they "certainly correspond to the truth" - or 
something of the sort no, it is just this that is called "thinking," "speaking," "inferring," 
"arguing".32 
The passage above may suggest that Wittgenstein is making the standard claim that the source of all 
necessity lies in definitions or the meaning of \vords - i.e. standard conventionalism. This, Stroud 
argues. is not Wittgenstein' s position. Stroud explores what, according to W, the source of necessity is 
by examining why it is impossible to come up with and tmly understand a putative alternative logical 
system. Wittgenstein' s examples of the deviant studene:l or the woodcutters who sell wood in a way 
different to us3" initially seem intelligible. but this is only so because they are examples that are 
sc\erely isolated or restricted. We think we are able to understand them and we think they present 
genuine alheit unsophisticated and uncomplicated alternatives only because the further-reaching 
consequences of calculating, counting and so on in these deviant ways have not been explicitly brought 
out. The attempt to put oneself in the shoes of one of these deviant people and get a clearer 
understanding of what it would be like to be one of them would inevitably involve the progressive 











more we successfully manage to situate ourselves in the world of these deviant people, the less ground 
we have left for finding them intelligible. In other words, we cannot both be one of them and find them 
intelligible, since our flnding them intelligible rests ultimately on our being one of us. We cannot be 
aile of them and still find them intelligible on our own terms, or by our own lights. However, this does 
not mean that we do not understand them because they are contradictory or meaningless, or because 
their putative behaviour is logically impossible. So despite suggestions that Wittgenstein is endorsing a 
standard conventionalism which entails that certain activities count as calculating or measuring as a 
matter of definition (it is just this that is called 'thinking," speaking," "interring," 'arguing,,)J5, his view 
imohes considerations broader than just the alternative (or deviant) activities he describes. The 
necessity does not derive from the fact that we just call so and so such and sllch (stipulations or 
defInitions), but from the fact that we all happen to go on in a certain way (obtain the same results). It s 
not that we agree on definitions but that there is a consensus of action - we all happen to, given the 
same training, go on in the same \-vay. And the way we happen to go on is part of a larger picture of 
other activities that we happen to engage in. Anyone kind of activity has its home in the web of other 
activities and beliefs - it is woven into these other practices and beliefs that are peculiar to us. Thus the 
consideration of an alte111ative practice involves the consideration of practices and beliefs which form 
the setting in which the activity under consideration is a part. One cannot understand isolated extreme 
eccentricities. Stroud argues that what all this can be taken to show is that since we can acknowledge 
the contingency of our practices, we can acknowledge that there can be different ways of calculating, 
measuring, inferring and so on, although we may not be able to understand what these alte111ative ways 
of thinking may have been or what they amount or come to. Our particular activities are embedded in a 
wider form of life, and, as Pears36 says, it would be asking too much to expect Wittgenstein to construct 
systems of thought which are as complete and useful as our inherited system which has evolved over 
time. Note though that Stroud's point is stronger than the one Pears makes. Both would acknowledge 
that any particular practice is embedded in a larger web which has a history, but all Pears is saying is 
that \ve cannot expect Wittgenstein to situate his examples of alternative practices in a web as complete 
and articulated as ours such a web is massive and has evolved over time. Stroud's point, however, is 
that the more we are able to buy into this alternative system - the more we are able to become natives 
in this system the less we are able to, by our own standards, regard alternative systems as intelligible. 
We \\ould then be more of 'them' and less of 'us'. Understanding is about belonging to a system. But 
perhaps Stroud is being too extreme here. It certainly seems the case that practices make sense in the 











up being one of us, in order to understand practices alternative to our own. Ancient Greek represents a 
mindset radically different to our own, but we are able, with some effort, to study and understand them. 
It docs not require that we give up modern civilization. That Wittgenstein's examples are thin, then, 
may not be, as Stroud suggests, because we cannot intelligibly set up alternative systems to our own, 
but may be simply that, as Pears suggests, a hugely elaborate task, one that could be embarked upon, 
but perhaps in another project. Thomas Kuhn's discussions of different scientific paradigms seem to 
indicate that we can entertain different systems of scientific thought (albeit not, according to Kuhn, a 
matter of rationality that we move from the one to the other); however, these different systems of 
scientific thought do not seem to be accompanied by far-reaching alterations in general thinking. The 
alternative geometries (for example, the Riemannian geometry developed in response to the 
descriptions of the world derived from Einstein's theory of relativity) is another such example. 
Ne\'ertheless, we have not yet come up with alternative logics (a system where the principle of the 
excluded middle, or the principle of non-contradiction does not hold, for example) and it is not clear 
that \\e could come up \vith sllch alternatives. Perhaps Wittgenstein should have the last word on this: 
Then according to you everybody could continue the series as he likes; and so infer 
anyhow! In that case we shan't call it "continuing the series" and presumably not 
"inference". And thinking and inferring (like counting) is, of course, bounded for us, not 
by an arbitrary definition, but by the natural limits corresponding to the body of what 
can be called the role of thinking in our lives. 
For we are at one over this, that the laws of inference do not compel him to say or to 
write such and such like rails compelling a locomotive. And if you say that, while he 
may indeed say it, still he can't think it, then I am only saying that that means, not; try 
as he may he can't think it, but: it is for us an essential part of thinking that - in talking, 
writing, etc. - he makes this sort of transition. And I say further that the line between 
what we include in 'thinking' is no more a hard and fast one than the line between what 
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Chapter 6: Philosophical Method in the PI 
In the TLP Wittgenstein had offered a theory of propositional meaning, a project which, no doubt 
captivating, went quite against the de jure account of the role and method of philosophical discourse 
advocated in that book. In the TLP he advocated that the aim of philosophy is the logical clarification 
of thoughts and that philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity that does not result in 
philosophical propositions but rather in the clarlfication of propositions. He goes on to say that the job 
of philosophy is to set limits to what can be thought and hence to settle controversies about the limits of 
natural science. (TLP 4.112-5). However, despite his admonishing remarks about philosophy that were 
directed against the tradition of philosophy followed by his contemporaries and predecessors, the TLP 
still forms part of the metaphysical tradition Wittgenstein wanted to distance himself from. Throughout 
his philosophical career. however, he remained wedded to the idea that the problems of philosophy are 
not bOlla .tide problems, but result from misunderstanding of the logic of our language. They are really 
misuses of language in the guise of factual discourse. The way to approach these problems according to 
this view is not to take them at face-value but to expose them for what they are and so do away with 
them. This is achieved by equipping ourselves with the logic of language so we can clearly see that 
they do not constitute legitimate uses of language. The TLP maintained that this logic of language was 
something that lay beneath the surface structure of everyday language and had to be excavated by 
logical analysis. Wittgenstein's task was to lay bare the essential structure of language. He tackled the 
matter by producing an account of the essential function of language (the Picture Theory), and the 
essential structure of language (atomism and the truth-functional account of language). From this he 
presented us with the most general form of the proposition a form that is common to, and underlies 
all diverse factual expression. Armed with this we are in position to perform a litmus test on any 
proposition - we can test whether it does or does not, on analysis, bear the structural hallmark of a 
legitimate proposition. We are now in a position to, Wittgenstein would have us believe, separate the 
wheat from the fodder. By the time he wrote the PI he had of course abandoned nearly everything 
\vhich belonged to the former picture of language - the idea that the world had an essential structure 
\\hich language reflected, that propositions ultimately describe the world. that both language and the 
\vorld are atomistically structured, that the end-product of analyses are simple names which designate 
SImple objects. However significant these realizations were, they do not represent the watershed change 
111 Wittgenstein's approach to doing philosophy. The characteristic feature he believed the PI displayed 











the particular theory of language in the TLP was not replaced with another go at a theory in the PI. The 
conviction behind this, which incidentally is a conviction maintained in the TLP as well, is that a theory 
of language is not possible because we can only give an account of language from the inside - outside 
there is nothing, outside you cannot breathe. This is a captivating metaphor - presenting an idea similar 
to the idea of the all-pervasiveness of space. Everything happens in space - there is nothing outside 
space - there can be no talk of 'outside' space. In a letter written to the newspaper editor of the Times 
at thc time Einstein's theory of the curvature of space had been publicised, the reader asked: 'curved in 
what'?' This is a revealing question, showing how difficult it is to grasp the idea that there can be no 
ta Ik of' outside space'. In the later work Wittgenstein presents an argument that is really the meat of the 
metaphor: We have no independent access to the putative external items that the realist solicits as 
validation for the meaningfulness of our language. This is not due to an epistemic handicap on our part; 
the point is a logical one. Any theory which appeals to language-independent items is an empty one 
we cannot refer to such putative items except by using the very language that the theory is meant to 
explain. We have no independent standpoint from which to refer to these alleged language-independent 
items. The motivation behind such quasi-explanations is the desire to model philosophical explanations 
on scientific explanations. Hmvever, in typical scientific explanations the explanation can be identified 
independently of what is to be explained, unlike with philosophical explanations. If we cannot explain 
the meaningfulness oflanguage in this way, what is left for us to do? Wittgenstein advises that we must 
do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place. 
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any 
possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that contrary to our preconceived ideas, it 
is possible to think such-and such' - whatever that may mean. (The conception of 
thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There 
must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all 
explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its 
light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are of course 
not empirical problems; they are solved rather, by looking into the workings of our 
language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise those workings: in despite 
of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by reporting new 
experience, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle 











The obvious question to raise here is: what kind of philosophical contribution would descriptions make, 
or rather, what do descriptions have to do with his project of drawing the limits of language? In the 
earlier work he claimed that underneath the diversity of language there is a single unifying structure -
its essence. He later realised that this idea was simply a preconception about language. He repudiated 
this view in the TLP calling it a preconceived requirement, rather than the result of actually examining 
language, a requirement that distorted the form his earlier project took. 
We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I 
imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another. - But what 
becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here. - But in that case 
doesn't logic altogether disappear? - For how can it lose its rigour? Of course not by 
our bargaining any of its rigour out of it. The preconceived idea of crystalline purity 
can only be removed by turning our whole examination around. (One might say: the 
axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our 
real need.) 
The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the sense in 
which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say e.g. 'Here is a Chinese 
sentence", or "No, that only looks like writing: it is actually just an ornament" and so on. 
We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about 
some non-spatial, non-temporal chimera [Note in margin: Only it is possible to be 
interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways], But we talk about it as we do about 
the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their 
physical properties. 
The question "What is a word really? Is analogous to "What is a piece in chess? (PI 
108) 
In the first part of PI 108 Wittgenstein challenges the idea that he held in the TLP - that the 
(unassailable) character of logic is only preserved by its possessing a 'crystalline purity' a timeless 
independent and definite stmcture that is located in some platonic hinterland. The PI claims that this 











turn our attention to the other direction ~ imvards and look at our actual practices. We must rotate our 
axis of reference around the fixed point of our real need. By looking at our actual practices we will see 
the grammar of our language. It was not just a mistake to assume that logic has a crystalline purity (a 
preconceived idea). it was also a mistake to assume that what we are examining is something non-
spatial and non-temporal (a chimera). The real subject matter of our examination is language-in-lise. 
Thc TLP maintained that the meaning of a word was the object it picked out, objects have an 
independent logical fom1. and once a name is correlated with an object, it picks up its logical form. and 
this then determines the way a name can be combined ~ the logical fom1 of the object determines the 
meaning of the name. The new idea is that asking for the meaning of a word is asking for the use we 
make of that word. "The meaning of a word is its use in the language." (PI 43) and "The question 
"What is a word really" is analogous to "What is a piece in chessT 
Rather than regarding the diverse forms of language as superficial differences united at a lower level by 
a common stmcture. he now came to see them as manifestations of the bona fide diversity within 
language. The diverse forms of proposition did not hide or camouflage something else underneath. The 
diversity \ve see is what is in fact the case - language has diverse uses. In the Blue Book he pins the 
source of this preconception down to the TLP's 'misguided craving for generality' which generated a 
'contemptuous attitude toward the particular,.1 But doing away with this craving for generality and 
respecting the particular case in its own right did not mean that Wittgenstein was now no longer 
concemed with the essence of language. In the TLP he had thought of language as an independent 
mechanism the basic niles of which are already written into it, so to speak, and which only required 
that we feed the mechanism with particulars and the mechanism chums out the result. In the PI he 
came to see language as the product of human activity. This is reflected in the way he talks about his 
subject of investigation in the PI. In the TLP he was absorbed with the issue of the stmcture and 
function of the propositioll, in the PI he asks questions or makes statements about whether particular 
acti,'ities count as language (or. in the terminology in the PI) as 'following a mle', for example, he 
talks of 'regular connection between what people say and their actions', he says understanding a 
language involves mastering a recllllhjue, and that grasping a nile is exhibited in 'obeying the mle or 
against it in actual cases'. obeying a rule is a practice. and he asks whether obeying a nile is 











He introduces new technical terms to talk about language. He articulates the notions of 'language' and 
'proposition' in terms of 'language-games'. He first uses the notion of a game and then later the notion 
of family-resemblance to illustrate that language does not have an essence in the Tractarian sense, hut 
that it is unified in a much loser way: first, he compares linguistic activities to a game. The point here is 
that just as games do not have a single common feature running through all of them in virtue of which 
they count as instantiations of the concept 'game" so too with language. Different games are related to 
each other by a complex network of similarities (such as being goal-oriented etc.) that overlap and 
intersect each other, in much the same way in which members of a family resemble each other in a 
variety of different ways. With regard to language one cannot put forward an analytic definition 
specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for an expression to count as an instantiation of 
language, but you can point out how different expressions are related to each other and how these 
groups of related expressions are in tum related to other groups of related expressions. In PI 65 
Wittgenstein's interlocutor complains that although Wittgenstein has much to say about language-
games, he has failed to state precisely what a language-game is and has therefore failed to say what the 
essence of language is. Wittgenstein retOlts by acknowledging this complaint, but rejects the request for 
the essence of language on the grounds that language has no essence understood in the way the 
interlocutor asks for. In other words his acceptance of the interlocutor's charge is really a rejection of 
the interlocutor's underlying 'craving for generality'. 
It might be argued that the PI's notion of language-games plays pretty much the same logical role as 
the conceptualised notion of language in the TLP i.e. according to the TLP language is constituted by 
simple names arranged in logical form; the PI also imposes a conceptual structure on language by 
conceiving of language as a system of overlapping language-games. One way of responding to this is 
that the PI's talk of language games is not meant to be understood as an a priori necessary stmcture of 
language, but as a convenient working model of language \vhich derives from observing language-in-
use. so to speak. It's a way of talking about language that accords better with and affords a 'clear view 
of the aim and functioning of ... words· 2. In his discussion about the way in which games can be 
characterised Wittgenstein says: 
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 












resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, 
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the 
same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a family ..... (PI66-67). 
Our clear and simple-language-games are not preparatory studies for a future 
regimentation of language - as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-
resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are 
meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but 
also of dissimilarities. 
For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the 
model as what it is, as an object of comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not 
as preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. 
(The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.) (PI 129-130) 
The slogan which has come to characterise the philosophy of the later work: 'meaning is use' can give 
the impression that Wittgenstein has produced a new account of meaning specifying that the meanings 
of words consists in its use and that there is therefore something sacrosanct about the notion of 'use'. 
However. the new locutions of 'language-games' 'use', 'family-resemblance' do not constitute a 
systematic 'use theory of meaning'. Wittgenstein employs the notion of 'use' in an intentionally broad 
way since the uses of expressions are as disparate and various as the language-games in which they 
occur. Therefore no single formula can capture their variety. And he does not only confine himself to 
the word 'use'. He also talks of functions of words and sentences (PIlI, 17, 274, 556, 559), the aims 
and purposes of words and sentences (PI 5,6,8.348) and of their roles and employments (PI 66). These 
different locutions are meant to capture the general notion of the part an expression plays in language. 
Mastery of a language then consists in being able to employ expressions in the many different 
language-games in which they belong. 
The numerous dialectical discussions on the use of various expressions in language, and the 











are tied up with his project of drawing the limits of language, and (ii) what these descriptions 
have to do with the classical problems of philosophy. These questions can be answered 
simultaneously. In the both the TLP and the PI Wittgenstein claims, and quite rightly so, it 
seems, that language has a surface structure and a grammatical structure. In the TLP this 
grammatical structure was camouflaged and had to be excavated, in the PI he says that the 
grammatical structure can be obtained by commanding a clear view, a surview, of the uses of 
language and the interconnections between (segments of) language. As Hacker puts it: the TLP 
sought to achieve a correct logical point of view by 'geological means', Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy seeks a correct logical point of view by 'topographical means'. 3 
Consider the geography of a country for which we have no map, or else a map in tiny 
bits. The difficulty about this is the difficulty with philosophy; there is no synoptic view. 
Here the country we talk about is lal1guage and the geography grammar. We can walk 
about a country quite well but when forced to make a map we go wrong.4 
The heir to the TLP's notion of 'the correct logical point of view' of language is this idea of a 'surview' 
of language. The surview consists of all the applications, logical connections, illustrations, and 
conceptions of a segment of language. The main source of misunderstandings characteristic of 
philosophy is the difficulty in surveying our use of language: 
A main source of the failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of 
the uses of our words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A 
perspicuous understanding produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing 
connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. 
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. 
It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 
'Weltanschauung'?)(PI 122) 
This perspicuous representation of language is a kind of synopsis, or can perhaps be describes as a 











are perspicuous, we have a clear understanding of the limits of sense and are in a position to see when 
the rules for the use of expressions have been violated. To say that we do not have a surview of 
language is not to say that we do not hmv to use language. As competent speakers there is a 
straightforward sense in which we know the rules for the use of our language. We can often correct 
both our own and the mistakes of others, and can explain the rules which we follow in our use of 
expressions. What we lack. however, is the view of the logical interconnections between different 
segments of our language. For example, we may know how to use verbs of perception and verbs of 
sensation (and their corresponding nouns), yet we may be unaware of the different ways in which they 
are used. We can thus be mislead to accept talk of 'visual sensations' that are supposedly caused by 
objects that we see, or that sensations are just 'the firing of c-fibres' in our brain. We may know how to 
use number-words, yet we may take at face-value the claim of the philosopher of mathematics that 
number-words are the names of numbers and that numbers are objects, for example. Although we are 
able to talk perfectly well of tables and chairs (and treat them as objects), and we are quite able to use 
numerals and apply arithmetical techniques, we are quite unaware of the differences in the way we talk 
of chairs, on the one hand, and the way we talk of numbers. So, for example, we may be gulled into 
talking about numbers in the way we talk about chairs: chairs exist just as numbers exist, and so we can 
ask questions about (the existence ot) numbers in the same way that we can ask questions about the 
existence of chairs. Another example: we can talk perfectly well about mental states such as patience or 
determination, and we can talk equally well about marbles and stones. Yet we may not be aware that 
the way we talk about them is quite different. We can lend marbles, sell them, diminish or increase our 
supplies etc. We can clearly not speak of mental states in the same way. However, because we lack a 
perspicuous representation of the interconnections and differences between these different kinds of 
uses. we can be taken in by the philosopher's talk of 'whether I can have access to your pains', for 
example, or \vhere your pain was before you had it. 
Wittgenstein talks about this susceptibility to linguistic confusions in terms of an 'urge', on our part, to 
misunderstand language. in The Blue Book as a 'craving' for generality. He also uses pathological 
terms such as philosophy being a 'disease of the intellect', something we are inflicted with, and 
language having 'bewitched' us. 











The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. (PI 255). 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our 
language. (PI 109) 
Bewitchment is a very strong term. It suggests not merely that the philosopher is on the wrong track (as 
man who mistakenly walks North to go from Oxford to London), but that we are unreasonably or 
irrationally convinced that we are on the right path. Given this drastic diagnosis, equally drastic 
measures to undo this are called for. We cannot simply tap the misled person on the shoulder and 
infon11 him that he has made a mistake and then re-direct him. The cure for this disease of the intellect 
is. according to W. )'ia a kind of psychotherapy. The philosopher-as-psychoanalyst has the task of 
bringing latent or suppressed nonsense (linguistic confusions mistaken for metaphysical problems) into 
the clear light of day. 
My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that 
is patent nonsense. (PI 464) 
In ordinary psychotherapy it is usually the patient himself who recognises that he has some sort of 
problem and needs help -- failing which the whole therapy may not take place. Typically, however, the 
philosopher does not think that there is a problem with him, but that he is dealing with something that 
is, by its very nature, profound and seemingly intractable. In Wittgenstein's own case it is very likely 
that that he thought he needed help. Philosophical problems genuinely tormented him, and he sought a 
solution that would give him peace. It is hard not to take the following paragraph as an unselfconscious 
auto-biographical note. 
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy 
when I want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring itself in question ..... There is not a philosophical 
method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (PI 133) 
This not to suggest that Wittgenstein advocated the psychoanalytic method because he may, at some 











(and perhaps other) turmoils made the metaphor of psychoanalysis all the more attractive to him. While 
philosophers typically seek an answer to philosophical conundrums, Wittgenstein wanted to be healed. 
However, given what Wittgenstein thought what was wrong with philosophy, the psychoanalytic 
method, quite independently of Wittgenstein's own experience of philosophical problems, is 
illuminating. The philosopher-as-analyst has to, together with the patient, try to understand the exact 
contours of the conflict in the patient's mind. It is only once the afflicted recognises it as the correct 
expression of his particular problem that the first step towards the realization that the boundaries of 
sense has been transgressed.s 
It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a 
mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a 
clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the 
contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is side-stepping a 
difficulty.) (PII2S). 
The philosopher thus alms to gIve the patient an insight into his own understanding and 
misunderstanding. It is once the patient has recognised the contours of his problem (when latent 
nonsense has been made patent), that the surview becomes useful. The analyst can now point out the 
actual interconnections between segments of our language and show the patient how he has deviated. 
The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose. 
(PI 127). 
A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 
'seeing connexions. (PI 122). 
The interesting question is: why could \ve not simply flash the surview of a section of language under 
consideration to the philosophically misled person - why the psychoanalysis? The answer was 
suggested earlier: the way Wittgenstein sees it, the patient is 'bewitched' mesmerized, and so will not 












A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and 
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. (P/115) 
A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false 
appearance, and this disquiets us. "But this isn't how it is!" - we say. "Yet this is how it 
has to be!" (PI 112) 
... One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, 
and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it. (PI 114) 
But this is not the only reason. Wittgenstein says that there is value in making such mistakes. 
The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense 
and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits 
of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery. (P/119) 
The discovery here, I take it, is the correct grammar supplied by the surview of a segment of language. 
Wittgenstein seems to give the impression that there is a difference between merely possessing a 
surview of a segment of language and being presented with the surview (or discovering the limits) after 
having made a mistake. He seems to suggest that there is a special value in seeing the correct answer 
(the correct grammar) when seen in the light of the kinds of mistakes that are (and could have been) 
made in its absence. He also says that philosophy should not merely try to terminate a disease of 
thought, for there is vallie ill the slow cure of the illlless.6 Again, he seems to suggest that there is 
intrinsic value in coming to recognise that a mistake has been made. It is plausible to think that 
Wittgenstein believed that when the misled person recognises the contours of his mistake he can better 
appreciate the solution, or rather, the correct path. What though, if we had a commanding view of a 
segment of our language to start off with? We would then not be tempted to make the kinds of mistakes 
we otherwise make in its absence. But Wittgenstein gives the impression that access to the surview is 
some how more valuable after the mistakes have been made. One way of making sense of this is to see 











many segments of our language, we \vould never be immune to linguistic confusions since, as Hacker! 
suggests, although a perspicuous representation may be illuminating for a given generation and prevent 
philosophical conundrums, advances in both knowledge and culture bring new and hitherto 
unencountered paradigms that capture our imaginations. Darwinism, Marxism, Freudian psychology, 
mathematical logic, computer science and artificial intelligence all breed new mythologies that distort 
our understanding in new ways. Philosophy will thus have to go over the ground afresh. The task of 
philosophy, like that of the psychotherapist, is thus never over. 
But the question remains, why is possession of a surview of a segment of language more significant 
after a mistake than before? Why can we only have understanding after a close encounter with 
misunderstanding? This is like saying that one cannot achieve virtue without first having overcome the 
temptation of vice. The point to see here is that Wittgenstein's argument is not that we cannot 
appreciate the tine distinctions and interconnections between language uses unless we have first been 
taken in by the charm of a misunderstanding, for surely we are able to appreciate these interconnections 
on their own. However, appreciating these distinctions do not amount to an appreciation of the limits of 
language. You only know what counts as an illegitimate use of language when you know the boundary 
between a correct and incorrect use of language. You have to know that using an expression in a certain 
way' marks the cut-off point- marks the departure from sense. In a way this is like the argument 
that goodness cannot be appreciated as goodness unless you know what (counts as) badness or evil. 
Appreciating the customary uses of language as sense (as belonging to the one side of the line dividing 
legitimate and illegitimate uses of a word) necessarily involves knowing what counts as crossing the 
boundaries. Giving descriptions of actual uses is one thing, but drawing the boundaries of sense must 
involve the oscillation between sense and nonsense. We have to allow ourselves to attempt to cross the 
limits, and it is only once we have felt that we are in no-mans land (language has gone on holiday) -
that we know the precise point at which the limits have been transgressed - that we know where the 
limit is. The limit thus must be discovered by first going past it, and then coming back to ordinary use. 
It is like attempting to sit on a fragile chair without knowing the exact point at which the chair will 
give. The only way we can discover this point is by having gone beyond it slightly and feeling the chair 
starting to give. What we feel at this point is the limit of the amount of pressure we can exert or apply. 
In the TLP Wittgenstein attempted to provide us with a formula or standard against which we can 
measure whether a proposition has sense. But this formula was built on a misconceived idea about 











vanous particular ways of using language is respected in their own right. Drawing the limits of 
language can thus not be done in one fell swoop but must be done piecemeal - the limits must be 
discovered for all the different uses of language. What this means is that a philosophy of language 
cannot be systematic. In his preface Wittgenstein describes his method in the PI as one that travels 
criss-cross over the landscape oflanguage drawing connections between various misuses of language 
(philosophical conundrums). and indicating the subtle interconnections between various uses of 
language. With the new method we cannot remain in our philosophers' armchair and construct a hold-
all theory of language. We have to go into the field, as it were, travel the high-ground of the various 
llses of language (most notably philosophical uses of language) and discover when we are no longer on 
the stable ground of sense. Although Wittgenstein did not advocate this method in so many words the 
abundant dialectical discussions between himself and an imaginary interlocutor demonstrates this. We 
see for example in the private language argument that Wittgenstein draws out, by means of a reductio 
argument. the fatal implication of mistaken uses of language: the private language argument shows that 
when we talk about our sensations in the way we do about objects we end up with an empty theory. It is 
an explanation that makes speaking about sensations and learning to use sensation words, impossible. 
The target of the private language argument is the mistaken assumption that our learning to use 
sensation-words is like our learning to use object-words: sensation-words refer to mental objects as 
object-words refer to physical objects. The arguments demonstrate that a putative language that refers 
to private inner sensations cannot be taught and cannot be learned; in fact it does not count as a 
language at all. The very idea is incoherent. The immediate playing field of this argument is the 
learning of sensation-words but its reverberations go far: it challenges for example the phenomenalist's 
idea that all our words refer to sense-data (mental representation of objects in the world); it challenges 
the Cartesian idea that the only indubitable knowledge one can have is knowledge about one's own 
existence (knowledge cut off from sensory causes or effects). The discovering-the-limits method is 
elegantly presented in this cluster of arguments. Wittgenstein constantly tests or plays out the 
implications of the philosophical (mis)uses of ordinary words and shows that such (mis)uses produce 
incoherent conclusions. 
By claiming that philosophical problems are in fact linguistic confusions Wittgenstein is not trivialising 











The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the 
character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the 
forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our 
language. --Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? 
(And that is what the depth of philosophy is.) 
This remark anticipates the criticism that Wittgenstein had, as he says in PI 118 - destroyed everything 
that is interesting, great and important: philosophy is not what we thought it was i.e. an investigation 
into the essential workings of reality. Philosophers, he tells us, are like flies in the fly-bottle, unable to 
find their \"lay out (PI 309). they are occupied by confusions that arise when language is like an engine 
idling (PI 132.) There is however. no real loss. What has been destroyed were 'houses of cards' 
anyway. But linguistic disquietudes. we are assured, are not trivial mistakes. It is not a trivial mistake 
to speak about sensations in the way we do about objects. Even if it is pointed out to us that we are 
struggling with a linguistic confusion (and not a metaphysical one), the struggle is nevertheless a hard 
one. It is a conceptual struggle, and conceptual struggles are extremely challenging - the best testimony 
to this being the PI itself 
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